CHALLENGES FACE IRISH PRIME MINISTER IN SECOND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000696

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL EI
SUBJECT: CHALLENGES FACE IRISH PRIME MINISTER IN SECOND

REFERENDUM ON LISBON TREATY

REF: A. USEU BRUSSELS 1892

B. DUBLIN 660

C. DUBLIN 653 AND PREVIOUS

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Classified By: Charge Robert Faucher; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

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Summary
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1. (C) Irish Prime Minister Brian Cowen has reached an
accord with the European Council whereby Ireland will hold a
second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty by the end of October
2009 in exchange for "legally binding guarantees" from the
European Council on matters of concern to the Irish
electorate. Work will now commence on drafting language to
formalize the guarantees. Initiatives to educate the Irish
public about the Treaty -- and the EU -- are in the works.
Formidable challenges remain. The Treaty document is no less
obtuse. The 'No' campaign is once again likely to be
well-funded and well-organized. Voter apathy will be a
problem. The political parties -- who dropped the ball in
June 2008 -- will again be in charge of the 'Yes' campaign.
The Irish electorate could reject the Treaty as a vote of no
confidence in the Cowen government, especially if the current
economic downturn persists. Cowen will need to be
politically astute and careful, less a second 'No' vote on
the Treaty severely compromise Ireland's role in the EU and
likely cause his weak governing coalition to collapse. End
summary.

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Cowen Strikes an Agreement
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2. (U) On December 12, Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach)
Brian Cowen announced that he had reached an accord with the
European Council to hold a second referendum on the Lisbon
Treaty by the end of October 2009 in exchange for the
European Council's agreement that every EU member state
(including, of course, Ireland) would retain a permanent EU
Commissioner and that "legally binding guarantees" would be
put in place to protect Irish neutrality, tax independence,
and family and ethical issues (read abortion) (Ref A). Cowen
told the Irish press that the European Council promises, if
satisfactorily put in place, were sufficient for him to
return to the Irish people for their approval of a "new"
Treaty package.

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Next Steps
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3. (C) On December 16, Helen Blake, Counselor, EU Division,
Department of Foreign Affairs, told POLOFF that finalization
of the accord with the European Council would take two
tracks. First, she said, the Irish Government, in
consultation with the Secretariat of the European Council,
would draft language to formalize the "legally binding
guarantees." Saying that the exact EU mechanism to legalize
the language had yet to be agreed, Blake noted that legal
measures would also be required within Ireland to codify the
guarantees. Blake predicted that this process would be
accomplished by late spring or early summer 2009.


4. (C) Commenting that the second referendum would occur
about the time of the end of the current European Commission
on October 31, 2009, Blake pointed out that there were legal
reasons why it was important for the EU to have clarity on
Ireland's position on the Treaty by October 31. If Ireland
does not ratify the Lisbon Treaty by or about that time, the
new European Commission would have to be convened under the
rules of the Nice Treaty, which would require a reduction in
the number of Commissioners, negating the key concession
Cowen just gained from his European partners that all EU
member states would retain a permanent Commissioner. Loss of
Ireland's Commission seat was a leading reason given by
voters for their "No" vote on the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008.



5. (C) The second track, Blake said, would be a public
government response to the late-November 2008 report of the
Oireachtas (Parliament) Sub-Committee on the Future of
Ireland in the EU. In recognition that the biggest single
factor identified in the defeat of the Treaty in June 2008
was that the voters did not understand it, the response to
the Oireachtas report, Blake stated, would be the start of a
widespread campaign to better educate the Irish electorate
about the Treaty -- and, indeed, about the EU itself. Blake
indicated that the government campaign would assume a very
low level of basic knowledge on the part of the electorate

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about the workings of the EU and the Treaty. The theory,
Blake said, was that the more the public learned about the EU
and the Treaty, the more likely they would be to vote in
favor of it. She indicated that the government would portray
the agreements Cowen reached in the European Council as
"copper-fastened" legal guarantees that the EU intended to
listen to the concerns of the Irish and that Irish interests
would be protected under the Treaty. Foreign Minister
Micheal Martin, Blake said, is particularly eager to get on
with the education campaign.


6. (C) Fianna Fail Advisor (and former Fianna Fail Director
of Research) Liam Cullen told POLOFF on December 17 that in
approaching the second referendum, Fianna Fail would seek to
build stronger relationships among all the parties supporting
the Treaty and would endeavor to set aside political
differences. There would be a greater effort by the party to
organize at the grassroots level to sell the Treaty and
mobilize voters, he said. He noted that the party's public
outreach would put greater emphasis on the important benefits
of EU membership, particularly in light of the current
worldwide economic difficulties.

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Comment: Cowen's Challenges
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7. (C) Cowen has neatly set the stage for a second
referendum -- an outcome that most political observers viewed
as inevitable. However, he will still face the same obtuse
document that caused so much confusion in June 2008 (and was
cited by 40 percent of the "No" voters as the primary reason
for their negative vote). It is probable that he will once
again stand against the same well-funded and well-organized
groups (led by Sinn Fein and Libertas) that defeated the
Treaty in June 2008. In the run-up to the October
referendum, the 'Yes' campaign will need to be much more
adept at communicating the benefits of the Treaty (and the
consequences of again rejecting it),rebutting the deliberate
distortions and inaccurate allegations that marked the 'No'
campaign in June (especially in the Libertas camp),and
overcoming the apathy of many Irish voters.


8. (C) Comment continued. Under Irish law, the government
will not be allowed to campaign. As in June 2008, the 'Yes'
campaign will be left to the political parties -- who have
already once dropped the ball, a fact that Cowen himself has
privately admitted. A successful 'Yes' campaign will require
a much more concerted effort by both the government parties
(Fianna Fail and the Greens) and opposition parties (Fine
Gael and Labor); Cowen cannot take the support of the
opposition parties for granted. Finally, the Irish
electorate (as they have done in past referendums) could
reject the Treaty as a vote of no confidence in the Cowen
government, especially if the economy doesn't rebound during
the next ten months. Cowen needs to be politically astute
and careful in coming months. A second 'No' vote on the
Treaty would severely compromise Ireland's role n the EU and
likely cause his governing coalitionto collapse.
FAUCHER