KOSOVO/CHAD HIGH ON IRISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000043

SIPDIS

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PARM KV EI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO/CHAD HIGH ON IRISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENDA

REF: A. DUBLIN 33

B. STATE 1087

C. 07 STATE 167308

Classified By: DCM Robert J. Faucher; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
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1. (C) During a meeting with visiting Office Director Kathy
Allegrone, Irish Foreign Affairs Political Director Rory
Montgomery stated that Ireland is likely to quickly recognize
a declaration of independence by Kosovo, though not without
misgivings. Montgomery reaffirmed Ireland's commitment to
the planned ESDP mission to Chad, but indicated it was very
unlikely that Ireland would make further military
contributions to the NATO force in Afghanistan. He noted
that Ireland is firmly committed to the Oslo Process, which
seeks to ban cluster munitions. End summary.

Kosovo
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2. (C) During her visit to Ireland January 18, EUR/WE Office
Director Kathy Allegrone met with Department of Foreign
Affairs Political Director Rory Montgomery, who was eager to
discuss the unfolding situation in Kosovo (Ref C).
Commenting that Kosovo was discussed for four hours at the
recent EU Political Directors' meeting in Ljubljana,
Montgomery noted that EU policy on Kosovo has gradually
coalesced. For example, he said, the EU consensus agreement
to push forward with the planned civilian European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) rule of law mission to Kosovo was a
decision that had exceeded his expectations, though he
admitted that the timing of the mission was not yet fully
agreed. (Note: Montgomery said that ten Irish police
officers have already applied for the ESDP mission. End
note.)


3. (C) Montgomery commented that he perceived five groupings
of EU member states on the Kosovo question. There are those
nations that have few doubts and unequivocally support
unilateral independence, including the French and British. A
second group -- the majority of EU member states including
Ireland -- are queasy about unilateral independence, but
recognize that there is no better alternative. (The Irish
Government, Montgomery said, sees no logical reason to oppose
Kosovo's independence.) Another group -- including Sweden
and the Netherlands -- have serious worries that insufficient
consultation has taken place and question the legal basis for
unilateral independence, but in the end they are likely to
support independence. (In the meantime, Montgomery noted,
this groups acts as a useful brake to slow down the process.)
A fourth group is distinctly nervous and unhappy about
unilateral independence, including Bulgaria, Romania and
Greece. Finally, Cyprus, totally opposed, is in a group of
its own.


4. (C) In reply to Allegrone's question about how Ireland
viewed UNSC resolution 1244 and whether this would affect
KFOR operations, Montgomery noted that the Irish Attorney
General had determined that resolution 1244 would remain in
effect until the Security Council determined otherwise.
Ireland, he stated, intends to maintain its presence in KFOR.
(Note: Ireland employs a "triple lock" mechanism to ensure
that its overseas peacekeeping missions do not infringe on
the nation's long-held policy of military neutrality. Before
peacekeeping forces can be deployed, the proposed mission
must have a UN mandate, be approved by relevant government
departments (such as defense and foreign affairs),and
authorized by the Parliament (Dail). End note.)


5. (C) In the end, Montgomery predicted, Ireland will
quickly recognize a declaration of independence by Kosovo --
though it won't be among the first wave of nations to do so.

Chad
--------------


6. (C) Montgomery reviewed the history of the Irish decision
to participate in the ESDP mission to Chad, which began, he
said, over a lunch between Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach)
Bertie Ahern and French President Sarkozy in September 2007
and culminated on November 5, 2007 with Irish Cabinet
approval for the mission. He described a confluence of

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events that made Ireland's participation in the Chad mission
possible, including available peacekeeping capacity from
Ireland's completion of UN missions in Liberia and Lebanon in
2007, and no clear niche for Ireland military capabilities in
the peacekeeping mission to Darfur. (Interestingly,
Montgomery revealed that Irish political leaders would have
preferred to engage in Darfur rather than Chad, but could not
figure out how.) Montgomery reiterated that about 350 Irish
peacekeeping troops will be sent to Chad and that the ESDP
mission will be commanded by Irish Major General Pat Nash.
While it is clear there is a role for the EU in Chad,
Montgomery said, he nonetheless expressed concern that the
ESDP mission was approved for only one year. He wondered how
the mission could achieve success in such a short time period
and what its exit strategy would be.

Afghanistan
--------------


7. (C) When pressed by Allegrone whether Ireland could
contribute more to the NATO peacekeeping effort in
Afghanistan, Montgomery politely, but flatly, stated that
there was little or no prospect of further Irish
contributions. (Note: Ireland, a member of Partnership for
Peace, currently contributes seven troops to the force in
Afghanistan. End note.) Montgomery said that excess Irish
peacekeeping capacity would be fully utilized in Chad. When
Allegrone pointed out that there would be some perfect niches
for Ireland in Afghanistan and that the peacekeeping effort
there was a serious European problem, in part because of the
drug trade, Montgomery admitted that there was little
political stomach in Ireland for further engagement in
Afghanistan. He speculated that Irish political leaders and
the Irish public see Afghanistan as "too American, too NATO,
and too dangerous."

Oslo Process: Cluster Munitions
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8. (C) Montgomery also raised the matter of Ireland's firm
support of the Oslo Process, which seeks to ban cluster
munitions (Refs A and B). (Note: Ireland is one of the
founding member states of the Oslo Process. End note.) He
said that Ireland would be hosting an Oslo Process conference
in May 2008, at which, he anticipated, there would be
considerable pressure for a complete ban. Nonetheless, he
acknowledged that a total ban would make it difficult to
achieve buy-in from a number of Western European nations that
use cluster munitions, and voiced the opinion that, though
the debate would be difficult, the final outcome would
reflect a consensus view.

FOLEY