Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA94
2008-02-04 13:30:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FEBRUARY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PHUM QA 
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PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0094/01 0351330
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041330Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7547
RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0206
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0133
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000094 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FEBRUARY
13-14 VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000094

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FEBRUARY
13-14 VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Mr. Attorney General: Embassy Doha welcomes your
February 13-14 visit to Qatar. Your Qatari counterpart, Ali
bin Fetais Al-Marri, met three times with your predecessor,
in both Doha and Washington, and is extremely pleased at the
prospect of your visit so soon after assuming office. This
visit will build upon the solid institutional relationship
between the Qatari Public Prosecution and the U.S. Department
of Justice established by your predecessor and presents a
good opportunity to convey to the highest levels of the GOQ
the value we attach to counterterrorism and law enforcement
cooperation - and to urge that this cooperation be deepened.


2. (S) Qatar lags behind other Gulf countries in overall
counterterrorism intelligence sharing with the U.S., though
GOQ cooperation is improving when a strong nexus is made to a
law enforcement investigation. It is vital that we maintain
if not expand this relationship. We hope that a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) on bilateral law enforcement
cooperation between DOJ and Qatar's Public Prosecution will
be ready for signature during your visit. Although
non-binding, the MOU matters because the GOQ needs it as
cover for the judicial assistance it provides us.


3. (C) We also recommend that you encourage Al-Marri to use
his influence to finalize and implement the draft Qatari law
on Trafficking in Persons. While commending the government
for its cooperation with the DOJ, you should make clear that
much more must be done to protect the large vulnerable
population of Qatar and that the USG will continue to support
such efforts.


4. (C) You should expect a strong pitch to transfer to Qatar
three detainees, two in Guantanamo and one in the Naval Brig
in Charleston. Al-Marri is particularly frustrated that the
USG has not provided him with more information on the charges
and accusations against these persons, nor mapped out a clear
path to their release or transfer.

--------------

DETAINEES IN GUANTANAMO AND CHARLESTON
--------------


5. (S) Qatari national Jarallah Al-Marri is currently being
held in Guantanamo Bay; his brother, Ali, is in the U.S.
Naval Brig in Charleston. (The Al-Marri are a large tribe in
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Gulf, and the two
prisoners are not closely related to the Attorney General.)
The Qatari AG has said he is prepared to take any action
permitted under Qatari law that would clear the way for their
to transfer to Qatar. While he understands that the ultimate
decision on these cases rests with the U.S. Department of
Defense, he very much wants to secure the transfer of these
three individuals, believes the relationship he has developed
with DOJ should help in that regard, and is certain to ask
for your assistance.


6. (S) Ali Al-Marri, the Charleston detainee, may soon be
indicted in the U.S. on material support charges and the U.S.
has formally transmitted a judicial assistance request to the
GOQ seeking banking records and other evidence that could
support his prosecution in the U.S. Although you may not be
able to deliver good news about him or the other two
detainees, you should note the importance the U.S. places on
Qatar's cooperation with the U.S. prosecution of Ali
Al-Marri, whose bank records we have requested on the grounds
of judicial assistance.


7. (S) A third individual, Sudanese citizen Sami Al-Hajj, is
of interest to the Qataris because he was a cameraman for the
Doha-based Al-Jazeera television network at the time he was
taken into custody. His family continues to reside in Qatar
and pressures the Amir to help facilitate his release. The
Sudanese Government informed the GOQ that it has no objection
to Al-Hajj's transfer to Qatar, though we have told the GOQ
that, even if Al-Hajj were approved for transfer, the USG
would be reluctant to send him to a third country.
Meanwhile, Al-Hajj has become a cause celebre for Al Jazeera,
which broadcasts frequent stories on his incarceration and
appeals for his release.

--------------
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
--------------


8. (C) The dark underbelly of Qatar's spectacular

DOHA 00000094 002 OF 004


energy-driven growth is the abysmal working conditions of the
hundreds of thousands of Asian and South Asian workers
brought here to build the country's roads and modern
high-rises and provide the services and manual labor that
Qataris never will. Along with most of its Gulf neighbors,
Qatar was downgraded Last year to Tier 3 in the annual State
Department TIP report, and as such was liable for U.S.
sanctions (which were waived by Presidential Determination).
While there appears to be growing sensitivity to the issue at
senior levels, many influential Qataris led by the prosperous
but competition-free business community strenuously resist
anything that smacks of liberalizing labor and immigration
laws, fearing an erosion of their privileged position in a
country where Qataris constitute at best 15 percent of the
population.


9. (C) There has been little progress by the GOQ on TIP since
the release of the State Department's annual TIP Report last
June. Neighboring countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE)
have issued anti-TIP legislation; Qatar has not. The GOQ has
long promised a comprehensive anti-TIP law and major changes
to the Sponsorship Law (which itself often creates harshly
inequitable conditions for more than 90 percent of Qatar's
foreign workforce) but new legislation has not been issued.
While there have been isolated cases of forced prostitution
(not prosecuted),most TIP victims in Qatar are male and
female domestic workers (who are not covered under the Labor
Law) and male unskilled and semi-skilled laborers. The
government has agreed to finance and host a DOJ program
($225,000) to better equip law enforcement personnel and
labor inspectors to identify TIP crimes and protect victims,
but the program has not yet begun.


10. (C) Your visit presents an opportunity to urge the GOQ at
the highest levels to pass and enact legislation to
criminalize and prosecute TIP crimes and protect TIP victims.
You should also deliver a message that Qatar, because of its
extraordinary wealth is unusually positioned to set an
example in the region for just and humane treatment for the
foreigners who are building their country. In the meantime,
existing criminal statues, rather than civil provisions of
the Labor Law, can be used to prosecute crimes of forced
labor and prostitution.

--------------
A VITAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP...
--------------


11. (S) The U.S. has a lot at stake in Qatar. Al-Udeid Air
Base and other U.S. military facilities are critical to
CENTCOM operations from Iraq to Afghanistan to the Horn of
Africa. Qatar hosts approximately 9,000 U.S. forces, some
100 U.S. and Coalition aircraft, as well as the CENTCOM
Forward Headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center,
SOCCENT Forward Headquarters, and other important DOD
facilities. Qatar is funding hundreds of millions of dollars
in construction for the U.S. at Al-Udeid Air Base. Our hosts
regularly send military personnel to the U.S. for training,
and after years of sourcing their military hardware in
Europe, are showing increasing interest in buying American,
with a major sale of C-17 aircraft first on the list.

--------------
... AND A STRATEGIC PARTNER IN ENERGY
--------------


12. (C) Qatar is exceptionally friendly to U.S. energy
companies and appreciates the competence and expertise they
bring to the country's economic development. Since 1999,
there has been USD 60 billion in foreign investment in
Qatar's energy sector with the majority, about USD 40
billion, coming from U.S. firms, including ExxonMobil,
ConocoPhillips, Anadarko, and Occidental. Soon, nearly 20
percent of ExxonMobil's global Revenue will derive from
Qatar. Qatar is also of growing importance to the U.S. from
an energy security perspective as this small emirate will
next year become a major supplier of LNG to the U.S.
following the recent CFIUS approval of $2.2 billion
development by Qatar Petroleum, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips
of the Golden Pass LNG terminal in southeast Texas. Qatar is
now the world's largest LNG exporter and will soon be the
U.S.' largest source of imported LNG.


13. (U) At over USD 60,000, Qatar's per capita income is
already ranked in the top five in the world, alongside
Luxembourg and Liechtenstein. Between now and 2012, Qatar's
LNG exports will more than double, bringing a corresponding
growth to Qatar's economy and global financial clout.

DOHA 00000094 003 OF 004



--------------
COMMITMENT TO EDUCATIONAL REFORM, RULE OF LAW
--------------


14. (C) Beyond strong military and energy relationships,
there is a lot going right in Qatar from the U.S.
perspective. Qatar's commitment to modernize its educational
system is exemplified by Education City, a 2500-acre campus
on the outskirts of Doha. Managed by the Qatar Foundation,
the umbrella organization chaired by the Amir's wife, Sheikha
Mozah, Education City is home to five U.S. college branch
campuses (Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical
School, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, and Virginia
Commonwealth University),with some 800 students currently
enrolled. Northwestern University in late 2007 announced its
intention to establish a school or journalism. Meanwhile,
primary and secondary school curriculum is being reformed
along U.S. standards and a network of competitive charter
schools is gradually replacing out-moded government-run
schools. And rule of law, if not full democratization, is
taking root firmly, though slowly.

--------------
TROUBLESOME POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
--------------


15. (S) Although our relationship with Qatar remains solid in
the energy, military and educational fields, politically it
has soured steadily since the beginning of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). This trend began with Al Jazeera's harshly
biased coverage of OIF in 2003, but it has been Qatar's
foreign policy initiatives - and its maddening behavior on
the UN Security Council for the past two years - that really
drove the deterioration. In addition, bilateral CT and
intelligence cooperation - of obviously critical importance
in this region - is now the worst of all GCC states.
Meanwhile, the senior Qatari leadership appears to have grown
jealous of our relationships with regional rivals and annoyed
that we don't give Qatar more attention, including
senior-level visits and visibility in our own regional
initiatives.


16. (S) Our own list of grievances with Qatar is long enough,
but at the core are its high-level engagement with Hamas
leaders even as we seek to isolate them; support for Syria
and its allies in Lebanon as we work to support the
democratic majority; serving as a flak for Sudan and
Hezbollah during its just-ended stint on the UN Security
Council; and a failure to follow through on its stated
commitment to forgive Iraqi debt.


17. (C) The Amir shares our view that restoration of order
and a successful democratic transition in Iraq are of
paramount importance not only to Iraq but to the region.
While the Qataris has expressed concerns about civil war in
Iraq, their officials also state publicly that the Coalition
needs to stay in the country to establish wider security.
However, a strong distaste for Iraq's Shia-dominated
government drives Qatar's resistance to follow through on
some of our priorities, including comprehensive debt
forgiveness.


18. (C) Al Jazeera is by far the region's most prominent
media outlet and the bane of many governments in the region,
though no longer the irksome centerpiece of U.S.-Qatari
relations. The network is more than ten years old with an
Arabic-speaking audience of some 50 million viewers. In
November 2006, it launched an English-language channel with a
potential audience of 70 million and ambitions to compete
with the major U.S. and British satellite networks worldwide.
Since early 2006, the USG has seen a bumpy downward trend in
inflammatory anti-Western bias and inaccuracy in Al Jazeera's
content, though biased and inaccurate reporting continues to
appear.


19. (S) Qatar is often accused (by Jordan, the Palestinian
Authority, and others) of funneling money to Hamas, though we
have never seen clear evidence that this is happening. The
Qataris have been largely cooperative on counter-terrorist
finance issues, apparently anxious to avoid letting their
small but growing financial sector be exploited by
terrorists. The Qatar Authority for Charitable Works
monitors all domestic and international charitable activities
and approves international fund transfers by the charities.
Qatar has a Financial Information Unit that resides in the
Qatar Central Bank and can review suspect accounts. Local
banks work with the Central Bank and the FIU on CT finance

DOHA 00000094 004 OF 004


and anti-money laundering issues, and bank officials attend
U.S.-sponsored conferences on these subjects.


20. (S) Iran hangs heavily over our relationship with Qatar,
which believes we may have plans for Iran, perhaps even
military plans, that we are not sharing with them. During
its 2006-07 tenure on the UN Security Council, Qatar cast the
consensus-breaking (14-1) vote on Resolution 1696 in July

2006. (Qatar later joined consensus in two unanimous votes,
UNSCR 1736 and UNSCR 1747, to impose sanctions on Iran's
nuclear program.) Qatar does share our concern about Iran's
nuclear program and revolutionary ideology, but Qatar's
geographic proximity, vulnerability of its energy
installations, and the fact that its massive off-shore gas
reserves are shared with Iran, dictate a less confrontational
approach.


21. (C) We believe the Qatari leadership regards our
relationship as strategic and permanent, and they see the
military bases, energy contracts, and U.S. universities as
evidence of this. But at this point, the Qatari leadership
have written off the political relationship and are likely
waiting out the Administration hoping that bilateral
relations improve in 2009. In the meantime, Qatar has always
responded well to high-level contact; likewise, isolating
Qatar has only had a negative effect on its behavior. Visits
like yours help enormously to sustain the positive aspects of
our bilateral relationship.
RATNEY