TSA ASSESSMENT FINDS QATAR'S AVIATION SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000868

SIPDIS

TSA HQ FOR KIP HAWLEY
AMMAN FOR TSAR BRYANT CHEVALIER
ABU DHABI FOR FAA REP ROY BARNETT AND ICE
FRANKFURT FOR TSA OFFICE
STATE FOR EEB/JOHN BYERLY AND BRIAN SILER
STATE FOR DS, DSS, DS/T/ATA, AND DS/IP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018
TAGS: EAIR ASEC QA
SUBJECT: TSA ASSESSMENT FINDS QATAR'S AVIATION SECURITY
STILL LACKING

REF: DOHA 820

Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- A November 29 to December 8 TSA assessment of Doha
International Airport (DIA) found that previously identified
shortcomings in meeting International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) security standards remain unaddressed.
Moreover, the team assessed that boarding gate screening for
flights to the U.S. remains inconsistent and judged that
adequate procedures will not be sustained in TSA's absence.

-- The team's assessment indicated that those security
responsibilities under Qatar Airways' purview are up to
standard; the Qatari police who screen the passengers
continue to be problematic.

-- TSA is internally discussing next steps and will send
additional representatives to Doha as needed over the next
few months to monitor and assess the situation and provide
assistance.

--------------
(C) COMMENT
--------------

-- Ambassador plans to call at the earliest opportunity on
the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Chairman, Minister of
State for Interior Affairs, and Qatar Airways CEO to
highlight our continued concerns over aviation security.

-- Though a Secretarial Action would clearly disgruntle the
Qataris and affect the bilateral relationship, Post believes
such action would likely force Qatar to oversee, perform, and
resource police screening properly, or contract with a
private entity to fix the problem (as advocated by Qatar
Airways).

-- While contract screening may in time present its own set
of problems, the police are clearly unable to consistently
screen passengers adequately. Left unaddressed, the
deficiencies in this regard will worsen as airport expansion
continues and a new, much larger airport opens in a few years.

-- The CAA has made incremental progress over the past year
in establishing oversight mechanisms, but it remains too
bureaucratically weak and unfocused to carry out proper
regulatory authority. The Authority has begun hiring a small
cadre of inspectors but on the whole remains overly reliant
on a single expatriate security advisor for management,
policy, and liaison with foreign observers such as TSA.

End Key Points and Comment.


1. (C) A TSA team comprising Amman-based TSA Representative
(TSAR) Bryant Chevalier and Frankfurt-based Transportation
Security Specialists Alva Ellis and Christopher Brown visited
Doha November 29 to December 8 to assess Doha International
Airport (DIA) against ICAO Annex 17 security standards and
inspect Qatar Airways against TSA regulations for flights to
the U.S. As directed by TSA, the team spent a majority of
its time at the gates where the U.S.-bound flights boarded
due to continuing inconsistencies in the screening of
passengers and hand-carried baggage. During two meetings
with Qatari representatives toward the end of their visit,
described in detail below, the TSA team emphasized the
continued, serious USG concerns with general airport
security, especially the boarding gate screening procedures
for flights to the U.S.


2. (U) Qatari participants in the meetings included Deputy
Director of Airport Police Essa Al-Rumaihi, CAA Vice Chairman
Ibrahim Abdulgadir, CAA Security Advisor Ian Gilchrist, Qatar
Airways Security Manager Benny Thomas, and two recently-hired
CAA inspectors. Also participating for the USG were DCM

DOHA 00000868 002 OF 004


Ratney and Econoff Fabrycky.

--------------
Problem Areas, and TSA's Options
--------------


3. (C) During a December 4 meeting at the CAA, Chevalier
provided the team's interim findings, emphasizing the
consistent problems observed in sustaining required security
measures at the boarding gate for flights to the U.S., to
include: inadequate hand-wanding of females, inconsistent
physical searches of hand-carried baggage, contamination
of hand-carried baggage by returning screened items to
unscreened passengers, mixing of screened and unscreened
female passengers, and a lack of consistent police
supervision. He emphasized that TSA HQ views the situation
in Qatar as serious and is planning stepped-up engagement
over the next few months to determine the sustainability of
passenger screening. Planned visits to Qatar include:

-- The International Industry Representative (IIR) based in
Frankfurt, within 30-60 days.

-- The TSAR, within 30-60 days.

-- Another inspection team to review ICAO standards and
procedures for flights to the U.S., within 4-6 months.


4. (C) Chevalier noted that if improvements are not observed,
options for TSA leadership include the recommendation of a
Secretarial Action, based on the open ICAO requirements and
concerns over passenger screening. Underscoring that "this
is very serious," he explained the process, noting that if
the TSA Administrator recommends to the Secretary of Homeland
Security such action, Qatar would likely face a 90-day action
plan to demonstrate sustained improvements. If adequate
progress is not made, the Secretary has several options
available, including suspension of flights to the U.S.
Chevalier concluded by noting that the inspection team's
findings sufficiently established that current airport
security measures are not to standard. He added that TSA
would soon issue specific recommendations for Qatari
authorities based on the findings.


5. (C) The Qatari interlocutors responded passively to the
above points. Gilchrist noted that the CAA had been
"reluctant to get involved in checkpoint design issues," but
it is now clear that CAA must assume that level of
responsibility. Al-Rumaihi reiterated points made previously
about cultural sensitivities on searching women and how the
police are trying to ensure consistent staffing and
supervision. Abdulgadir took the team's point that
sustainability is the main concern and thanked the team for
its report.

-------------- --------------
Security Sustainability for Flights to the U.S. Key
-------------- --------------


6. (C) During an outbrief December 6, Gilchrist stated that
Qatar's goal with respect to flights to the U.S. is to move
past the Emergency Amendment to help make the airline's
commercial operations more efficient (i.e., by making sure
security standards are good enough elsewhere that there does
not have to be an EA and thus additional security
procedures). He understood that right now TSA is generally
happy with the screening for flights to the U.S., but the
rest of the airport is a problem.


7. (C) Chevalier corrected him, stating that TSA is not
satisfied with the screening procedures for flights to the
U.S.; this is the primary concern. The team believes that
when TSA inspectors are not present, the required security
procedures will not be maintained. Even when inspectors were
present, the U.S. team had to undertake corrective actions to
ensure passengers were adequately screened. On the positive
side, Ellis noted that passenger check-in, hold and transfer
baggage screening, aircraft security, and catering security
are up to standard, based on the team's assessment, but the

DOHA 00000868 003 OF 004


gate screening had deficiencies every day. Chevalier
informed the Qatari representatives that TSA HQ requested
that the team extend its stay (to observe flights to the
U.S.) through December 8, and stressed the need for
fundamental changes in the airport's passenger screening. He
further noted that team members would brief TSA HQ on their
findings, after which TSA will communicate a way forward to
the Government of Qatar.


8. (C) In a separate conversation with Col. Al-Rumaihi, DCM
identified the quality of police screening as the fundamental
ongoing problem. Al-Rumaihi appeared to understand the
gravity of the situation but offered no remedy for it. He
currently operates the airport with a few hundred police
staff (the work of most of whom he acknowledges is
inadequate),but opening the new airport in 2011 will require
close to 2000 police personnel at minimum, he observed.

--------------
ICAO Shortcomings Remain Unaddressed
--------------


9. (C) During the outbrief, Chevalier reiterated that the
team focused on the deficiencies at the boarding gate for
flights to the U.S. Of the nine open items from last year's
assessment, one is closed (access control to the baggage
area) but eight still remain open. Chevalier stressed that
the primary concern remains the substandard level of
screening at all the checkpoints per ICAO standards. For
example, no security personnel are posted at transfer
screening checkpoints to control passenger flow on the entry
side, and police often misidentify which passenger sets off
an alarm or do not screen all passengers.


10. (C) On quality control, Gilchrist noted that there is an
"embryonic infrastructure" which, he acknowledged, still
needs to be turned into a real program. Chevalier responded
that this item could be closed in the future if
implementation is effective.


11. (C) Turning to the other areas, Ellis reported that the
risk assessment procedures item is still open, and the
screening of passengers and cabin baggage is still not
commensurate with ICAO standards. She noted that the hold
baggage screening item is still open due to the poor quality
observed at the primary screening checkpoint for originating
passengers, meaning the area is still not sterile. Security
should screen all baggage after it's turned over to the
carrier. In response to Gilchrist's questions, Ellis
acknowledged the team was satisfied with hold baggage and
transfer baggage screening for the flights to the U.S. The
team was also satisfied with other aspects of airport
security, such as perimeter control and security lighting.


12. (C) Chevalier said TSA is looking for improvements, and
he again offered training to help achieve security goals. He
reiterated the team's concern that in the absence of U.S.
inspectors deficiencies would continue. It appears to be a
training, oversight, and human resourcing issue for the
police; they do not have enough staff, and current staff are
not doing the job or being supervised correctly. Qatar
Airways has implemented the non-screening requirements of the
EA for which it is individually responsible. He asked when
TSA can expect to see sustainable improvements.


13. (C) Gilchrist responded that Qatar is a sovereign state
and Annex 17 issues are between them and ICAO. He said that
Qatar is under no obligation to provide a corrective action
plan to the U.S. He noted ICAO had done two audits on Qatar
and provided a corrective action plan, which the state of
Qatar has accepted.


14. (C) Separately, Gilchrist asked the TSA team if the U.S.
could provide sophisticated x-ray training (such as for the
Smith-Heimann EDX machine in the premier lounge). Chevalier
promised to look into it and respond.


15. (U) This cable has been cleared by TSA.


DOHA 00000868 004 OF 004


LeBaron