SCENESETTER FOR LTGEN ALLEN'S DECEMBER 17 VISIT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000866

SIPDIS

FOR LTG JOHN ALLEN FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR LTGEN ALLEN'S DECEMBER 17 VISIT TO
QATAR

Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) General Allen, Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to
Qatar. I look forward to meeting with you and joining you
for dinner with the Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces,
Major General Hamad bin Ali Al-Attiyeh. Because your visit
is so short and December 18 is Qatar's National Day, there
will unfortunately be no opportunities for engagement with
Qatari leadership during this trip.


2. (C) As this is your first visit, relationship-building is
clearly a major objective. GEN Petraeus visited Qatar twice
as MNF-I Commander, but has yet to visit since assuming
command of CENTCOM. The Qataris are very much looking
forward to that, and to beginning, with your visit,
engagement with the new CENTCOM leadership team. On a future
visit, we hope you will be able to meet with Qatar's Heir
Apparent, Sheikh Tamim Al Thani, who has overall
responsibility for Qatar's military and security services.


3. (C) Here we provide the Country Team's views on how your
visit can best advance the U.S. Government's strategic
objectives in Qatar. We also discuss the key strategic
trends in the bilateral relationship over the coming three
years. We start, however, with a brief review of the
bilateral relationship.

--------------
THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


4. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the
U.S. is impressive, especially for a small country the size
of Connecticut, with only 1.7 million inhabitants, of whom
only about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens.

-- The U.S.-Qatar military relationship is, of course,
extremely important. Qatar provides the U.S. military
exceptional access to two major Qatari military
installations, Al Udaid Air Base and Camp As-Sayliah -
perhaps CENTCOM's most important operating installations
outside of Iraq. Qatar charges us no rent, and in fact is
funding over $700 million in construction projects for the
exclusive use of the U.S. military.

-- Until recently, the U.S. had never made a major defense
sale to Qatar. In July, however, Qatar signed contracts with
Boeing for two C-17s with an option for two more, and with
Lockheed-Martin for four C-130Js with an option for two more.
The C-17 and C-130 sales are a signal the Qataris are
beginning to invest in their own defensive capabilities -
with a preference for U.S.-origin equipment. Qatar Armed
Forces have expressed interest in many other U.S. defense
systems, most notably an integrated air defense.

-- The broader economic relationship between Qatar and the
United States is vital. U.S. energy companies have invested
tens of billions of dollars in the oil and gas industry here.
Qatar, which holds the third largest natural gas reserves in
the world after Iran and Russia, is expected to become in
2009 one of the most important suppliers of imported
liquefied natural gas to the U.S. market.

-- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large,
Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $60,000.
Even with the current global financial crisis, Qatar's
national revenues will continue growing, and Qatar should
soon have the highest per capita income in the world.

-- Vast wealth has bolstered the country's political
ambitions, leading to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that
have too often been at odds with U.S. objectives. Examples
include Qatar's relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and
Sudan.

-- Qatar's location, wide-ranging foreign relations,
fast-growing economy, and expanding transportation links have
made counterterrorism cooperation, including counterterrorist
financing, a key aspect of our relationship. Qatar's wealth,
in particular, means its citizens are potential sources of
money for violent extremists and cooperative efforts to
target and prevent these financial flows are central to our
bilateral agenda.


DOHA 00000866 002 OF 005


-- Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab states to
modernizing its educational system, and has turned decisively
to the Unites States for help. Qatar has imported branch
campuses of six U.S. universities, including Texas A&M,
Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical School, Georgetown,
Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern. It is instituting a
U.S. model of charter schools at the elementary and secondary
levels.

-------------- --------------
THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: KEY TRENDS THROUGH 2011
-------------- --------------


5. (S) Following are the key trends over the next three years
that we believe will have the greatest impact on our military
relationship:

-- Qatar will continue to modernize its military through the
purchase of U.S. weapons systems, though competition will
continue from the French, British, and others. Despite
Qatar's wealth, defense purchases will be made in the context
of a frugal military budget. Economic development will
remain Qatar's top spending priority.

-- Qatar will continue to face a formidable challenge
staffing its military with Qataris because there are so few
Qataris and because more attractive salaries exist in the
private sector. The continued dependence on foreign
nationals, particularly in the enlisted ranks, will continue
to present concerns about transfers of sensitive U.S.
technology.

-- The Qatari leadership will seek to increase the prestige
of its military within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and
the international arena, but has no clearly defined strategy
for doing so. Likewise, Qatar is attracted to the latest
military systems, even while its military modernization is
not guided by a national security strategy, at least not one
we're aware of.

-- Qatar's defense purchases are currently misaligned with
the maritime threats to its critical economic infrastructure
and the ballistic missile threats it faces from Iran. But
Qatar's recent C-130 and C-17 aircraft purchases do align
with its desire to carve out a niche in the region and
internationally for humanitarian relief and disaster
response. This trend will continue.

-- In the short term, irritating customs and immigration
issues stemming from Qatar's need to demonstrate sovereignty
over Al Udaid Air Base will continue to plague the mil-mil
relationship. This is compounded by USG personnel who fail
to follow published rules and procedures. Recent infractions
noted by the Qataris include personnel from the CENTCOM
Assessment Team and INTERNAL LOOK.

-- We expect that the biggest factor in our engagement in the
near term will be Qatar's sensitivity to the large, enduring
U.S. military presence. While Qatar's leadership and
population regard our presence as a permanent and necessary
deterrent to the aggression of surrounding states,
principally Iran and Saudi Arabia, it does expose it to
regional criticism and, potentially, to terrorist attack.

-- We expect, therefore, that Qatar will continue to pursue a
policy of strengthening and deepening the military
relationship through increased combined planning, training,
exercises, and operations - along the lines of the
relationship that exists between the U.S. Forces in Korea and
the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

-------------- --------------
HOW YOUR VISIT CAN HELP THESE STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT GOALS
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Defense sales and other elements of security
assistance and cooperation are aimed at strengthening our
long-term military and economic relationship. The Government
of Qatar's efforts to modernize the Qatar Armed Forces, to
include airlift, critical economic infrastructure protection,
and missile defense, are in line with USG objectives to
strengthen regional partners and enhance regional security.


7. (C) Embassy Doha is working to synchronize activities

DOHA 00000866 003 OF 005


across the interagency in an effort to support execution of
USG policy, plans and programs. As we work to deepen and
expand our strategic, operational and tactical cooperation
with the Government of Qatar, we see your visit as a tool to
further these shared, strategic, goals. Here's how your
visit can help:


8. (S) The trends identified above suggest a strong
imperative for Qatar to develop an overarching national
security strategy, guiding its military development, defense
purchases, cooperation with the U.S. and other allies. The
U.S. has a strong interest in working with Qatar on that,
ensuring to the extent possible, that their national security
strategy is consistent with, and supportive of, our own.
Given your position as Deputy Commander, U.S. Central
Command, you are well placed to urge the Qatari leadership
in this direction and help them understand the importance of
developing a broad and detailed strategy into which their
current defense acquisitions fit.


9. (C) PRAISE FOR DEFENSE SALES: You should compliment Qatar
for signing contacts with Boeing in July for two C-17s (with
an option for two more) and with Lockheed-Martin for four
C-130Js (also with an option for two more) and encourage the
Qataris to continue down this path. Boeing anticipates
initial delivery of the first C-17 in late 2009.

-- The C-17 and C-130 sales (both hybrid DCS-FMS cases) are a
signal the Qataris are beginning to invest in their own
defense capabilities, especially in the area of humanitarian
relief. Qatar is also looking at U.S. helicopters and
Hellfire II missiles as part of its National Security Shield
effort, and possibly F-16 or F-18 fighter aircraft as well as
an integrated air defense system. Currently, U.S. and Qatari
officers are meeting in Tampa to discuss how best to proceed
toward this integrated missile defense. This sale has the
potential, as it could include Patriot-PAC 3 and sentinel
radar, to be worth upwards of USD 20 billion.


10. (S) GETTING THE PATRIOT MISSILES BACK ON THE RAILS: This
issue has now festered for more than a year and the
motivations behind Qatar's inaction remain largely mysterious.

-- Patriots were deployed to Qatar in fall 2006 to support
the 15th Asian Games. Protection was primarily for U.S.
Forces at Al Udaid and Camp As-Sayliah, but also covered a
large portion of Doha and some (though not all) critical
infrastructure. On October 15, 2007, a routine test sequence
resulted in the accidental launch of a Patriot Missile from a
battery at Camp As-Sayliah. The missile landed on the Qatari
COS' farm a few kilometers from Camp As-Sayliah, with no
injuries or property damage. U.S.-Qatari cooperation on the
investigation was good and the Qataris appreciated that ADM
Fallon responded quickly to their request to stand both
batteries down and physically remove missiles from the
launchers.

-- The Qataris originally signaled that they would agree to
put the Patriot batteries back up, but first asked for the
full report on the incident, temporary rules of engagement,
and an analysis of the Patriots' coverage area to ensure that
the city of Doha is covered and not just the military bases.

-- Completion of the final report took longer than expected,
but has since been briefed to senior Qatari military
officers. In early September, however, we were informed that
the Government of Qatar seeks to establish strategic-level
rules of engagement (as opposed to tactical procedures) on
exactly when, where, and how the Patriots may be used.

-- LTG Dempsey and LtGen North engaged MG Al-Attiyah
personally for redeployment of Patriots, but to no avail.
CENTCOM and AFCENT are aware of the rules-of-engagement
request and are concerned about the ramifications and
precedence set by entering into such discussions. We believe
that the delay in the return to operational status likely
boils down to Qatari sovereignty concerns and, perhaps, a GOQ
desire for some form of role in granting permission or
approval prior to firing missiles. The Qataris have also
asked for coverage of Ras Laffan, the natural gas
liquefaction and shipping facilities in the northeast of the
peninsula. That is simply impossible, however, with the
current Patriot assets in country.


DOHA 00000866 004 OF 005


-- Most recently, OMC Qatar was informed that Qatar wished to
get the Patriots back on the rails by December 24, most
likely as a response to Mumbai and perceptions that U.S.
forces in Qatar could be targeted during the U.S. holiday
season. Lead for negotiations changed to BG Abdulla Juma'an,
the Qatar Armed Forces' Chief of International Relations. BG
Abdulla informed OMC Qatar that he was ready to negotiate
with U.S. air defense personnel; OMC Qatar is working to
coordinate a meeting.

-- Meanwhile, Qatar is aggressively pursuing FMS information
on an integrated air defense system which includes, among
other systems, Patriot-PAC 3. Additionally, Qatar is aware
that its neighbors Bahrain and UAE are in the process of
receiving one each Patriot battery as part of an enhanced air
defense posture for U.S. Forces in the region.

-- Continuation of the current situation is clearly a
lose-lose for both U.S. and Qatar in terms of security. You
should encourage MG Al-Attiyeh to authorize us to put the
Patriots back on rails regardless of the outcome of the
operational guide or rules of engagement discussions.
Although the final decision likely lies with Sheikh Tamim, MG
Al-Attiyeh's recommendation will be decisive.


11. (C) ENCOURAGE RESOLUTION OF ONGOING CUSTOMS ISSUES: You
should note U.S. understanding that military facilities
provided for U.S. use in Qatar are sovereign Qatari
territory, and in this context express our desire to resolve
customs problems that plague our overall bilateral strategic
defense relationship.

-- There have been numerous incidents in which Coalition
personnel violated established Qatar customs procedures on
entry or exit from the country, leading to Qatari accusations
that U.S. personnel are not respecting Qatari sovereignty.
These led Qatar, in March 2007, to implement troublesome new
customs procedures for personnel, equipment, and cargo
entering or transiting the country.

-- These tactical-level irritants will be exacerbated as we
shift operational focus to efforts in Afghanistan, and will
lead to delays in intra-theater cargo movement thus degrading
our operational capabilities. Continued degradation of this
type will continue to erode our once strong strategic
mil-to-mil relationship.

-- CENTCOM J5, AFCENT, ASG-Qatar and OMC Qatar personnel held
discussions with the Qatari Armed Forces in June and November
2007 and March 2008, which led to agreement on temporary
procedures. Only constant, daily OMC Qatar and AFCENT
interaction with the Qatar Armed Forces GHQ and Customs and
Ports Authority officials prevent detrimental effects to U.S.
operations.

-- We regard the temporary procedures as a stepping stone for
permanent procedures that respect U.S. and Qatar sovereignty,
support U.S. operations and are in line with the Defense
Cooperation Agreement. Meetings are now scheduled for
January 12-14 in Tampa at which, we hope, permanent
procedures can be agreed. But in the meantime, some goodwill
from the Qatari side would go a long way toward easing U.S.
military operations in Qatar.


12. CHOD CONFERENCE: Redlines on both sides caused a delay
in the previously scheduled Chiefs of Defense conference to
be co-hosted by CENTCOM and Qatar. No new date has been
agreed upon.

-- CENTCOM wishes Qatar to invite (in addition to GCC, Iraq
and Lebanon) Jordan and Egypt. Qatar insists that CENTCOM
invite those two countries, owing to Qatari sensitivities
that earlier invitations went unanswered. There is potential
for re-engagement at least on the part of Jordan as there has
been a thaw in the relationship.

-- CENTCOM wishes invitations to be dual-signed, Qatar wants
to send the invitations independently and suggests that
General Petraeus send a letter of endorsement.

-- There is also disagreement over who will pay for what.

-- At a minimum, we recommend you ask the COS if he still
wishes to co-host the conference, if he has given any

DOHA 00000866 005 OF 005


additional thought to dates, and if he has thoughts on the
Jordan-Egypt issue. If CENTCOM still wishes Qatar to host
the conference, we recommend you discuss with the Chief of
Staff if there is leeway on one or more of these issues.
LeBaron