Fraud Report - Doha

UNCLAS DOHA 000852


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC QA
SUBJECT: Fraud Report - Doha


1. (U) COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Qatar's population consists of a large
majority of third country nationals (TCNs). NIV applicants from
Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine,
Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen account
for a large portion of post's visa workload. No one nationality
accounts for more than 30 percent of post's applicant pool. Our IV
applicant pool is small but similarly diverse and growing. Post's
fraud investigator verifies the documents of IV applications against
known exemplars and conducts investigations of NIV applications as
referred by interviewing officers.

Thanks to large natural gas and petroleum resources, Qatar's economy
continues to grow at a record pace, with a population now estimated
at upwards of 1.7 million. This growth has brought a tremendous
influx of new people to Qatar and, combined with Qatar's expansion
of its natural gas exports, also fueled inflation to double digits
five years in a row. With this growth and economic pressure on the
working and lower classes in particular, Post's fraud workload and
concerns continue to grow. We receive applications from all across
the economic spectrum, from white collar to unskilled laborers. The
FPU has seen growth in the number of NIV, DV and U.S. Passport fraud
schemes reported in Qatar.

Post's fraud investigator resigned early in the year to accept a
position in another office of the embassy. We have been without
fraud support for most of the reporting period. Post welcomed the
arrival of the new Fraud Investigator last month, and investigations
and fraud review resumed.

2.(U) NIV FRAUD: There is generally little fraud associated with
applications from citizens of Qatar, with the exception of
naturalized Qataris. A recent application from a family of
naturalized Yemeni-Qataris appeared to be the usual shopping trip,
until a review from IAFIS revealed that one of the party had been
working in a liquor store in the United States and had been arrested
for selling to a minor, and another member of the group had been
arrested in the US for petty theft. The applicants received a
second interview and were refused the visa.

Among the expatriate community that applies for visas, fraud appears
to be generally unsophisticated, usually involving questionable
letters of employment. We have only rarely seen photo-substituted
documents. Many of the oil and gas businesses in Qatar send TCN
employees to the U.S. for training. Verifying the employment of the
applicants is often required. Post still has problems contacting
appropriate officials, and it can take many days and phone calls to
confirm simple facts.

H-1B and L-1 visa fraud remain areas of concern. Post continues to
receive applications from Indian nationals who exaggerated their
work experience when filing for an H1-B petition through friends or
family in the United States. FPU returned files to DHS for
companies suspected of benching, as anecdotal evidence from visa
interviews suggests some applicants don't know exactly for whom they
will be working and are often sent out to other companies upon
arrival in the U.S. FPU/I works with the FPUs in Chennai and New
Delhi to verify educational documents and other qualifications.
Petitioners are also checked for applicants who have been submitted
for revocation by Chennai and New Delhi for possible indicators of
fraud for current cases in Doha.

Post processes a high number of non-immigrant visas for domestic
employees of Qatari families and government officials. These
domestic employees routinely travel with their employers to the U.S.
Post is aware of one specific report of domestic servant abuse
involving a Qatari diplomat but otherwise has received no reports of
trafficking in A3, G5 and B1 Visas. Post adheres to Department
policy in requiring a signed contract between employers and their
domestic employees that shows the employee is treated according to
U.S. Labor Law standards.

As part of our SOP with Qatar Airways, Post revoked the visas of
over 50 Qatar Airways crew members who had resigned or were
terminated.

3.(U) IV FRAUD: All IV petitions and applications received at post
involve TCNs. Most IV beneficiaries are citizens of the Philippines
or South Asian or Arab countries. All IV cases are screened by the
Fraud Investigator against FPU and other post exemplars. The Fraud
Investigator relies heavily on the FPUs in Manila, India, Thailand,
Yemen, and Sudan, among others. Typical IV fraud usually involves
applicants trying to conceal prior marriages, or in one case a
marriage that had not been terminated prior to the subsequent
marriage to an American. Post has had several cases of
beneficiaries or petitioners being married to more than one person
at the same time.

4.(U) DV FRAUD: FPU verified 10 DV visa applications during the
current period. DV applicants in Doha are all TCNS who are often
from high-fraud countries such as Bangladesh, Somalia, Sudan and
Yemen. FPU works with U.S. Embassy counterparts in Dhaka, Sanaa,
Katmandu and other posts to verify documents, especially birth
certificates and education certificates. Fraud has been detected
most often in the educational documents submitted to support a
baccalaureate degree. Upon examination by FPUs in the country of
origin, many are quickly identified as fabricated or altered to
cover their lack of the required education qualification.

5.(U) ACS AND US PASSPORT FRAUD: Post continues to receive requests
from foreign citizens to authenticate suspect academic credentials
from online institutions who are not accredited and for whom it is
difficult to determine if the "degree" holder actually earned the
qualifications. "Degrees" are often notarized or certified as true
copies by a notary public in the U.S. rather than through a school
registrar. We recently received authentications from "Capitol
University." These "degrees" are then used by the recipients to
claim qualifications they do not hold and to earn a higher salary
rate under Qatar's labor laws.

6.(U) ADOPTION FRAUD: None. Post received no adoption applications
today in FY 2008. Adoption is not allowed in Qatar for non-Muslims.
Muslims are allowed to adopt in Qatar, but this generally does not
occur due to the extended nature of Qatari families and that orphans
are treated as Qatari citizens upon abandonment. As such, only
Muslim Qatari citizens can adopt. In limited cases, the Family
Court of Qatar grants guardianship if the orphan's religious,
national and cultural background matches with that of the guardian.

7.(U) ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS: Post receives few V92/93 cases
or other DHS benefits cases. However, with the launch of Qatar
Airways flights to Newark and Washington-Dulles International
Airports, Post receives an increasing number of calls from Airport
Immigration and Qatar Airways Transit Unit to verify the travel
documents, visas and passports of transit passengers headed to the
U.S.

8.(U) COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: The FPU and
Consular Section maintain close ties with a wide range of host
country officials, including Airport Immigration, the Capital
Police, Qatar Airways, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of the Interior, Qatar's prison system. Cooperation is very good
for TCN visa fraud. Punishments for fraud usually include possible
jail time, loss of sponsorship and deportation from Qatar. Fraud
among Qatari citizens is very low.

9.(U) AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: An area of particular concern is
fraud emanating from third countries perpetrated by TCNs either
resident in Qatar or visiting here. Qatar's current TCN population
accounts for anywhere from 75 to 90 percent of Qatar's population.
The Visa Unit received NIV applications from over 100 different
nationalities during the previous year. Many IV cases come from
high fraud countries and, as noted above, have increased in
complexity and number.

Post continues to see fraudulent letters for crew work on Norwegian
cruise lines, although this has decreased significantly. Post
received one authentic petition for a worker on Norwegian, which was
probably the most scrutinized offer Norwegian has ever submitted.
After thorough investigation it was found to be legitimate and the
visa was issued.

10.(U) STAFFING AND TRAINING: FPU consists of one-part time Fraud
Prevention Manager and one full-time Fraud Investigator (FPU/I).
FPM is K. Quinn Andrus, Vice Consul, who also serves as Visa Unit
Chief. FPU/I is Arshad Karim. FPM attended the FPM course at FSI
in 2007.

LEBARON