Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA839
2008-12-02 07:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

BRITISH AND FRENCH VIEWS OF QATAR'S INITIATIVE ON

Tags:  PREL PHUM SU QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHDO #0839/01 3370741
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020741Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8489
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0178
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1132
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000839 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM SU QA
SUBJECT: BRITISH AND FRENCH VIEWS OF QATAR'S INITIATIVE ON
DARFUR

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- French Special Envoy for Darfur Issa Maraut told U.S.
Special Envoy Williamson November 23 in advance of
Williamson,s meetings with Qatari officials that Minister of
State Al-Mahmoud understands quite well the issues of Darfur,
is hard-working and wants to succeed.

-- The British Ambassador John Hawkins observed that
Al-Mahmoud is now spending 90 percent of his time on Darfur.

-- The British, Hawkins said, essentially want progress on
the ground in Darfur, no focus on the International Criminal
Court deferment of indictments for now, and close cooperation
between Bassole and Qatar.

End Key Points.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000839

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM SU QA
SUBJECT: BRITISH AND FRENCH VIEWS OF QATAR'S INITIATIVE ON
DARFUR

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- French Special Envoy for Darfur Issa Maraut told U.S.
Special Envoy Williamson November 23 in advance of
Williamson,s meetings with Qatari officials that Minister of
State Al-Mahmoud understands quite well the issues of Darfur,
is hard-working and wants to succeed.

-- The British Ambassador John Hawkins observed that
Al-Mahmoud is now spending 90 percent of his time on Darfur.

-- The British, Hawkins said, essentially want progress on
the ground in Darfur, no focus on the International Criminal
Court deferment of indictments for now, and close cooperation
between Bassole and Qatar.

End Key Points.


1. (C) In a November 23 meeting with French Special Envoy for
Sudan Issa Maraut, U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Richard
Williamson (accompanied by Ambassador) underscored the need
for the P-3 to work together to encourage the rebel groups to
take risks and participate in Qatar,s Initiative on Darfur.


2. (C) Williamson also pointed out that the International
Criminal Court indictments were a pressure point for Sudanese
President Bashir. If the regime has enough stress,
semi-autonomy for Darfur may be viewed as better than the
break-up of Sudan. The question is whether the Government of
Sudan can be persuaded on this point. Given the added
pressure on the President, those around Bashir are
considering their options.


3. (C) Maraut agreed with Williamson and, noting that he had
been on the ground in Doha for more than a month consulting
with the GOQ on Darfur, said Bassole was working &cleverly8
with Qatar. He added that the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) is a problem. The group intends to visit Doha to
consult with the Qataris, but it is often their tactic to
negotiate and take military action at the same time, which is
not helpful.


4. (C) Turning to Abdul Wahid, Williamson observed that he
has to play with the Qataris and asked Maraut for his
thoughts. Would the French help pressure him, given that he
resides in Paris? Maraut described Abdul Wahid as stubborn
but agreed with Williamson that his participation is vital.
Maraut encouraged Williamson to take up the issue of French
leverage on Abdul Wahid during his upcoming MFA consultations
in Paris.

--------------
ANY ADVICE?
--------------


5. (C) Williamson asked Maraut for advice on his scheduled
November 24 meetings with the GOQ. Maraut responded that the
U.S. need not worry about UN and African Union mediator
Djibril Bassole having a central role, as favored by the P-3.
They are working closely together. Minister of State Ahmed
Al-Mahmoud sees JEM and Abdul Wahid as the main rebel
elements with whom he must contend. He appears to understand
that the rebels do not welcome an Arab League role in the
mediation process. Asked about Abdallah Yehya of SLM Unity
and Minni Minnawi of SLM, Maraut said Minnawi was a problem
for the Sudanese Government during the negotiations in Libya.
Perhaps, Maraut speculated, Minnawi is now out of the game.
Williamson noted that while Minnawi,s role in potential
discussions may not be a major issue, it cannot be ignored.


6. (C) Maraut said that Al-Mahmoud would seek the P-3,s
advice, and work closely with Bassole, on the participation
of groups in any Doha conference. Williamson said he would
look to the French for advice on encouraging JEM. He
observed that Al-Mahmoud is positively engaged and wants to
succeed. He is sincere and hard-working, and he now
understands quite well the issues of Darfur.

--------------
THE BRITISH VIEW
--------------


7. (C) British Ambassador to Qatar John Hawkins observed that
Qatar likes to advance regional initiatives. He said he was

DOHA 00000839 002 OF 002


unsure why Qatar had an interest in Sudan, to which
Williamson responded that it likely came about from the
Amir,s early September meeting in Damascus with President
Sarkozy. Hawkins observed that Al-Mahmoud is spending 90
percent of his time on Sudan and would be pleased by
Williamson,s visit, since the French, Canadian and British
envoys for Sudan had all met with him.


8. (C) The British, Hawkins said, essentially want progress
on the ground in Darfur, no focus on the International
Criminal Court deferment of indictments for now, and close
cooperation between Bassole and Qatar. Asked by Ambassador
if one should be subordinate to the other, Hawkins replied
that the UK believes both should work and coordinate
together. Williamson offered that neither one need to be
designated as the lead so long as there is mutual
coordination between them. He added that the role of the P-3
matters, because the rebels have more confidence in the P-3
than in the Arab League.


9. (U) Special Envoy Williamson has cleared this message.

LeBaron