Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA791
2008-11-06 14:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR MARK LAGON'S VISIT TO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KTIP ELAB QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4668
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0791/01 3111425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061425Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8405
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0064
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0820
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0513
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000791 

SIPDIS

G/TIP PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR LAGON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KTIP ELAB QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR MARK LAGON'S VISIT TO
QATAR

REF: A. DOHA 675

B. MUSCAT 732

Classified By: Amb. Joseph E. LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000791

SIPDIS

G/TIP PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR LAGON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KTIP ELAB QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR MARK LAGON'S VISIT TO
QATAR

REF: A. DOHA 675

B. MUSCAT 732

Classified By: Amb. Joseph E. LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. We have
requested meetings with Minister of State for Interior
Affairs Sheikh Abdullah Bin Nasser Al Thani, Minister of
Labor and Social Affairs Dr. Sultan Bin Hassan al-Dhabit
al-Dousari, Minister of State for International Cooperation
and Conferences Dr. Khalid Al Attiyah, General Secretary of
the National Human Rights Committee Dr. Ali Bin Samikh Al
Marri, Coordinator of the Office to Combat Trafficking in
Persons Dr. Miriam Al Malki, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Director of Human Rights Sheikh Khalid Al Thani. Your visit
comes as we are establishing a cooperative dialogue with the
Government of Qatar on how to better address Qatar's Tier 3
TIP ranking and presents an excellent opportunity to
strengthen U.S.-Qatar engagement on this issue.


2. (C) Below we provide the Country Team's views on how your
visit can best advance the U.S. Government's strategic
objectives in Qatar. We also discuss the key strategic
trends in the bilateral relationship over the coming three
years. We start, however, with a brief review of the
bilateral relationship.

--------------
THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


3. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with The
U.S. is impressive, especially for a country the size of
Connecticut, with only 1.7 million inhabitants, of whom only
about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens.

-- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large,
Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $60,000.
Even through the current global financial crisis, Qatar's
national revenues will continue growing, and Qatar should
soon have the highest per capita income in the world.

-- That wealth has fueled the lightening-fast economic
development that is behind Qatar's growing TIP problem -
hundreds of thousands of foreign workers have been brought in
to build Qatar's infrastructure and staff its institutions,
and work in Qataris' homes.


-- Vast wealth has also bolstered the country's political
ambitions, leading to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that
too often been at odds with U.S. objectives. Examples
include Qatar's relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Sudan.

-- The U.S.-Qatar military relationship is extremely
important. Qatar provides the U.S. military exceptional
access to two major Qatari military installations, Al Udaid
Air Base and Camp As-Saliyeh - perhaps CENTCOM's most
important operating installations outside of Iraq. Qatar
charges us no rent, and in fact is funding over $700 million
in construction projects for the exclusive use of the U.S.
military.

-- The U.S.-Qatar economic relationship is vital. U.S.
energy companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in
the oil and gas industry here. Qatar, which holds the third
largest natural gas reserves in the world after Iran and
Russia, is expected to become in 2009 one of the most
important suppliers of imported liquefied natural gas (LNG)
to the U.S. market.

-- Our educational and cultural relationship with Qatar is
strong and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few
other Arab states to modernizing its educational system, and
has turned decisively to the United States for help. Qatar
has imported branch campuses of six U.S. universities,
including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical
School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern.
At the elementary and secondary levels it is instituting a
U.S. model of charter schools.

-- Al Jazeera, the television network with an Arabic-speaking
audience of some 60 million, is based on Qatar and funded by
the Amir. The network's biased coverage, particularly of
issues important to the U.S., has long been an irritant in
our bilateral relationship. We nevertheless recognize the
value of appearing on Al Jazeera in order to ensure that
official U.S. voices are heard in the Arab world. Because it

DOHA 00000791 002 OF 004


is funded by the Amir, Al Jazeera avoids reporting critical
of Qatar. In a few cases, however, they have broadcast
stories that discuss the TIP problem in the Gulf, including
in Qatar.

--------------
TIP IN QATAR: THE DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT
--------------


4. (C) Qatar's population has doubled over the past five
years. As many as 1.6 million of the estimated 1.7 to 1.8
million population is of foreign origin. These numbers are
expected to grow among every nationality and region of
origin, checked only by Qatari security concerns about
certain nationalities, such as Pakistanis and Iranians.

-- (C) Qataris constitute only 8-12% of the population. As
the foreign population grows, Qataris will become a smaller
minority in their own country despite a relatively high birth
rate. Qatar is not expected to increase the size of its
citizen population by easing restrictions on naturalization
in the near future.

-- (SBU) South Asians from India, Sri Lanka, Nepal,
Bangladesh, and Pakistan account for an estimated 800,000 to
900,000 of the expatriate population and work in a variety of
sectors, including construction, import/export, labor,
business, and information technology. Because their numbers
are so large, and their jobs tend to arrive as unskilled or
semi-skilled workers, it is among these communities that the
majority of the TIP problems occur.

-- (SBU) Several Arab countries' nationals have a major
presence in Qatar, including Egypt, Palestine (typically
long-term residents),Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and
Syria. Expatriate Arabs constitute an estimate 300,000 to
400,000 of the population. They tend to work in engineering,
accounting, import/export, education, energy, services,
hotels, and beauty.

-- (SBU) An estimated 200,000 East Asians live in Qatar.
They are mainly from the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, South
Korea, and China. East Asians are prominent in the fields of
mechanical technology, energy, construction, engineering,
housekeeping, and labor.

-- (SBU) There are as many as 40,000 Africans living in
Qatar. They come from Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and South Africa. African expatriates work mainly
in construction, labor, trade, import/export, energy, and oil
services.

-- (SBU) Europeans account for an estimated 20,000 to 25,000
of the expatriate population. They are generally citizens of
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, and Turkey.
Europeans work in energy, shipping, engineering,
construction, management, education, finance, and investment.

-- (SBU) An estimated 5,000 to 12,000 expatriates from North
and South America (excluding the U.S.) reside in Qatar. They
are mainly from Canada, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, and
Colombia. These individuals work in energy, oil field
services, education, and for Qatar Airways.

-------------- --
PARTNERING WITH QATAR AGAINST HUMAN TRAFFICKING
-------------- --


5. (C) TIP remains one of the most persistent social ills in
Qatar and a major area where the bilateral relationship can
founder. A major U.S. imperative in Qatar is to raise
awareness on TIP, and human rights issues generally, and to
find ways to shape public attitudes and government policies.
We have begun to set up a closer working relationship on TIP
issues with the Qatar government and look to strengthen it
further with your help. Our overarching goal is to set up an
effective Embassy-GOQ mechanism to actively address Qatar's
TIP Tier 3 Rating and improve it.

-- (C) On September 11, Ambassador met with Minister of State
for International Cooperation and Conferences Dr. Khalid Al
Attiyah, a former Chairman of the National Human Rights
Committee. They agreed to forge a more cooperative
relationship on the issue of human trafficking. The Embassy
hopes that by working with Qatari officials in a spirit of
confidence and cooperation, we can gain a better
understanding of the situation and better advise them of how

DOHA 00000791 003 OF 004


to address this issue. Dr. Al Attiyah has been exercising
his influence to open doors for the Embassy's labor and human
rights officer, and while our relationship with some of the
authorities remains strained, the new approach has already
paid dividends in the preparation of the 2008 Human Rights
Report.


6. (C) There are two primary reasons that our engagement with
Qataris on TIP issues is so difficult. First, Qataris
primarily see these issues through the prism of national
security given their small numbers relative to the
overwhelming size of the migrant population. Talking to them
about guest workers in terms of human rights seldom is the
right approach. We have more success when we acknowledge
that Qataris are concerned about maintaining control of their
country, its culture, and political institutions. It is
important to bear in mind as well that, other than the
exploitation of domestic workers in Qatari homes, most
Qataris are personally removed from the majority of the abuse
that occurs here. It is third country nationals overseeing
the day-to-day management of expatriate workers -- sometimes
of the same national origin -- who carry out most of the
abuse. Convincing Qataris that giving foreign workers a
stake in the country -- not necessarily citizenship, which is
inconceivable at present -- is in their long-term interest
will require long-term, sustained engagement. Part of this
engagement requires giving Qataris tools to master their own
land when the vast majority of residents are non-Qatari.


7. (C) Second, Qatari officials engaged with us on these
issues have the perception that the goal posts move with each
passing year. For example, the most recent TIP report
contains global language on sex abuse towards children which
is tangential to the main TIP problems here and was never
raised with the GOQ prior to the report,s publication. They
are also indignant that we don,t give them credit for what
they are trying to do on the road toward tangible results.
Looking back, Qataris expected applause and respect for its
decision to ban juvenile camel jockeys and instead, from
their perspective, saw their TIP rating fall and more
conditions expected of the government.


8. (C) Qatari officials often tell us that they don,t know
where our end game lies. In this vein, you should be
prepared to discuss the recent decision to upgrade Oman's TIP
rating from Tier 3 to Tier 2 watchlist based upon the
expected passage of comprehensive anti-trafficking
legislation there (see ref B). In our discussions with our
Qatari counterparts, we have consistently stressed that Tier
rankings are based upon concrete measures, not the promise of
future action. The texts of the 2008 TIP Report dealing with
Oman and Qatar are virtually identical, and the Qataris may
cite the decision as an unfair "moving of the goal posts."

-------------- -
HOW YOUR VISIT CAN ADVANCE THIS STRATEGIC GOAL
-------------- -


9. (C) Our Qatari counterparts complain that the annual TIP
Report does not accurately reflect the reality here in the
country, in particular that it does not reflect their efforts
to combat human trafficking. They know that it is essential
for them to communicate with the Embassy more closely, and
have responded favorably to our outreach efforts. You can
thank them for this positive response and encourage them to
strengthen their lines of communication with the Embassy in
the future.


10. (C) You should encourage your interlocutors to continue
their efforts to enforce compliance with existing labor laws.
Expatriate laborers in Qatar still work under very difficult
conditions, but we are beginning to see encouraging signs
that the situation is improving. Our counterparts from many
of the labor sending countries report improved relations with
the Qatari authorities and that there are better conditions
at the Deportation Center. More businesses are being
sanctioned for violating laws governing working conditions.
While these sanctions are generally administrative, and it is
still too early to identify a solid trend, we encourage you
to recognize these achievements and ask the Qataris to
strengthen their efforts in the future.


11. (C) You should inquire as to the status of the revised
labor law currently pending before the Advisory Council (see
ref A) and offer our technical expertise. The Advisory
Council opened its new session on November 4 and is expected
to consider the matter soon. There is an ongoing debate

DOHA 00000791 004 OF 004


within the Qatari ruling elite over how to approach these
reforms. One group maintains that that the presence of
hundreds of thousands of foreign laborers is a national
security matter. A competing, yet smaller, group believes
that the importation of foreign labor is an economic and
legal matter and therefore should be managed through the
application of economic and legal principles, chief among
them the sanctity of contract. While the draft law is not as
strict as we would like, the fact that they are considering
changes to the legal structure of their labor importation
system is an encouraging sign.
LeBaron