Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA75
2008-01-29 13:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

QATAR SHOWING INCREASED ATTENTION TO ENERGY

Tags:  ENRG PTER PREL PGOV ECON ETTC EAID EAGR EFIN 
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VZCZCXRO3898
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0075/01 0291314
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 291314Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7528
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000075 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, COS KUPFER
S/CT FOR BAVERILL
DS/ATA FOR KMALOY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2037
TAGS: ENRG PTER PREL PGOV ECON ETTC EAID EAGR EFIN
ASEC, EPET, EINV, TRGY, QA
SUBJECT: QATAR SHOWING INCREASED ATTENTION TO ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION BUT STILL NON-COMMITTAL ON CEIP

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000075

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, COS KUPFER
S/CT FOR BAVERILL
DS/ATA FOR KMALOY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2037
TAGS: ENRG PTER PREL PGOV ECON ETTC EAID EAGR EFIN
ASEC, EPET, EINV, TRGY, QA
SUBJECT: QATAR SHOWING INCREASED ATTENTION TO ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION BUT STILL NON-COMMITTAL ON CEIP

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Department of Energy Assistant Secretary
for Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, Kevin
Kolevar; DOE Secretary Bodman's Chief of Staff Jeff Kupfer;
Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff met with Minister of State for
Energy and Industry Dr. Mohammed Saleh Al-Sada and Qatar
Petroleum Director of the Industrial Security Directorate,
Brigadier Abdulaziz Al-Ansari, January 22 on the margins of
Energy Secretary Bodman's visit to Qatar. A/S Kolevar and
COS Kupfer underscored the current threat to critical energy
infrastructure and the need for greater security due to the
global implications from any attack. They offered a USG
technical assessment of infrastructure vulnerabilities in
Qatar and recommended moving forward urgently on the
assessment. The Minister of State expressed interest in USG
technical assistance; however, Al-Ansari cautioned that any
cooperation would have to wait until his staff was fully
constituted. End Summary.

--------------
Concerns Noted
--------------


2. (S) Minister for State Al-Sada echoed A/S Kolevar's
concerns regarding security and protection of energy
infrastructure in Qatar, identifying two main threats to
Qatar's energy sector: external (e.g. terrorist threats from
Al-Qa'ida) and internal threats from the large number of

unskilled third-country laborers employed on Qatari work
sites. The Minister of State identified the number one GOQ
concern as the exposure of infrastructure vulnerabilities and
consequent risks to industrial facilities. The current GOQ
priority, he said, was strengthening security at facilities
throughout the country, focusing initially on critical energy
infrastructure at the three main industrial centers of Ras
Laffan Industrial City, Dukhan and Messiad.

--------------
Qatari Strategic Security Initiatives
--------------


3. (S) According to Al-Sada, the Heir Apparent recently
established an Industrial Security Steering Committee under
the Ministry of Interior charged with managing the current
nationwide industrial security apparatus and improving
security capacity. The creation of the steering committee
was part of the Heir Apparent's strategic security
initiatives, including the planned establishment of an
integrated National Crisis Center (NCC) and development of
the National Security Shield (NSS). The NCC would provide
coordinated command and control of security and civil defense
units in response to national emergencies, while the NSS
would create a series of interconnected fixed and mobile
radar platforms to identify threats by sea, air and land.

--------------
Security's Expanded Importance
--------------


4. (S) The Minister of State explained that the
complexities of the security situation and the growth of
industrial facilities had changed the nature of
infrastructure protection. No longer was security an
ancillary function - responsible only for entry/exit control
and loss-prevention - it now encompassed planning,
development and implementation of a long-term strategy. He
identified the need for proactive security planning and
operations in providing for business continuity and the
establishment of continuity of operations (COOP) sites in the
event of terrorist, occupational or natural disaster
incidents. Al-Sada touted the creation of a single,
structured and tiered response plan that delineated the
coordination among various industrial companies, QP Security,
MOI police, Internal Security Forces, and the Qatari Armed
Forces. The plan incorporated individual company security
plans (e.g. Conoco-Phillips, Exxon-Mobil, QatarGas, etc),and
would be used in bi-annual exercises conducted by the
individual companies, explained Al-Sada.

--------------
QP Security: Continued Staffing Issues
--------------


5. (S) Brigadier General Al-Ansari, a career MOI police

DOHA 00000075 002 OF 002


officer, said he was still attempting to establish the right
mix of qualified people on his staff to carry out the
recommendations made by a U.S. security consulting firm that
had made recommendations on improvements to Qatar's newly
created steering committee. He said U.S. assistance could
not occur before he had established an effective operational
staff. (Note: In several meetings with the Charge d'Affaires
since July 2007, Al-Ansari has made this same argument.) As
a start, Al-Ansari offered that he had 300 applicants who had
been approved for industrial security positions. He shared
his philosophy that improving security required a parallel
approach with the incorporation of technology and building a
trained force of security professionals. Both Al-Sada and
Al-Ansari agreed that the demand for trained personnel was
greater than the current capacity to supply and train them.
The Minister of State maintained that the Security Academy at
College of the North Atlantic-Qatar (CNAQ) was doing a good
job in training staff, but that the demand outpaced the
academy's capacity of supply.

--------------
Urgency Explained and a Way Forward
--------------


6. (S) In response, A/S Kolevar reinforced the need for
urgency in establishing a CEIP program in Qatar, stating that
a new U.S. administration would take six months to a year to
gain knowledge sufficient to re-engage on an assistance
program. The benefit of moving forward on a program within
the next year would be the continuity Embassy staff and
current DoE officials could provide. A/S Kolever recommended
a formal USG assessment by summer 2008 of Qatar's needs,
especially with respect to training, as the next step
forward. The Qataris were non-committal. Post recommends a
letter from Secretary Bodman to the Qatari Energy Minister
following up on this visit and urging early engagement on
CEIP.


7. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Kolevar.
RATNEY