Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA743
2008-10-22 12:27:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

QATAR PRIME MINISTER SKETCHES DARFUR STRATEGY;

Tags:  PREL EFIN ECON QA SU IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHDO #0743/01 2961227
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P 221227Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8327
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0042
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0007
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/USAFCENT SHAW AFB SC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000743 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: PREL EFIN ECON QA SU IR
SUBJECT: QATAR PRIME MINISTER SKETCHES DARFUR STRATEGY;
COMMENTS ON FINANCIAL CRISIS AND IRAN

REF: DOHA 705

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

-------------
(S) Key Points
--------------

-- Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani sketched Qatar's
mediation strategy on Darfur during call by Ambassador
October 19th; the strategy concludes with a Sudan peace
conference organized and conducted like Qatar's peace
conference on Lebanon.

-- On the global financial crisis, the Prime Minister said
Qatar had increased the reserve requirements on Qatari banks
-- but out of precaution rather than need. He said Qatar was
not drawing down its financial accounts held outside Qatar,
contradicting comments by the Minister of Finance.

-- Turning to Iran, the Prime Minister told Ambassador he was
not optimistic that Iran would agree to pursue nuclear energy
only for peaceful purposes. In the Prime Minister's view,
Iran would continue discussions with the international
community only for the sake of buying time for its nuclear
weapons program.

------------
(S) Comments
------------

-- Qatar's de facto Foreign Minister, Ahmed bin Abdullah
al-Mahmoud, elaborated on Qatar's Sudan strategy in a meeting
with P5 Ambassadors on October 22. (see septel).

-- The Qataris appear to be committed to an extended, major
diplomatic effort on Sudan. That said, they have no illusion
that they will succeed. And they realize the importance of
have strong mechanisms in place for close coordination with
the United Nations, the African Union, and others.

-- On Iran, the Prime Minister's comments on the nuclear
issue reflect Qatar's experienced view of Iran's
disingenuousness. But Embassy notes that this view has not
stopped Qatar from deepening it dialogue with Iran on gas
issues. (See septel.)

END KEY POINTS AND COMMENT.

------------------------
DARFUR MEDIATION EFFORTS
------------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000743

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: PREL EFIN ECON QA SU IR
SUBJECT: QATAR PRIME MINISTER SKETCHES DARFUR STRATEGY;
COMMENTS ON FINANCIAL CRISIS AND IRAN

REF: DOHA 705

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

--------------
(S) Key Points
--------------

-- Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani sketched Qatar's
mediation strategy on Darfur during call by Ambassador
October 19th; the strategy concludes with a Sudan peace
conference organized and conducted like Qatar's peace
conference on Lebanon.

-- On the global financial crisis, the Prime Minister said
Qatar had increased the reserve requirements on Qatari banks
-- but out of precaution rather than need. He said Qatar was
not drawing down its financial accounts held outside Qatar,
contradicting comments by the Minister of Finance.

-- Turning to Iran, the Prime Minister told Ambassador he was
not optimistic that Iran would agree to pursue nuclear energy
only for peaceful purposes. In the Prime Minister's view,
Iran would continue discussions with the international
community only for the sake of buying time for its nuclear
weapons program.

--------------
(S) Comments
--------------

-- Qatar's de facto Foreign Minister, Ahmed bin Abdullah
al-Mahmoud, elaborated on Qatar's Sudan strategy in a meeting
with P5 Ambassadors on October 22. (see septel).

-- The Qataris appear to be committed to an extended, major
diplomatic effort on Sudan. That said, they have no illusion
that they will succeed. And they realize the importance of
have strong mechanisms in place for close coordination with
the United Nations, the African Union, and others.

-- On Iran, the Prime Minister's comments on the nuclear
issue reflect Qatar's experienced view of Iran's
disingenuousness. But Embassy notes that this view has not
stopped Qatar from deepening it dialogue with Iran on gas
issues. (See septel.)

END KEY POINTS AND COMMENT.

--------------
DARFUR MEDIATION EFFORTS
--------------


1. (S) Referencing a recent conversation in Washington
between NEA A/S David Welch and Qatar's Ambassador to the
U.S., Ambassador asked Hamid bin Jassim for Qatar's
assessment of the situation in Sudan. Bin Jassim said Qatar

would not host a conference in Doha to mediate on the
Sudanese conflict just for the sake of holding a conference.
Rather, any conference would have to be substantive and
achieve real progress. The United States, of course, would
be notified before any conference takes place.


2. (S) For now, Qatar plans to discuss next moves with
members of the Arab League. Returning to a possible
conference in Doha down the road, the Prime Minister said all
parties would participate in a televised opening ceremony.
The mediation to follow, however, would occur outside the
spotlight with the aim of narrowing the differences among the
parties. Once those differences were sufficiently narrowed
-- probably after a number of days -- the parties would hold
direct discussions with the goal of finalizing an agreement.


3. (S) President Bashir would have to make concessions,
asserted al-Thani. Before any conference in Doha could take
place, it is vital to schedule a meeting, likely in Libya,
between the Presidents of Sudan and Chad. The Prime Minister
added that it would be difficult to convince President Deby
to meet with his Sudanese counterpart given the huge refugee
problem in Chad. But, until these leaders entered into

DOHA 00000743 002 OF 002


dialogue, no forward movement would be possible. Hamid bin
Jassim also commented that holding the meeting in Libya is
essential. Otherwise, Qadaffi might undertake to spoil the
reconciliation process.


4. (S) Ambassador asked if Qatar played a role in the recent
arrest of a senior leader of the Janjaweed in Sudan, Ali
Mohamed Ali Abdel-Rahman. The Prime Minister responded that
Qatar had encouraged the arrest as part of its mediation
efforts.


--------------
STEADY COURSE DESPITE FINANCIAL STORM
--------------


5. (C) On the financial crisis, the Prime Minister said Qatar
had increased the reserve requirements on Qatari banks -- but
out of precaution rather than need. The Prime Minister said
Qatar was not repatriating any funds from foreign banks
overseas. He said the Qatar Investment Authority also was
still investing overseas. It had recently increased its
stake in Credit Suisse and in the coming days additional
investments would be made public. Qatar was making no change
in its policies.


6. (C) Al-Thani pointed out that Qatar would continue to have
its currency (and wealth) tied to the dollar, prompting
Ambassador to ask about progress on establishing a common
currency for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The
Prime Minister said that Qatar supports GCC efforts to adopt
a common currency, but that this change would be slow and
gradual. In his personal view, it is better not to link a new
GCC currency to a basket of international currencies.
Rather, he favors the creation of a new GCC currency backed
entirely by the region's considerable wealth.


7. (C) The Prime Minister cautioned that Qatar's holdings and
assets are predominantly priced in dollars, so severing
Qatar's currency from the dollar peg would require careful
planning, especially given the current deflation in asset
prices.

--------------
NEED TO EXIT FROM IRANIAN BAZAAR
--------------


8. (S) Turning to Iran, the Prime Minister told Ambassador he
was not optimistic that Iran would agree to pursue nuclear
energy only for peaceful purposes. In the PM's view, Iran
would continue discussions with the international community
only for the sake of buying time for its nuclear weapons
program.


9. (S) Qatar enjoys good relations with Iran, but that does
not mean Qatar is naive. Rather, al-Thani said he takes most
of what the Iranians say with a grain of salt. Qatar, he
stressed, does not have confidence in Iran but nonetheless
must be prudent and maintain open lines of communication
because Iran and Qatar share the natural gas reserves which
are the source of Qatar's wealth.


10. (S) The Prime Minister encouraged the U.S. to change the
nature of our approach by turning the tables on Iran and
asking the Iranians for what they want from the West.
Otherwise, he said, all of us will continue to play into the
endless bazaar haggling that so suits Iran.
LeBaron