Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA722
2008-10-15 13:32:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF SCHWARTZ'

Tags:  PREL MOPS PGOV QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6188
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0722/01 2891332
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151332Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8300
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USAFCENT SHAW AFB SC PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000722 

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF
GENERAL NORTON SCHWARTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF SCHWARTZ'
VISIT TO QATAR

REF: DOHA 664

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL NORTON SCHWARTZ, FROM
AMBASSADOR LEBARON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000722

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF
GENERAL NORTON SCHWARTZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF SCHWARTZ'
VISIT TO QATAR

REF: DOHA 664

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

FOR AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL NORTON SCHWARTZ, FROM
AMBASSADOR LEBARON


1. (C) General Schwartz, Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to
Qatar. We have requested office calls for you with the Heir
Apparent, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the Chief of Staff
of the Qatar Armed Forces, Major General Hamad bin Ali
Al-Attiyeh, and the Commander of the Qatar Emiri Air Forces,
Brigadier General (Pilot) Mubarak Mohammed Al-Khayarin. We
expect all will agree to see you, subject to their
availability. You last visited Qatar in April 2008 as
Transcom Commander, and met at that time with MG Al-Attiyeh.
Secretary Donley met with MG Al-Attiyeh earlier this month.


2. (C) Here we provide the Country Team's views on how your
visit can best advance the U.S. Government's strategic
objectives in Qatar. We also discuss the key strategic
trends in the bilateral relationship over the coming three
years. We start, however, with a brief review of the
bilateral relationship.

--------------
THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


3. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the
U.S. is impressive, especially for a small country the size
of Connecticut, with only 1.7 million inhabitants, of whom
only about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens.

-- The U.S.-Qatar military relationship is, of course,
extremely important. Qatar provides the U.S. military
exceptional access to two major Qatari military
installations, Al Udaid Air Base and Camp As-Saliyeh -
perhaps CENTCOM's most important operating installations
outside of Iraq. Qatar charges us no rent, and in fact is
funding over $700 million in construction projects for the
exclusive use of the U.S. military.

-- Until recently, the U.S. had never made a major defense
sale to Qatar. In July, however, Qatar signed contracts with
Boeing for two C-17s with an option for two more, and with
Lockheed-Martin for four C-130Js with an option for two more.
The C-17 and C-130 sales are a signal the Qataris are

beginning to invest in their own defensive capabilities -
with a preference for U.S.-origin equipment.

-- The broader economic relationship between Qatar and the
United States is vital. U.S. energy companies have invested
tens of billions of dollars in the oil and gas industry here.
Qatar, which holds the third largest natural gas reserves in
the world after Iran and Russia, is expected to become in
2009 one of the most important suppliers of imported
liquefied natural gas to the U.S. market.

-- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large,
Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $60,000.
Even with the current global financial crisis, Qatar's
national revenues will continue growing, and Qatar should
soon have the highest per capita income in the world.

-- Vast wealth has bolstered the country's political
ambitions, leading to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that
have too often been at odds with U.S. objectives. Examples
include Qatar's relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and
Sudan.

-- Qatar's location, wide-ranging foreign relations,
fast-growing economy, and expanding transportation links have
made counterterrorism cooperation, including counterterrorist
financing, a key aspect of our relationship. Qatar's wealth,
in particular, means its citizens are potential sources of
money for violent extremists and cooperative efforts to
target and prevent these financial flows are central to our
bilateral agenda.

-- Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab states to
modernizing its educational system, and has turned decisively
to the Unites States for help. Qatar has imported branch

DOHA 00000722 002 OF 005


campuses of six U.S. universities, including Texas A&M,
Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical School, Georgetown,
Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern. It is instituting a
U.S. model of charter schools at the elementary and secondary
levels.

-------------- --------------
THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: KEY TRENDS THROUGH 2011
-------------- --------------


4. (S) Following are the key trends over the next three years
that we believe will have the greatest impact on our military
relationship:

-- Qatar will continue to modernize its military through the
purchase of U.S. weapons systems, though competition will
continue from the French, British, and others. Despite
Qatar's wealth, defense purchases will be made in the context
of a frugal military budget. Economic development will
remain Qatar's top spending priority.

-- Qatar will continue to face a formidable challenge
staffing its military with Qataris because there are so few
Qataris and because more attractive salaries exist in the
private sector. The continued dependence on foreign
nationals, particularly in the enlisted ranks, will continue
to present concerns about transfers of sensitive U.S.
technology.

-- The Qatari leadership will seek to increase the prestige
of its military within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and
the international arena, but has no clearly defined strategy
for doing so. Likewise, Qatar is attracted to the latest
military systems, even while its military modernization is
not guided by a national security strategy, at least not one
we're aware of.

-- Qatar's defense purchases are currently misaligned with
the maritime threats to its critical economic
infrastructureand the ballistic missile threats it faces from
Iran. But Qatar's recent C-130 and C-17 aircraft purchases
do align with its desire to carve out a niche in the region
and internationally for humanitarian relief and disaster
response. This trend will continue.

-- In the short term, irritating customs and immigration
issues stemming from Qatar's need to demonstrate sovereignty
over Al Udaid Air Base will continue to plague the mil-mil
relationship.

-- We expect that the biggest factor in our engagement in the
near term will be Qatar's sensitivity to the large, enduring
U.S. military presence. While Qatar's leadership and
population regard our presence as a permanent and necessary
deterrent to the agression fo surrounding states, principally
Iran and Saudi Arabia, it does expose it to regional
criticism and, potentially, to terrorist attack.

-- We expect, therefore, that Qatar will continue to pursue a
policy of strengthening and deepening the military
relationship through increased combined planning, training,
exercises, and operations - along the lines of the
relationship that exists between the U.S. Forces in Korea and
the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

-------------- --------------
HOW YOUR VISIT CAN HELP THESE STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT GOALS
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Defense sales and other elements of security
assistance and cooperation are aimed at strengthening our
long-term military and economic relationship. The Government
of Qatar's efforts to modernize the Qatar Armed Forces, to
include airlift, critical economic infrastructure protection,
and missile defense, are in line with USG objectives to
strengthen regional partners and enhance regional security.


6. (C) Embassy Doha is working to synchronize activities
across the interagency in an effort to support execution of
USG policy, plans and programs. As we work to deepen and
expand our strategic, operational and tactical cooperation
with the Government of Qatar, we see your visit as a tool to
further these shared, strategic, goals. Here's how your

DOHA 00000722 003 OF 005


visit can help:


7. (S) URGING QATAR TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY: The trends identified above suggest a strong
Qatari imperative for Qatar to develop an overarching
national security strategy, guiding its military development,
defense purchases, cooperation with the U.S. and other
allies. The U.S. has a strong interest in working with Qatar
on that, ensuring to the extent possible, that their national
security strategy is consistent with, and supportive of, our
own. Given both your current position as CSAF and your
previous position commanding Transcom, you are well placed to
urge the Qatari leadership in this direction and help them
understand the importance of developing a broad and detailed
strategy into which their current defense aquisitions fit.


8. (C) PRAISING DEFENSE SALES: You should compliment Qatar
for signing contacts with Boeing in July for two C-17s (with
an option for two more) and with Lockheed-Martin for four
C-130Js (also with an option for two more) and encourage the
Qataris to continue down this path. Boeing anticipates
initial delivery of the first C-17 in August-September 2009.
Boeing and SAF/IA will meet 21-23 October with the QEAF
Transport Committee to advise that delivery may slip to the
right.

-- The C-17 and C-130 sales (both hybrid DCS-FMS cases) are a
signal the Qataris are beginning to invest in their own
defense capabilities, especially in the area of humanitarian
relief. Qatar is also looking at U.S. helicopters and
Hellfire II missiles as part of its National Security Shield
effort, and possibly F-16 or F-18 fighter aircraft as well as
an integrated air defense system.


9. (S) PROVIDING A RESPONSE ON LAIRCM: Qatar looks to the
USG for a response to their long-standing request to install
Large Aircraft Infrared Counter Measures (LAIRCM) on five
dedicated aircraft used by the Amir, his wife, the Heir
Apparent, and the Prime Minister.

-- Qatar originally requested the system in September 2003,
over five years ago. The system was offered to Qatar in
April 2004 but the offer was canceled in December. It is our
understanding that USAF release policy for the system
changed, making Qatar ineligible.

-- DSCA is currently unwilling to engage Qatar on the
acquisition of LAIRCM. DSCA's initial concern was that the
Amir's aircraft was not exclusively his; in fact, it is.
Another concern involves maintenance - only citizens of
certain countries are allowed to maintain the system, so this
issue would also have to be addressed.

-- It may be that the U.S. is reluctant to release this
technology to Qatar, but this has never been officially
articulated. The lack of response troubles the Qataris, who
perceive a real need to protect the Amir and their senior
leadership from potential threats -- which are more
pronounced in their view due to the U.S. military presence in
country.

-- Your giving Qatari officials feedback on the request would
mark a positive step forward. You should acknowledge to MG
Al-Attiyah that Qatar has submitted a request for the
installation of LAIRCM on five aircraft used by senior Qatari
officials and offer to look into the request and provide a
response.


10. (S) GETTING THE PATRIOT MISSILES BACK ON THE RAILS:
Patriots were deployed to Qatar in fall 2006 to support the
15th Asian Games in Doha. Protection was primarily for U.S.
Forces at Al Udaid and Camp As Sayliyah, but also covered a
large portion of Doha and some (not all) critical
infrastructure. On October 15, 2007, a routine test sequence
resulted in the accidental launch of a Patriot Missile from a
battery at Camp As-Saylieh. The missile landed on the Qatari
COS' farm a few kilometers from Camp As-Saylieh, with no
injuries or property damage. U.S.-Qatari cooperation on the
investigation was good and the Qataris appreciated that ADM
Fallon responded quickly to their request to stand both
batteries down and physically remove missiles from the
launchers.


DOHA 00000722 004.4 OF 005


-- The Qataris originally signaled that they would agree to
putting the Patriot batteries back up, but first asked for
the full report on the incident, temporary rules of
engagement, and an analysis of the Patriots' coverage area to
ensure that the city of Doha is covered and not just the
military bases.

-- Completion of the final report took longer than expected,
but has since been briefed to senior Qatari military
officers. In early September, however, we were informed that
the Government of Qatar seeks to establish strategic-level
rules of engagement (as opposed to tactical procedures) on
exactly when, where, and how the Patriots may be used.

-- LTG Dempsey and LTG North engaged MG Al-Attiyah personally
for redeployment of Patriots, but to no avail. CENTCOM and
AFCENT are aware of the rules-of-engagement request and are
concerned about the ramifications and precedence set by
entering into such discussions. We believe that the delay in
the return to operational status likely boils down to Qatari
sovereignty concerns and, perhaps, a GOQ desire for some form
of role in granting permission or approval prior to firing
missiles.

-- Meanwhile, Qatar is aggressively pursuing FMS information
on an integrated air defense system which includes, among
other systems, Patriot-PAC 3. Additionally, Qatar is aware
that its neighbors Bahrain and UAE are in the process of
receiving one each Patriot battery as part of an enhanced air
defense posture for U.S. Forces in the region.

-- You should encourage Sheikh Tamim to authorize us to put
the Patriots back on rails, as the final decision is likely
his. Preliminary discussions with CENTCOM air defenders
suggest an opportunity to deploy a second Patriot battery to
Qatar. Offering the second battery to cover what Qatar
considers to be of strategic importance may be just the right
bargaining chip to get permission to put the first battery
back on-line. We hope to have an answer on the viability of
this option before your arrival.

-- Continuation of the current situation, however, is
lose-lose for both U.S. and Qatar in terms of security. If
Sheikh Tamim's answer is that we need bilateral discussions
on strategic-level rules of engagement before doing so, the
Embassy will coordinate on next steps with CENTCOM.


11. (C) APPRECIATION OF EFFORTS TO ADD SECOND RUNWAY AT AL
UDAID: You should thank Sheikh Tamim and MG Al-Attiyah for
their ongoing efforts to secure Qatari financing for this
expansion.

-- AFCENT has long wanted Qatar to build a second runway at
Al Udaid something the Qataris had long resisted. In March,
the Qataris agreed to build it and, apparently, pay for it.
This demonstrates QAF commitment to accommodate U.S. presence
in light of their own increased airlift footprint at Al Udaid.

-- A final decision for payment currently rests with the
Ministry of Finance. MG Al-Attiyah expects positive
resolution in the near future. But despite an apparent lack
of response from the Ministry of Finance thus far, all
indications are that construction of the second runway is
progressing rapidly.


12. (C) ENCOURAGE RESOLUTION OF ONGOING CUSTOMS ISSUES: You
should note U.S. understanding that military facilities
provided for U.S. use in Qatar are sovereign Qatari
territory, and in this context express our desire to resolve
customs problems that plague our overall bilateral strategic
defense relationship.

-- Customs problems continue to plague our working-level
engagement with the Qatari Armed Forces. There have been
numerous incidents in which Coalition personnel violated
established Qatar customs procedures on entry or exit from
the country, leading to Qatari accusations that U.S.
personnel are not respecting Qatari sovereignty. These led
Qatar, in March 2007, to implement troublesome new customs
procedures for personnel, equipment, and cargo entering or
transiting the country.

-- CENTCOM J5, AFCENT, ASG-Qatar and OMC Qatar personnel held

DOHA 00000722 005 OF 005


discussions with the QatariArmed Forces in June and November
2007 ad March 2008, which led to agreement on temporary
procedures. Only constant, daily OMC Qatar and AFCENT
interaction with the Qatar Armed Forces GHQ and Customs and
Ports Authority officials prevent detrimental effects to U.S.
operations.

-- These tactical-level irritants will be exacerbated as we
shift operational focus to efforts in Afghanistan, and will
lead to delays in intra-theater cargo movement thus degrading
our operational capabilities. Continued degradation of this
type will continue to erode our once strong strategic
mil-to-mil relationship.

-- We regard the temporary procedures as a stepping stone for
permanent procedures that respect U.S. and Qatar sovereignty,
support U.S. operations and are in line with the Defense
Cooperation Agreement. But in the meantime, some goodwill
from the Qatari side would go a long way toward easing U.S.
military operations in Qatar.
LeBaron