Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA718
2008-10-15 06:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

Tags:  PTER ASEC PGOV PREL QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5874
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0718/01 2890640
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 150640Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8295
RUEAWJL/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000718 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV PREL QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK FILIP TO QATAR

REF: DOHA 664

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000718

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV PREL QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK FILIP TO QATAR

REF: DOHA 664

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. You are
scheduled to meet with Qatar's Attorney General, Dr. Ali bin
Fetais Al-Marri, and either the Director or Deputy Director
of Qatar State Security (QSS). Dr. Al-Marri may also host a
lunch in your honor that would include other Qatari judicial,
security and law enforcement leaders.


2. (C) Below we provide the Country Team's views on how your
visit can best advance the U.S. Government's strategic
objectives in Qatar. We also discuss the key strategic
trends in the bilateral relationship over the coming three
years. We start, however, with a brief review of the
bilateral relationship.

--------------
THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


3. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the
U.S. is impressive, especially for a country the size of
Connecticut, with only 1.7 million inhabitants, of whom only
about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens.

-- The U.S.-Qatar law enforcement cooperation has deepened
considerably over the past few years, and the GOQ has shown
an commendable commitment to rule of law. In lieu of an
extradition treaty, the Qataris have deported to U.S. custody
several American citizen fugitives, and cooperate regularly
with our Legal Attache. The Ministry of Interior, which has
authority over law enforcement agencies in Qatar, sends large
numbers of their personnel to U.S. universities and private
training institutes. The MOI and judiciary have welcomed
visits and training by U.S. experts.

-- Qatar's location, wide-ranging foreign relations,
fast-growing economy, and expanding transportation links have
made counterterrorism cooperation, including counterterrorist
financing, a key aspect o our relationship. Qatar's wealth,
in particula, means its citizens are potential sources of
moey for violent extremists and cooperative efforts o
target and prevent these financial flows are cntral to our
bilateral agenda.

-- The U.S.-Qatr military relationship is extremely
important. Qatar provides the U.S. military exceptional

accss to two major Qatari military installations, Al Udaid
Air Base and Camp As-Saliyeh - perhaps CENTCOM's most
important operating installations outside of Iraq. Qatar
charges us no rent, and in fact is funding over $700 million
in construction projects for the exclusive use of the U.S.
military.

-- The economic relationship between Qatar and the United
States is vital. U.S. energy companies have invested tens of
billions of dollars in the oil and gas industry here. Qatar,
which holds the third largest natural gas reserves in the
world after Iran and Russia, is expected to become in 2009
one of the most important suppliers of imported liquefied
natural gas (LNG) to the U.S. market.

-- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large,
Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $60,000.
Even through the current global financial crisis, Qatar's
national revenues will continue growing, and Qatar should
soon have the highest per capita income in the world.

-- Vast wealth has bolstered the country's political
ambitions, leading to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that
too often been at odds with U.S. objectives. Examples
include Qatar's relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Sudan.

-- Our educational and cultural relationship with Qatar is
strong and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few
other Arab states to modernizing its educational system, and
has turned decisively to the Unites States for help. Qatar
has imported branch campuses of six U.S. universities,
including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical
School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern.
At the elementary and secondary levels it is instituting a
U.S. model of charter schools.

-- The U.S. government is concerned about the treatment of
foreign workers in Qatar. Qatar's rapid growth, and the
resulting massive demand for foreign workers to develop the
country's infrastructure often leads to exploitation and
abysmal working conditions for the laborers. Qatar has been

DOHA 00000718 002 OF 003


ranked Tier 3 - the lowest - in the State Department's
Trafficking in Persons Report for 2008.

-- Given Qatar's wealth, the country has great potential to
be a partner in U.S. policy initiatives to provide aid to
struggling regional states. We frequently approach them
about participating financially in these initiatives.

-- Al Jazeera, the television network with an Arabic-speaking
audience of some 60 million, is based on Qatar and funded by
the Amir. The network's biased coverage, particularly of
issues important to the U.S., has long been an irritant in
our bilateral relationship. We nevertheless recognize the
value of appearing on Al Jazeera in order to ensure that
official U.S. voices are heard in the Arab world.

-------------- --------------
THE COUNTERTERRORISM AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RELATIONSHIPS:
KEY TRENDS THROUGH 2011
-------------- --------------


4. (S) Over the next three years, we believe the following
are the major trends with the greatest impact on our
counterterrorism and law enforcement relationship. It is
here where your visit, and those of other senior USG
officials, can have the most important impact.

-- Due to its small size and great wealth, Qatar will not be
a major source of jihadists leaving to engage in terrorism.
Some of Qatar's citizens, however, may support terrorism
financially, perhaps outstripping the ability of the
government to stop it.

-- We expect that Qatar will continue to be an inconsistent
partner in combating terrorism, in part because of fear of
embarrassment by acknowledging problems - and in part because
more engagement might antagonize extremist groups and
invite an attack.

-- The population of foreigners will continue growing
(foreigners already outnumber Qatari citizens by
seven-to-one). The societal changes that come with this
rapid population growth will outpace the government's ability
to effectively address the law enforcement challenges it
faces.

-- Qatar's crime rate is among the lowest in the world, but
there has been a 330% increase in crime across the board
since 2005. This trend, in particular, will continue along
with the country's demographic shifts. Rapid economic
development will also increase opportunities for money
laundering and cybercrime.

-- Meanwhile, Qatar's law enforcement agencies will continue
facing formidable challenges in staffing and retaining
quality personnel as they work to shift to an all-Qatari
police and military force.

-- Qatar's judiciary is largely independent. The same
standards of law apply to both Qataris and expatriates, and
this positive rule of law trend will continue.

--------------
COUNTERTERRORISM: A MAJOR GOAL
FOR OUR STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT
--------------


5. (S) Although cooperation on law enforcement issues has
improved markedly over the past few years, counterterrorism
cooperation and intelligence sharing has lagged. The U.S.
has a strong interest in improving this cooperation.

-- (S) There are policy and attitudinal differences between
the U.S. and Qatar over terrorism, particularly with respect
to Hamas. For example, Hamas is viewed very differently than
Al-Qaida and its ilk. This is a major point of friction in
the bilateral relationship that stands in the way of greater
cooperation on the political level.

-- (S) The intelligence on Qatar's official support for Hamas
is inconclusive, with divisions on this issue even within the
U.S. intelligence community. The USG needs a more accurate
picture of the role of the Qatari Government and its citizens
in financing - or tolerating the financing of - terrorism,
especially funds directed towards Hamas.

-- (S) As noted above, as Qatar's financial sector expands
and the country's wealth grows, so too will the potential for
Qatar to be a source of money from private Qatar citizens to
terrorist groups. Qatar's Central Bank currently cooperates

DOHA 00000718 003 OF 003


on a range of anti-terrorist finance efforts, and we need are
working to expand that cooperation. Qatar has an agency
charged with regulating foreign charitable contributions by
its citizens and we need to deepen our relationship with it.

-- (S) In addition to more cooperation on terrorist finance,
we need more information sharing, more access to suspects of
concern, and more coordinated effort to disrupt
Al-Qaida-related funding and logistical activities in and
through Qatar.

--------------
HOW YOUR VISIT CAN HELP THESE STRATEGIC GOALS
--------------


6. (S) We believe the following approach will help your visit
advance these goals:

-- (C) Continue the positive, senior-level dialogue on the
al-Subaie case that has thus far included visit to Qatar by
AG Mukasey, FBI Director Mueller, CIA Director Hayden,
Treasury U/S Levey, and Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Wainstein. You should
thank the Qataris for their cooperation to date, encourage
continued cooperation, and highlight recently passed
intelligence suggesting a continued serious threat posed by
al-Subaie and his circle. (You will be briefed separately on
this issue both in Washington and at the Embassy in Doha
prior to you meetings here.)

-- (C) Encourage Qatar's Attorney General to respond
positively on a long-standing request for banking records
associated with the Qatari citizen Ali al-Marri, currently in
Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. Working together
to prosecute Ali al-Marri would be an important gesture of CT
and law enforcement cooperation. The Qatari AG told us
earlier this year that the USG's refusal to return Al-Jazeera
cameraman (and Sudanese citizen) Sami al-Hajj to Qatar rather
than Sudan was a personal embarrassment and led to his
decision to decline our judicial assistance request on Ali
al-Marri. He has subsequently said he would reconsider the
decision, but has not followed through.

-- (S) Note our continued interest in cooperation on
combating terrorist finance. The IMF recently issued a
report which the local press touted as a "clean bill of
health" on financial crimes and money-laundering. The
reality is more complicated, and while our cooperation with
the Qatar Central Bank is good, the Qataris need to be
reminded of the constant need for vigilance. (Principal
responsibility for this issue lies with the Qatar Central
Bank, with which you are not meeting. Qatar's AG is not
directly involved. QSS, however, gets involved in the when
financial crimes are investigated and prosecuted, and a brief
discussion of this issue with QSS leadership would be useful.)

LeBaron