Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA587
2008-08-18 13:51:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR AUGUST 26 CENTCOM COMPONENT

Tags:  PREL MOPS PGOV QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3000
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0587/01 2311351
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181351Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8143
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0219
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0180
RHMFISS/USAFCENT SHAW AFB SC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RBDHDZA/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000587 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AUGUST 26 CENTCOM COMPONENT
COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000587

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AUGUST 26 CENTCOM COMPONENT
COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes CENTCOM leadership, staff, and
component commanders to Qatar. During the last CCC, in May
2008, both GEN Petraeus and LTG (P) Dempsey met with Qatari
Armed Forces Chief of Staff (COS) MG Hamad al-Attiyah.
During this visit, we hope to arrange meetings with MG
al-Attiyah and other Qatari leaders. The following
information on Qatar represents the Country Team's consensus
view on the state of the U.S.-Qatar relationship and current
issues on the mil-mil agenda.


2. (C) At the strategic level, the U.S.-Qatar military
relationship is in good shape. Qatari officials regard our
strategic partnership as permanent, outliving any political
differences with Washington. The Qataris appreciate the
frequent high-level DOD visitors here, but will nevertheless
be concerned about where the transition in Washington will
leave the U.S.-Qatar military relationship.


3. (C) Despite the positive atmosphere at the strategic
level, our operational-level cooperation continues to be
hampered by difficulties with Qatari Customs. Some of the
problems are self-inflicted, including troops and contractors
transiting Al-Udeid Air Base with alcohol, pornography, and
occasionally drugs. Some of the customs difficulties may
also be a GOQ "tool" to remind us of their sovereignty, but
unfortunately in ways that have a serious impact on U.S.
operations here. Managing that operational-level
cooperation, and overcoming these problems, requires a great
deal of engagement - by the Embassy, by CENTCOM, and by our
frequent senior-level visitors.

-------------- --------------
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S.-QATAR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
-------------- --------------


4. (S) PATRIOT MISSILE LAUNCH: On October 15, 2007, a
routine test sequence resulted in the accidental launch of a
Patriot Missile from a battery at Camp As-Saylieh. The
missile landed on the Qatari COS' farm a few kilometers from
Camp As-Saylieh. Fortunately, no one was hurt and there was
no property damage. U.S.-Qatari cooperation on the
investigation was good and the Qataris appreciated that ADM

Fallon responded quickly to their request to stand both
batteries down and physically remove missiles from the
launchers. The investigation revealed a software gap that
allowed the missile to be fired even in training mode and a
doctrinal gap that allowed the firing sequence to be executed
without the launchers being physically disconnected from the
launch controller. The Qataris signaled that they would
agree to putting the Patriot batteries back up, but first
asked for the full report on the incident, temporary rules of
engagement, and an analysis of the Patriots' coverage area to
ensure that the city of Doha is covered and not just the
military bases. Completion of the final report took longer
than expected, but has since been briefed to senior Qatari
military officers and we are now close to redeploying the
batteries. According to discussions between COS and LTG
North on August 1, from the Qatari military perspective,
everything is ready and is only waiting final review and
approval by the Heir Apparent, Sheikh Tamim, who has been out
of the country.


5. (C) DEFENSE SALES: Until recently, the U.S. had never made
a major defense sale to Qatar. In July, however, Qatar
signed contracts with Boeing for two C-17s with an option for
two more, and with Lockheed-Martin for four C-130Js with an
option for two more. Boeing anticipates initial delivery of
the first aircraft in August-September 2009. The C-17 and
C-130 sales (hybrid DCS-FMS cases) are a signal the Qataris
are beginning to invest in their own defensive capabilities.
They are also looking at U.S. helicopters and Hellfire II
missiles as part of their National Security Shield effort,
and possibly F-16 or F-18 fighter aircraft as well as an
integrated air defense system.


6. (C) DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NAVAL BASE: We had been told that
Qataris finally settled on a location for a new naval base in
the north of the peninsula, but MG al-Attiyeh recently told
DepSecDef England, without further explanation, that those

DOHA 00000587 002 OF 004


plans are indefinitely on hold. When ultimately developed,
the Qataris have made clear that the base will be large
enough to host the largest U.S. naval vessels and very much
want the U.S. to utilize it. During then-TRANSCOM Commander
GEN Schwartz's visit in April, the Qatari COS mentioned that
the base could be used as a seaport for military cargo and
logistics support. The Qataris also have plans to develop a
major new commercial port south of Doha and intend it to be
large enough to accommodate the largest U.S. Naval vessels,
including aircraft carriers.


7. (C) SECOND RUNWAY AT AL-UDEID: AFCENT has long wanted
Qatar to build a second runway at Al-Udeid, something the
Qataris had long resisted. In March, the Qataris agreed to
build it and, apparently, to pay for it. Final decision for
payment currently rests with the Ministry of Finance. COS
expects positive resolution in the near future.


8. (C) CUSTOMS ISSUES: Customs problems continue to plague
our working-level engagement with the Qatari Armed Forces.
There have been numerous incidents in which Coalition
personnel violated established Qatar customs procedures on
entry or exit from the country, leading to Qatari accusations
that U.S. personnel are not respecting Qatari sovereignty.
These led Qatar, in March 2007, to implement troublesome new
customs procedures for personnel, equipment, and cargo
entering or transiting the country. CENTCOM submitted a
counterproposal in June 2007. CENTCOM J5, AFCENT, and OMC
Qatar personnel held discussions with the Qatari Armed Forces
in June and November 2007 and March 2008, which led to
agreement on temporary procedures. Only constant (daily) OMC
Qatar and AFCENT interaction with the Qatar Armed Forces GHQ
and Customs and Ports Authority officials prevent detrimental
effects to U.S. operations. We regard the temporary
procedures as a stepping stone for permanent procedures that
respect U.S. and Qatar sovereignty, support U.S. operations
and are in line with the Defense Cooperation Agreement.
Recent concerns of abuse of sovereignty by visiting DVs has
led the Qataris to tighten procedures for the use of the DV
lounge at AUAB, unfortunately, these changes occurred without
notification and coincidentally during an unplanned diversion
of an aircraft carrying GEN Petraeus.


9. (S) DEPORTATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL: The Government of
Qatar, through the Ministry of Interior (Immigration) and
Customs and Ports Authority have stepped up penalties on U.S.
personnel who the Qataris believe violated Qatari law,
whether deliberately or accidentally. Most recently, eight
U.S. service members (six USAF security personnel and two USA
EOD personnel) were deported following their detention by
Emiri Guard security and intelligence personnel. The U.S.
personnel were engaged in Personnel Security Operations area
familiarization/reconnaissance which took them onto Emiri
Palace grounds. QAF Intelligence and Emiri Guard Security
forces viewed this as "targeting" and "reconnaissance"
despite the innocence of the mission. This instance
highlights the growing need for U.S. forces in Qatar to
coordinate activities "outside the gate" through this Embassy
with host country agencies.


10. (C) RELOCATION OF CENTCOM FORWARD HEADQUARTERS (CFH) and
other facilities from Camp As-Saylieh: The Qataris
eventually want all U.S. facilities out of Camp As-Saylieh
and two committees are currently discussing different aspects
of the move. Sticking points will be the timeline (ours
long, Qatar's short) and cost-sharing. The new CFH at
Al-Udeid should be completed and fully mission capable in May

2009. A new SOCCENT Forward Headquarters will also be
completed in 2009.

--------------
THE BROADER U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


11. (C) Over the coming years, Qatar's importance to the U.S.
will only grow. Qatar is now the largest LNG exporter in the
world and has the world's third largest reserves after Russia
and Iran. By the end of 2009, Qatari will become a major
supplier of LNG to the U.S. market. Fueled by growing
exports of oil and LNG, Qatar's economy has been booming.
Some estimates put per capita income at USD 60,000. Between

DOHA 00000587 003 OF 004


now and 2012, Qatar's LNG exports will double, bringing a
corresponding growth to Qatar's economy and the global
financial clout of Qatar's sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar
Investment Authority. Unfortunately, wild economic growth is
also producing 14 percent inflation (felt most acutely in the
housing market) and feeding a demand for cheap construction
labor in a country that already has a very poor record on
treatment of foreign workers.


12. (C) IRAQ: The Amir thinks we made a big mistake toppling
Saddam Hussein, but shares our view that restoration of order
and a successful democratic transition in Iraq are of
paramount importance not only to Iraq but to the region, and
their officials state publicly that the Coalition needs to
stay in the country to establish wider security. However, a
strong distaste for Iraq's Shia-dominated government drives
Qatar's resistance to follow through on some of our
priorities, including comprehensive debt forgiveness and
greater political engagement. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the
UAE, Qatar has made no commitment to send an ambassador to
Baghdad. In his recent meeting with DepSecDef England, the
Emir reiterated that the U.S. can't leave Iraq right away,
but identified the challenge as finding a strong leader who
can control the country, adding that it would be chaos if the
U.S. left too soon.


13. (S) IRAN: Iran hangs heavily over our relationship with
Qatar, which worries that we may have plans for Iran, perhaps
even military plans, that we are not sharing with them.
Qatar fears and deeply distrusts Iran, and shares our concern
about its nuclear program, which it regards as unstoppable.
But because of Qatar's geographic proximity, vulnerability of
its energy installations, and the fact that its massive
off-shore gas reserves are shared with Iran, Qatar will do
nothing to engender an antagonistic relationship. During the
DepSecDef visit, the Emir identified Iran as the key to the
whole region and expressed hope that incentives now being
offered to Iran will encourage its leadership to be more
reasonable.

--------------
ISSUES TO RAISE
--------------


14. (S) During host nation meetings by senior U.S. military
officials, we recommend making the following points:

-- Thank the Government of Qatar (GOQ) for its continued
partnership and support for the war on terror and our broader
U.S. military operations in the region. Note that this is
especially evident from the access Qatar gives the U.S.
military at Al-Udeid Air Base and Camp As-Saylieh, and
GOQ-funded construction at Al-Udeid.

-- Explain that despite the political transition in
Washington following U.S. elections, there will be
considerable continuity in our military relationship with
Qatar.

-- Congratulate MG al-Attiyeh on signing contracts in July
for purchase of C-17 and C-130 aircraft. We have a strong
commitment to help the GOQ derive maximum benefit from these
purchases, which represent an important advancement in our
mil-mil relationship.

-- Note that a logical next step in our strategic
relationship would be for Qatar to join the maritime
Coalition. The new NAVCENT commander, VADM Gortney, just
visited Qatar and looks forward to engaging the GOQ regularly.

-- Tell MG al-Attiyeh that we are pleased that our Special
Forces personnel are participating/mentoring an ongoing
Qatari exercise in Mongolia and we are always looking for
such ways to deepen our military relationship.

-- Note that all information required by the GOQ on the
Patriot missile batteries has been provided and ask when we
should expect Sheikh Tamim to approve putting the missiles
back on the rails.

-- Note that customs procedures affecting U.S. operations at

DOHA 00000587 004 OF 004


Al-Udeid and Camp As-Saylieh remain an irritant in what
otherwise is a solid working relationship, and request GOQ
assistance in establishing workable, long-term technical
solutions in this area.

-- Query COS on his vision of the relationship at the working
level and ask what we can do better in order to eliminate
issues/customs problems which continue to plague our
working-level engagement and negatively affect operations.
LeBaron