Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA539
2008-07-30 13:56:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GORDON

Tags:  PREL MOPS QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9466
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0539/01 2121356
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301356Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8090
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000539 

SIPDIS

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ENGLAND FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GORDON
ENGLAND'S VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: Amb. Joseph E. LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000539

SIPDIS

FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ENGLAND FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GORDON
ENGLAND'S VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: Amb. Joseph E. LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. During
your last visit here, in July 2005, you met with Qatari Armed
Forces Chief of Staff MG Hamad al-Attiyah and other Qatari
officials following MG al-Attiyah's unfortunate experience at
a Florida airport. You also met with MG al-Attiyah during
his visit to Washington last winter. For your upcoming
visit, you will be meeting again MG al-Attiyah and, we
expect, either the Amir or the Heir Appparent.


2. (C) At the strategic level, the U.S.-Qatar military
relationship is in good shape. Qatari officials regard our
strategic partnership as permanent, outliving any political
differences with Washington. The Qataris appreciate the
frequent high-level DOD visitors here, but will nevertheless
be concerned about where the transition in Washington will
leave the U.S.-Qatar military relationship.


3. (C) Despite the positive atmosphere at the strategic
level, our operational-level cooperation continues to be
hampered by difficulties with Qatari Customs. Some of the
problems are self-inflicted, including troops and contractors
transiting Al-Udeid with alcohol, pornography, and
occasionally drugs. But some of the customs difficulties may
also be a GOQ "tool" to remind us of their sovereignty ) but
unfortunately in ways that have a real operational impact on
U.S. operations here.

-------------- --------------
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S.-QATAR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
-------------- --------------


4. (C) RELOCATION OF CENTCOM FORWARD HEADQUARTERS (CFH) and
other facilities from Camp As-Saylieh: The Qataris
eventually want all U.S. facilities out of Camp As-Saylieh
and two committees are currently discussing different aspects
of the move. Sticking points will be the timeline (ours
long, Qatar's short) and cost-sharing. The new CFH at
Al-Udeid should be completed and fully mission capable in May

2009. A new SOCCENT Forward Headquarters will also be
completed in 2009.


5. (S) SHEIKH TAMIM INVITATION TO CENTCOM: GEN Abizaid
several times invited Sheikh Tamim to visit CENTCOM, an
invitation that ADM Fallon repeated. We also offered to

arrange meetings in Washington. Tamim's response was always
the same: he wants to come, "but needs to find the right
time." We speculate that either the Qataris are concerned
about Tamim finding himself in discussions out of his depth,
fearful that he will be treated poorly by his Washington
interlocutors, or annoyed that the invitation is to Tampa,
not Washington. The Qatari Armed Forces COS had an
exceptionally good experience in his recent visits to
Washington and Tampa and this may help convince Tamim to
finally accept the invitation.


6. (S) PATRIOT MISSILE LAUNCH: On October 15, 2007, a
routine test sequence resulted in the accidental launch of a
Patriot Missile from a battery at Camp As-Saylieh. The
missile landed on the Qatari COS' farm a few kilometers from
Camp As-Saylieh. Fortunately, no one was hurt and there was
no property damage. U.S.-Qatari cooperation on the
investigation was good and the Qataris appreciated that ADM
Fallon responded quickly to their request to stand both
batteries down and physically remove missiles from the
launchers. The investigation revealed a software gap that
allowed the missile to be fired even in training mode and a
doctrinal gap that allowed the firing sequence to be executed
without the launchers being physically disconnected from the
launch controller. The Qataris signaled that they would
agree to putting the Patriot batteries back up, but first
asked for the full report on the incident, temporary rules of
engagement, and an analysis of the Patriots' coverage area to
ensure that the city of Doha is covered and not just the
military bases. Completion of the final report took longer
than expected, but has since been briefed to senior Qatari
military officers and we are now close to redeploying the
batteries.


7. (C) DEFENSE SALES: Until recently, the U.S. had never made
a major defense sale to Qatar. In July, however, Qatar
signed contracts with Boeing for two C-17s with an option for
two more, and with Lockheed-Martin for four C-130Js with an
option for two more. Boeing anticipates initial delivery of
the first aircraft in August 2009. The C-17 and C-130 sales
are a signal the Qataris are beginning to invest in their own
defensive capabilities. They are also looking at U.S.

DOHA 00000539 002 OF 003


helicopters and Hellfire II missiles as part of their
National Security Shield effort, and possibly F-16 or F-18
fighter aircraft.


8. (C) DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NAVAL BASE: We believe the Qataris
have finally settled on a location for a new naval base in
the north of the peninsula. They have not finalized the plan
or chosen a contractor (Bechtel wants the contract and we
have advocated for them). They made clear that the base will
be large enough to host the largest U.S. naval vessels and
very much want the U.S. to utilize it. During then-TRANSCOM
Commander GEN Schwartz,s visit in April, the Qatari COS
mentioned that the port could be used as a Seaport for
military cargo and logistics support. The Qataris also have
plans to develop a major new commercial port south of Doha
and intend it to be large enough to accomodate the largest
U.S. Naval vessels, including aircraft carriers.


9. (C) SECOND RUNWAY AT AL-UDEID: AFCENT has long wanted
Qatar to build a second runway at Al-Udeid, something the
Qataris had long resisted. In March, the Qataris finally
agreed not only to build it, but to pay for it.


10. (C) CUSTOMS ISSUES: Customs problems have come to plague
our working-level engagement with the Qatari Armed Forces.
There have been numerous incidents where Coalition personnel
violating established Qatar customs procedures on entry or
exit from the country, leading to Qatari accusations that
U.S. personnel are not respecting Qatari sovereignty. These
led Qatar, in March 2007, to implement troublesome new
customs procedures for personnel, equipment, and cargo
entering or transiting the country. CENTCOM submitted a
counterproposal in June 2007. CENTCOM J5, AFCENT, and
Embassy OMC personnel held discussions with the Qatari Armed
Forces in June and November 2007 and March 2008, which led to
agreement on temporary procedures. Only constant Embassy OMC
and AFCENT interaction with the Qatar GHQ and their customs
officials prevent detrimental effects to U.S. operations. We
regard the temporary procedures as a stepping stone for
permanent procedures that respect U.S. and Qatar sovereignty,
support U.S. operations and are in line with the Defense
Cooperation Agreement.


11. (S/NF) B-1 INCIDENT: A ground incident the evening of
April 4 led to the total loss of a B-1 aircraft, though very
fortunately no injuries to the crew or other personnel.
AFCENT coordination and communication with the Qatari
military throughout the incident was excellent, and may
actually have deepened our relationships with Qatar,s
military.


12. (S) GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: Qatar's Attorney General, with
whom you met briefly in February, was extremely interested in
securing the release of Al Jazeera cameraman (and Sudanese
citizen) Sami al-Hajj to Qatar, and was disappointed that he
was ultimately transferred to Sudan. Within weeks of his
transfer to Sudan, Al-Hajj was back in Qatar, ostensibly
working in a newly created position at Al Jazeera producing
human right-related programming. He returned, however,
without Qatar's Attorney General being able to claim credit.
Meanwhile, the sole Qatari citizen in GTMO, Jarallah
al-Marri, was transferred to Qatari custody on July 27.
Al-Marri's brother, Ali al-Marri, remains in custody in the
Charleston Naval Brig. If the Qataris raise the issue of
Guantanamo detainees, we recommend you note our satisfaction
that Qatar's sole GTMO detainee, Jarallah al-Marri, was
transferred to Qatari custody on July 27. His brother, Ali
al-Marri, remains in the Charleston Naval Brig in a
different, more complicated, legal status.

--------------
THE BROADER U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


13. (C) Over the coming years, Qatar's importance to the U.S.
will only grow. Qatar is now the largest LNG exporter in the
world and has the world's third largest reserves after Russia
and Iran. By the end of 2009, Qatari will become a major
supplier of LNG to the U.S. market. Fueled by growing
exports of oil and LNG, Qatar's economy has been booming.
Some estimates put per capita income at USD 60,000. Between
now and 2012, Qatar's LNG exports will double, bringing a
corresponding growth to Qatar's economy and the global
financial clout of Qatar's sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar
Investment Authority. Unfortunately, wild economic growth is
also producing 14 percent inflation (felt most acutely in the
housing market) and feeding a demand for cheap construction
labor in a country that already has a very poor record on

DOHA 00000539 003 OF 003


treatment of foreign workers.


14. (C) IRAQ: The Amir thinks we made a big mistake toppling
Saddam Hussein, but shares our view that restoration of order
and a successful democratic transition in Iraq are of
paramount importance not only to Iraq but to the region.
While the Qataris have expressed concerns about civil war in
Iraq, their officials also state publicly that the Coalition
needs to stay in the country to establish wider security.
However, a strong distaste for Iraq's Shia-dominated
government drives Qatar's resistance to follow through on
some of our priorities, including comprehensive debt
forgiveness and greater political engagement. Unlike Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, Qatar has made no commitment to send an
ambassador to Baghdad.


15. (S) IRAN: Iran hangs heavily over our relationship with
Qatar, which worries that we may have plans for Iran, perhaps
even military plans, that we are not sharing with them.
Qatar fears and deeply distrusts Iran, and shares our concern
about its nuclear program, which it regards as unstoppable.
But because of Qatar's geographic proximity, vulnerability of
its energy installations, and the fact that its massive
off-shore gas reserves are shared with Iran, Qatar will do
nothing to engender an antagonistic relationship.

--------------
ISSUES TO RAISE
--------------


16. (S) During your August 5-6 visit, we recommend making the
following points:

-- Thank the Government of Qatar (GOQ) for its continued
partnership and support for the war on terror and our broader
U.S. military operations in the region. Note that this is
especially evident from the access Qatar gives the the U.S.
military at Al-Udeid Air Base and Camp As-Saylieh, and
GOQ-funded construction at Al-Udeid.

-- Explain that despite the political transition in
Washington following U.S. elections, there will be
considerable continuity in our military relationship with
Qatar. GEN Petraeus met with MG al-Attiyeh May 10 in Doha
and we expect him to be a frequent visitor here once he
assumes command of CENTCOM later this year.

-- Congratulate MG al-Attiyeh on signing contracts in July
for purchase of C-17 and C-130 aircraft. We have a strong
commitment to help the GOQ derive maximum benefit from these
purchases, which represent an important advancement in our
mil-mil relationship.

-- Note that a logical next step in our strategic
relationship would be for Qatar to join the maritime
Coalition. The new NAVCENT commander, VADM Gortney, will
have just visited Qatar and looks forward to engaging the GOQ
regularly.

-- Tell MG al-Attiyeh that we are pleased to provide Special
Forces personnel to join an upcoming Qatari exercise in
Mongolia and are always looking for such ways to deepen our
military relationship.

-- In your meeting with MG al-Attiyeh, you might note that
customs procedures affecting U.S. operations at Al-Udeid and
Camp As-Saylieh remain an irritant in what otherwise is a
solid working relationship, and request GOQ assistance in
establishing workable, long-term technical solutions in this
area.
LeBaron