Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DOHA390
2008-05-19 08:18:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DHS SECRETARY MICHAEL CHERTOFF'S

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER ASEC OTRA QA 
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S E C R E T DOHA 00390
CXDOHA:
 ACTION: DCM
 INFO: PAO LEGATT AMB RSO RAO P/E

DISSEMINATION: DCM /2
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:MRATNEY
DRAFTED: CDA:MRATNEY
CLEARED: P/E:SRICE, RSO:FTHEUS, LEGATT:MREARDON

VZCZCDOI992
PP RUEHC RHMFISS RUEHZM RHMFISS
DE RUEHDO #0390/01 1400818
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 190818Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7929
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000390 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC OTRA QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DHS SECRETARY MICHAEL CHERTOFF'S
MAY 2008 VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000390

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC OTRA QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DHS SECRETARY MICHAEL CHERTOFF'S
MAY 2008 VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Mr. Secretary, Qatar is emerging as a major transit
point for people and cargo in a volatile part of the world,
creating new challenges for our counter proliferation,
counterterrorism, and law enforcement efforts. Your visit to
Qatar will help us solidify our relationships and deepen our
bilateral cooperation in these vital areas.


2. (C) We have requested meetings with the Amir, Sheikh Hamad
bin Khalifa Al Thani, and his son, the Heir Apparent, Sheikh
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. Sheikh Tamim has responsibility
for the security portfolio in Qatar, and thus most of the
issues relevant to your visit. Usually for such a visit, we
would get a meeting with either the Amir or the Heir
Apparent. In addition, we have the following meetings
confirmed:

- Minister of State for Internal Affairs (de facto
Interior Minister),Sheikh Abdulla bin Nasser Al Thani.
Sheikh Abdulla has responsibility for the Internal Security
Forces, the Coast Guard, and immigration and airport police.
The Embassy has a strong relationship with the Interior
Ministry, which provides security for the U.S. Embassy and
our official visitors. The USG provides training to the MOI
through DS/ATA and CENTCOM.

- The head of Customs, Ahmed al-Mohannadi, who reports
directly to the Prime Minister but who has close
relationships with other security agencies. Al-Mohannadi is
new in that position but was formerly a very senior officer
with Qatari State Security, the domestic security and
intelligence agency. We have a strong interest in forging a
close relationship with Qatari Customs, something we had been
unable to do with his predecessor, and your visit will help
considerably to that end.

- The Chief of Staff of the Qatari Armed Forces, MG Hamad
bin Ali Al-Attiyeh, who is the key Qatari official on issues
affecting the U.S. military in Qatar. The Qatari Armed
Forces are responsible for border security and have expressed
an interest in cooperation with U.S. Border Patrol and other
DHS agencies. Coastal and off-shore security is shared by

the Coast Guard, which is part of MOI, and the Qatari Emiri
Navy, which reports to MG Al-Attiyeh.

--------------
THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


3. (C) The U.S. has a lot at stake in this small country:

- Qatar hosts - with no operational restrictions or
rental costs - the U.S. Central Command's most important
military installations in the Middle East.

- U.S. energy companies have invested tens of billions of
dollars in the oil and gas industry here, and Qatar will soon
become a major supplier of imported LNG to the U.S. market.

- Utilizing its extraordinary energy wealth, Qatar has
mad a commitment like few other Arab states to modernizing it
education system, adopting not only the U.S. of education,
but importing the U.S. educational institutions themselves.

- The Qatari leadership has taken important steps toward
building a society where the rule of law is respected, the
country's citizens increasingly participate in its
governance, and a healthy civil society can flourish.

- Qatar is the home of Al Jazeera, the largest Arabic
media outlet in the world with an audience of over 50 million.

- Qatar's rapid economic growth has led to a dreadful
record on human trafficking and dehumanization of the foreign
workers that account for the majority of the country's
residents.

- An ambitious foreign policy, which includes friendly
relations with Hamas and Syria, has often put Qatar at odds
with the USG. (Meanwhile, Qatar also maintains overt and
relatively positive ties with Israel.)


4. (S) A VITAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: Al-Udeid Air Base and
other U.S. military facilities are critical to CENTCOM
operations from Iraq to Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa.
Qatar hosts approximately 9,000 U.S. forces, some 100 U.S.
and Coalition aircraft, as well as the CENTCOM Forward
Headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center, SOCCENT
Forward Headquarters, and other important DOD facilities.
Qatar is funding over USD 700 million in construction for the
U.S. at Al-Udeid Air Base, regularly sends military personnel
to the U.S. for training, and after years of sourcing their
military hardware in Europe, will be making major U.S.
defense purchases. We are organizing a visit to Al-Udeid Air
Base during your visit.


5. (C) A STRATEGIC PARTNER IN ENERGY: Qatar is exceptionally
friendly to U.S. energy companies and appreciates the
competence and expertise they bring to the country's economic
development. Since 1999, there has been USD 60 billion in
foreign investment in Qatar's energy sector with the
majority, about USD 40 billion, coming from U.S. firms,
including ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. Qatar is also of
growing importance to U.S. energy security as this small
emirate will next year become a major supplier of LNG to the
U.S. following opening of the Golden Pass terminal in
southeast Texas. (Golden Pass was the first major Arab
investment in the U.S. following the Dubai Ports issue and
DHS was heavily involved in the CFIUS deliberations.)


6. (U) STAGGERING WEALTH: At over USD 60,000, Qatar's per
capita income is already ranked in the top five in the world,
alongside Luxembourg and Liechtenstein. Between now and
2012, Qatar's LNG exports will more than double, bringing a
corresponding growth to Qatar's economy and global financial
clout. That wealth is now driving massive infrastructure
investment, including a new airport and orders for USD 12
billion in Boeing aircraft for Qatar Airways. Unfortunately,
wild economic growth is also producing 14 percent inflation
and feeding a demand for cheap construction labor in a
country that already has a very poor record on treatment of
foreign workers.


7. (SBU) COMMITMENT TO EDUCATION, RULE OF LAW, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM: Beyond strong military and energy relationships,
there is a lot going right in Qatar,s domestic agenda.
Qatar's commitment to modernize its educational system is
exemplified by Education City, a 2500-acre campus on the
outskirts of Doha. Managed by the Qatar Foundation, the
umbrella organization chaired by the Amir's wife, Sheikha
Mozah, Education City is home to six U.S. university branch
campuses currently educating some 800 students:

- Texas A&M University (engineering)
- Carnegie Mellon University (business and IT)
- Weill-Cornell Medical School (medicine)
- Georgetown School of Foreign Service (foreign affairs)
- Virginia Commonwealth University (design)
- Northwestern University (journalism)


8. (SBU) Meanwhile, primary and secondary school curriculum
is being reformed along U.S. standards and a network of
competitive charter schools is gradually replacing out-moded
government-run schools. Rule of law, if not full
democratization, is taking root firmly, though slowly. Qatar
hosts frequent conferences on inter-religious dialogue and
Christian churches are being built on GOQ-supplied land - a
Catholic church just opened and five others are planned.


9. (S) TROUBLESOME POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP: Since the
beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the U.S.-Qatar
political relationship has soured badly, driven in particular
by Qatar's foreign policy initiatives and its maddening
behavior on the UN Security Council from 2006-07. Qatar
continues high-level engagement with Hamas leaders even as we
seek to isolate them, and supports the Syrian government,
even while the U.S. works to support the democratic majority.
Qatar is also often accused of funneling money to Hamas,
though we have seen little definitive evidence that this is
happening. Meanwhile, the senior Qatari leadership appears
to have grown jealous of our relationships with regional
rivals (including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan) and
annoyed that we don't give Qatar more attention, including
senior-level visits and visibility in our own regional
initiatives.


10. (S) Bilateral CT and intelligence cooperation - of
obviously critical importance in this region - has for
several years been the worst of all GCC states. Recent
visits by the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the CIA
Director have put this relationship on a more auspicious
footing. Your visit should also help considerably in this
regard.


11. (C) IRAQ: The Amir thinks we made a big mistake toppling
Saddam Hussein, but shares our view that restoration of order
and a successful democratic transition in Iraq are of
paramount importance not only to Iraq but to the region.
While the Qataris have expressed concerns about civil war in
Iraq, their officials also state publicly that the Coalition
needs to stay in the country to establish wider security.
However, a strong distaste for Iraq's Shia-dominated
government drives Qatar's resistance to follow through on
some of our priorities, including comprehensive debt
forgiveness and greater political engagement.


12. (S) IRAN: Iran hangs heavily over our relationship with
Qatar, which worries that we may have plans for Iran, perhaps
even military plans, that we are not sharing with them.
During its tenure on the UN Security Council, Qatar cast the
consensus-breaking (14-1) vote on Resolution 1696 in July

2006. (Qatar later joined consensus in two unanimous votes,
UNSCR 1736 and UNSCR 1747, to impose sanctions on Iran's
nuclear program.) Qatar fears and deeply distrusts Iran, and
shares our concern about Iran's nuclear program, which it
regards as unstoppable. But Qatar's geographic proximity,
vulnerability of its energy installations, and the fact that
its massive off-shore gas reserves are shared with Iran,
dictate a less confrontational approach.


13. (C) AL-JAZEERA: Al-Jazeera is by far the region's most
prominent media outlet and the bane of many governments in
the region, though no longer the irksome centerpiece of
U.S.-Qatari relations. The network is nearly 12 years old
with an Arabic-speaking audience of some 50 million viewers.
In November 2006, it launched an English-language channel
with a potential audience of 70 million and ambitions to
compete with the major U.S. and British satellite networks
worldwide. Since early 2006, the USG has seen a bumpy
downward trend in inflammatory anti-Western bias and
inaccuracy in Al-Jazeera's content, though biased and
inaccurate reporting continues to appear. We have also been
making more methodical efforts to get official USG voices on
the network.

--------------
SPECIFIC ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION
--------------


14. (C) Discussion of the following issues would support
Embassy Doha's objectives:

- (C) Qatar has a well-advanced biometric identification
program which is used for both their nationals and for
foreign workers. FBI Director Mueller, on a recent visit
here, discussed a fingerprint/biometric sharing initiative
with the Qataris, who responded positively. Your visit could
emphasize the importance of that program.

- (S) The rapid expansion of Qatar Airways will soon make
Qatar a major transit point for people and goods. You could
discuss transit cargo screening and cooperation on
interdiction of cargo of proliferation concern. (The
director of CIA's Counter Proliferation Center had
well-received discussions with officials from Qatar State
Security and Qatari Customs in March on this topic.) You
could also ask about sharing passenger name records for
transit passengers ) a powerful CT tool, though something
the Qataris will be reluctant to do.

- (C) With steady cooperation from TSA (and engagement by TSA
leadership) since the launch of non-stop flights to the U.S.,
Qatar's airline passenger screening procedures are improving.
TSA now has a long-term TDYer now working with the Civil
Aviation Authority. You could thank the Qataris for their
cooperation with TSA and reiterate our commitment to the
success of their flights, while emphasizing the need for
improved screening of all passengers and cargo, not just on
flights going to the U.S.

- (C) Qatar's Coast Guard and Navy are under-trained,
under-staffed, and under-equipped given the massive scale of
their on-shore and off-shore energy infrastructure. The
visit will be an opportunity to discuss cooperation with the
U.S. Coast Guard and emphasize the need to expand Qatar's own
coast guard. (Embassy Doha has been developing plans to
bring a team from NAVCENT to Qatar on May 27 to demonstrate a
Mark 5 Special Operations Craft to the Qatari Armed Forces,
Coast Guard, and Internal Security Forces. We also hope to
host a demonstration for the Heir Apparent. Schedule
permitting, we have approached the GOQ about organizing a
demonstration for the Heir Apparent in which you could
participate.)

- (C) ICE is interested in establishing a bulk cash
smuggling initiative with Qatar. There has been little
appetite elsewhere in the Gulf, but the visit is an
opportunity to pitch this initiative with the Qataris.
RATNEY