SCENESETTER FOR NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY WELCH'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000241

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KWBG QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY WELCH'S
APRIL 1 VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Ambassador Welch, Embassy Doha welcomes your visit
to Qatar. We have requested meetings for you with the Heir
Apparent, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, who has overall
responsibility for security issues in Qatar; Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hamad Bin Jassim Al Thani
(HBJ); and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed
Al-Mahmoud. The CENTCOM Commander and senior military
officers routinely meeting with Sheikh Tamim. The last
U.S. official to meet with HBJ was Ambassador Crocker, who
discussed Iraq-related issues with him October 31. You
spoke in February by phone with Al-Mahmoud, encouraging the
GOQ?s prompt recognition of Kosovo.


2. (C) You will want to follow up on Qatar's recognition of
Kosovo during your stop in Doha. The MFA's #3 official
told Charge recently that Qatar is prepared to recognize
Kosovo "at an appropriate time." It was clear from that
conversation that Qatar would prefer to recognize Kosovo in
concert with other GCC members and that Russian reaction to
diplomatic recognition is a GCC concern.


3. (C) Your visit occurs on the heels of the Arab League
Summit in Damascus, where the Amir's attendance is
expected. We recommend that you encourage Qatar to use its
influence with Syria to resolve the current presidential
election impasse in Lebanon. The Amir justifies his close
relationship with Syria by saying Qatar advocates dialogue
with everyone under the belief that communication opens
doors to the resolution of disputes. We have told the
Qataris that Syria is a case where Qatar can use its
relationship to bring about a solution for the good of
Lebanon and the region.


4. (C) Since you are arriving here after a stop in Israel
and the Palestinian territories, your interlocutors - who
are very concerned about the situation in Gaza - will
welcome your assessment of the way forward. You should
urge the GOQ to contribute portions of their Palestinian
assistance pledges to support a program for affordable
housing in the West Bank. This program was identified as a
"Quick Impact Project" by Quartet Representative Tony
Blair, Israeli Defense Minister Barak and Palestinian Prime
Minister Fayyad last November. As part of this effort,
OPIC is expected to consider this month a loan proposal of
$325 million to establish a new mortgage facility in the
West Bank to finance affordable housing. Charge raised
this issue with the MFA?s #3 official, who made no
commitment but said Qatar would welcome a more detailed
briefing in Doha from a U.S. experts. We have also shared
the mortgage proposal with HBJ's office and Madeleine
Albright raised it with HBJ when she was here in January.


5. (C) Ambassador Foley pitched assistance for Iraqi
refugees to the MFA March 27. Unfortunately, his
presentation was not at a sufficiently senior level to be
helpful due to the absence from Doha of more senior MFA
officials. We recommend that you encourage Qatar to help
ease the burden for countries, like Syria, hosting large
numbers of refugees.


6. (S) Finally, should you have a meeting with Sheikh
Tamim, we urge you to raise counterterrorism and
intelligence cooperation with him, previewing that this
will be the principle topic of FBI Director Mueller?s
upcoming visit on April 9. Qatar's record of sharing
intelligence with us is the worst among GCC states, and the
Heir Apparent is in a position to make it better. NEA/ARP
has provided you separate briefing materials on this
subject.


7. (C) Below is additional perspective on our overall
relationship with Qatar.

--------------
A VITAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP...
--------------


8. (S) The U.S. has a lot at stake in Qatar. Al-Udeid Air
Base and other U.S. military facilities are critical to
CENTCOM operations from Iraq to Afghanistan to the Horn of
Africa. Qatar hosts approximately 9,000 U.S. forces, some
100 U.S. and Coalition aircraft, as well as the CENTCOM
Forward Headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center,
SOCCENT Forward Headquarters, and other important DOD
facilities. Qatar is funding hundreds of millions of
dollars in construction for the U.S. at Al-Udeid Air Base.
Our hosts regularly send military personnel to the U.S. for
training, and after years of sourcing their military

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hardware in Europe, are showing increasing interest in
buying American, with a major sale of C-17 aircraft first
on the list.

--------------
... AND A STRATEGIC PARTNER IN ENERGY
--------------


9. (C) Qatar is exceptionally friendly to U.S. energy
companies and appreciates the competence and expertise they
bring to the country's economic development. Since 1999,
there has been USD 60 billion in foreign investment in
Qatar's energy sector with the majority, about USD 40
billion, coming from U.S. firms, including ExxonMobil,
ConocoPhillips, Anadarko, and Occidental. Soon, nearly 20
percent of ExxonMobil's global revenue will derive from
Qatar. Qatar is also of growing importance to U.S. energy
security as this small emirate will next year become a
major supplier of LNG to the U.S. following the recent
CFIUS approval of $2.2 billion development by Qatar
Petroleum, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips of the Golden Pass
LNG terminal in southeast Texas. Qatar is now the world's
largest LNG exporter and will soon be the U.S.' largest
source of imported LNG.


10. (U) At over USD 60,000, Qatar's per capita income is
already ranked in the top five in the world, alongside
Luxembourg and Liechtenstein. Between now and 2012,
Qatar's LNG exports will more than double, bringing a
corresponding growth to Qatar's economy and global
financial clout. That wealth is now driving massive
infrastructure investment, including a new airport and USD
12 billion in Boeing aircraft for Qatar Airways.
Unfortunately, wild economic growth is also producing 14
percent inflation and feeding a demand for cheap
construction labor in a country that already on Tier 3 of
the USG?s annual Trafficking in Persons report.

--------------
COMMITMENT TO EDUCATIONAL REFORM, RULE OF LAW
--------------


11. (C) Beyond strong military and energy relationships,
there is a lot going right in Qatar?s domestic agenda.
Qatar's commitment to modernize its educational system is
exemplified by Education City, a 2500-acre campus on the
outskirts of Doha. Managed by the Qatar Foundation, the
umbrella organization chaired by the Amir's wife, Sheikha
Mozah, Education City is home to six U.S. university branch
campuses (Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical
School, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, Virginia
Commonwealth University, with a Northwestern University
journalism program opening this fall),with some 800
students currently enrolled. Northwestern University in
late 2007 announced its intention to establish a school of
journalism. Meanwhile, primary and secondary school
curriculum is being reformed along U.S. standards and a
network of competitive charter schools is gradually
replacing out-moded government-run schools. And rule of
law, if not full democratization, is taking root firmly,
though slowly.

--------------
TROUBLESOME POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
--------------


12. (S) Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
U.S.-Qatar political relationship has soured badly, driven
in particular by Qatar's foreign policy initiatives and its
maddening behavior on the UN Security Council for the past
two years. In addition, bilateral CT and intelligence
cooperation - of obviously critical importance in this
region - is now the worst of all GCC states. Meanwhile,
the senior Qatari leadership appears to have grown jealous
of our relationships with regional rivals and annoyed that
we don't give Qatar more attention, including senior-level
visits and visibility in our own regional initiatives.


13. (S) Our own list of grievances with Qatar is long
enough, but at the core are its high-level engagement with
Hamas leaders even as we seek to isolate them; support for
Syria and its allies in Lebanon as we work to support the
democratic majority; serving as a flak for Sudan and
Hezbollah during its stint on the UN Security Council; and
a failure to follow through on its stated commitment to
forgive Iraqi debt.


14. (C) The Amir shares our view that restoration of order
and a successful democratic transition in Iraq are of
paramount importance not only to Iraq but to the region.
While the Qataris have expressed concerns about civil war

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in Iraq, their officials also state publicly that the
Coalition needs to stay in the country to establish wider
security. However, a strong distaste for Iraq's
Shia-dominated government drives Qatar's resistance to
follow through on some of our priorities, including
comprehensive debt forgiveness. Amb. Crocker urged greater
political contact, including a visit by HBJ to Baghdad,
during a meeting here last October, but HBJ blamed an Iraqi
government that sought to marginalize the Sunnis as the
primary obstacle to greater Qatari engagement.


15. (C) Al-Jazeera is by far the region's most prominent
media outlet and the bane of many governments in the
region, though no longer the irksome centerpiece of
U.S.-Qatari relations. The network is nearly 12 years old
with an Arabic-speaking audience of some 50 million
viewers. In November 2006, it launched an English-language
channel with a potential audience of 70 million and
ambitions to compete with the major U.S. and British
satellite networks worldwide. Since early 2006, the USG
has seen a bumpy downward trend in inflammatory
anti-Western bias and inaccuracy in Al-Jazeera's content,
though biased and inaccurate reporting continues to appear.


16. (S) Qatar is often accused (by Jordan, the Palestinian
Authority, and others) of funneling money to Hamas, though
we have seen little definitive evidence that this is
happening. The Qataris have been largely cooperative on
counter-terrorist finance issues, apparently anxious to
avoid letting their small but growing financial sector be
exploited by terrorists. The Qatar Authority for
Charitable Works monitors all domestic and international
charitable activities and approves international fund
transfers by the charities. Qatar has a Financial
Information Unit that resides in the Qatar Central Bank and
can review suspect accounts. Local banks work with the
Central Bank and the FIU on CT finance and anti-money
laundering issues, and bank officials attend U.S.-sponsored
conferences on these subjects.


17. (S) Iran hangs heavily over our relationship with
Qatar, which believes we may have plans for Iran, perhaps
even military plans, that we are not sharing with them.
During its tenure on the UN Security Council, Qatar cast
the consensus-breaking (14-1) vote on Resolution 1696 in
July 2006. (Qatar later joined consensus in two unanimous
votes, UNSCR 1736 and UNSCR 1747, to impose sanctions on
Iran's nuclear program.) Qatar does share our concern
about Iran's nuclear program and revolutionary ideology,
but Qatar's geographic proximity, vulnerability of its
energy installations, and the fact that its massive
off-shore gas reserves are shared with Iran, dictate a less
confrontational approach.


18. (C) We believe the Qatari leadership regards our
relationship as strategic and permanent, and they see the
military bases, energy contracts, and U.S. universities as
evidence of this. But at this point, the Qatari leadership
have written off the political relationship and are likely
waiting out the Administration hoping that bilateral
relations improve in 2009.

RATNEY