SCENESETTER FOR U/S LEVEY'S FEBRUARY 24-25 VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000155

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR DANIEL HARRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018
TAGS: PTER KTFN QA IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S LEVEY'S FEBRUARY 24-25 VISIT
TO DOHA

Classified By: CDA Michael A. Ratney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Your February 24-25 visit to Qatar should advance
our engagement with the GOQ on CT cooperation and
counter-terrorist finance, and continue our on-going
discussions with the Qataris on the need for vigilance
against money-laundering and Iranian exploitation of the
international banking system. The Qatari leadership
consistently welcomes Washington visitors and generally
responds well to sustained dialogue and engagement.


2. (S/NF) One frustration the Embassy faces - and you may
during your visit - is the GOQ's compartmentalization of
information. Issues of concern to the U.S. in some instances
are handled by the Qatar Security Services (QSS); others are
handled by the Central Bank; and key actors like the MFA may
be unaware of what other governmental agencies are doing.
The Embassy tries to encourage the GOQ to work cohesively,
and so your bringing matters of concern to the attention of a
range of senior officials should have an impact.


3. (S/NF) Although we are often at odds with the Qataris on a
range of foreign policy issues, the U.S. has a great deal at
stake in this country:

-- (S/NF) Qatar gives CENTCOM unrestricted access to Al-Udeid
Air Base and other U.S. military facilities that are critical
to operations from Iraq to Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa.
Qatar hosts thousands of U.S. forces, some 100 U.S. and
Coalition aircraft, as well as the CENTCOM Forward
Headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center, SOCCENT
Forward Headquarters, and other important DOD facilities.
And Qatar does this at no cost to the USG, with the GOQ
actually paying for $700 million in construction costs for
U.S. facilities at Al-Udeid Air Base.

-- (U) Exports of oil and LNG have made Qatar one of the
wealthiest countries in the world. Already the world's
largest exporter of LNG, Qatar has plans to invest an
additional USD 70 billion in its natural gas sector and
expand production through 2012 - by then more than doubling
LNG exports. Qatar is exceptionally friendly to U.S. energy
companies. Since 1999, there has been USD 60 billion in
foreign investment in Qatar's energy sector with the
majority, about USD 40 billion, coming from U.S. firms,
including ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Occidental. This
small emirate will next year become a major (and eventually
the largest) supplier of LNG to the U.S. when the Golden Pass
LNG terminal is completed in southeast Texas - a $2.2 billion
development by Qatar Petroleum, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips.

-- (SBU) Qatar's commitment to modernize its educational
system on the U.S. model is exemplified by Education City, a
2500-acre campus on the outskirts of Doha. Managed by the
Qatar Foundation, the organization chaired by the Amir's
wife, Sheikha Mozah, Education City is home to five U.S.
college branch campuses (Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon,
Weill-Cornell Medical School, Georgetown School of Foreign
Service, and Virginia Commonwealth University),with nearly
1000 students currently enrolled. Northwestern University
will soon open a school of journalism and mass communication.
Meanwhile, primary and secondary school curriculum is being
reformed along U.S. standards and a network of competitive
charter schools is gradually replacing out-moded
government-run schools.

-- Rule of law, if not full democratization, is taking root
firmly, though slowly. Judicial corruption is rare, the
police are increasingly professional, and a nascent civil
society is emerging. Qatari women have had the right to vote
since the first election took place in the country in 1999
for the Central Municipal Council. Qatar's continued delay
in announcing long-expected parliamentary elections may be
the result of seeing how an elected parliament in Kuwait,
strongly populated by Islamists, has worked against reforms
initiated by the ruler.

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A TROUBLESOME FOREIGN POLICY
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4. (S) Although our relationship with Qatar remains solid in
all these areas, it has soured steadily at the political
level since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This
trend began with Al Jazeera's harshly biased coverage of OIF
in 2003, but it has been Qatar's foreign policy initiatives -
and its maddening behavior during its 2006-07 term on the UN
Security Council - that really drove the deterioration.


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5. (S) Mere mention of Qatar to our regional allies raises
their ire, though we have seen no smoking gun for most of
their accusations. Our own list of grievances with Qatar is
long enough, but at the core are its high-level engagement
with Hamas leaders even as we seek to isolate them; support
for Syria and its allies in Lebanon as we work to support the
democratic majority; serving as a flak for Sudan and
Hezbollah during its stint on the UN Security Council; and a
failure to follow through on its stated commitment to forgive
Iraqi debt. Whether borne of sincerely held views, a product
of their prickly relationship with Saudi Arabia, or simply
longstanding Qatari contrarianism, foreign policy has come to
define the official U.S. view of Qatar.


6. (S) Iran hangs heavily over our relationship with Qatar.
During its 2006-07 tenure on the UN Security Council, Qatar
cast the consensus-breaking (14-1) vote on Resolution 1696 in
July 2006 (though later joined consensus in two unanimous
votes to impose sanctions on Iran's nuclear program). The
Iranian president has visited Qatar several times in the past
two years, and Qatari officials regularly visit Iran. But
what we and some of Qatar's neighbors may read as duplicity,
the Qataris no doubt see as survival. They do share our
concern about Iran's nuclear program and revolutionary
ideology, but Qatar's geographic proximity, vulnerability of
its energy installations, and the fact that its massive
off-shore gas reserves are shared with Iran, dictate a less
confrontational approach.


7. (S/NF) In addition, our bilateral counter-terrorism and
intelligence cooperation - of obviously critical importance
in this region - is now the worst of all GCC states.
Meanwhile, the senior Qatari leadership appears to have grown
jealous of our relationships with regional rivals and annoyed
that we don't give Qatar more attention, including
senior-level visits and visibility in our own initiatives.
We nevertheless believe the Qatari leadership regards our
relationship as strategic and permanent, and they see the
military bases, energy contracts, and U.S. universities as
evidence of this.

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GROWING COOPERATION ON CT FINANCE
--------------


8. (S/NF) The Qatar Central Bank and Qatar's nascent
Financial Information Unit (FIU) appear anxious to avoid
letting their small but growing financial sector be exploited
by terrorists and so has gradually been building a solid
legal and bureaucratic foundation for counter-terrorist
finance issues. The system has been untested by
prosecutions, however, and the GOQ has often been unwilling
to cooperate on designations of certain terrorist financiers,
particularly those where perceived as politically sensitive.


9. (S) Qatar is often accused (by Jordan, the Palestinian
Authority, and others) of funneling money to Hamas, though we
have seen little clear evidence that this is actually
happening. The Qatar Authority for Charitable Works monitors
all domestic and international charitable activities and
approves international fund transfers by the charities.
Qatar's Financial Information Unit resides in the Qatar
Central Bank and can review suspect accounts. Local banks
work with the Central Bank and the FIU on CT finance and
anti-money laundering issues, and bank officials attend
U.S.-sponsored conferences on these subjects.


10. (S) CT finance issues became troublesome during Qatar's
two-year tenure on the UN Security Council. Qatar had
blocked - at Kuwait's request - the designation of three
Kuwaiti terrorist financiers via the UN 1267 Committee.
Qatar also blocked - with Russia - the designation of a
Syrian Ba'ath-party official accused of financing Al-Qaeda in
Iraq, probably due to sensitivities over upsetting the
political relationship with Syria. Qatar was supportive,
however, of other requests which apparently did not impinge
on its political relationships with other regional countries.

RATNEY