QATAR: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT

S E C R E T DOHA 000152

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (Changed text in paragraph 6)

S/CT FOR S. GAIL ROBERTSON AND BRUCE AVERILL
NEA/ARP FOR BOB JACHIM
DS/T/ATA FOR KEVIN MALOY
DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KEVIN KOLEVAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2033
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ECON ETTC EAID EFIN EAGR ASEC
QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT

REF: A. SECSTATE 6461

B. DOHA 00075

C. DOHA 00311 (2007)

Classified By: CDA Michael Ratney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: Post assesses that U.S. investments in
Qatar's energy industry, coupled with the onset of regular
liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the U.S. 2008-12,
constitute the main critical infrastructure and key
resources, which if destroyed, disrupted or exploited might
have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United
States. Embassy Doha continues to engage Government of Qatar
entities across the spectrum to increase awareness and
implement increased security procedures to identify and
protect critical infrastructure. Qatari officials appear to
understand the need for strategic-level planning, but have
been slow to embrace USG offers for assistance or requests
for information/transparency on their current vulnerabilities
and infrastructure protection programs. Second to critical
energy infrastructure, the (distant) USG priority in Qatar
should be addressing the potential negative effects of a
pandemic outbreak. Priority three would be protecting
telecommunications and financial assets. End Summary.

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KEY RESOURCES
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2. (C) Qatar shares with Iran the largest non-associated gas
field in the world, and Qatar's portion contains an estimated
900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, giving it the
third-largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Qatar is
believed to have an agreement with Iran providing a set
extraction limit in the field; however, the details of this
arrangement are not known to us. In early 2008, Qatar's
share of hydrocarbon revenue from natural gas and derivatives
was 40 percent compared to 60 percent for oil. Current
estimates are that by 2012 Qatar plans to produce 77 million
tons of LNG annually, roughly a third of which Qatar hopes to
export to the U.S. market.

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CRITICAL INDUSTRIAL CENTERS
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3. (C) There are three main industrial facilities of interest
that if destroyed or their production disrupted could have an
immediate effect on U.S. national economic security. In
order of priority, these are Ras Laffan Industrial City
(RLIC),Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC) and port complex, and
Dukhan Industrial City. All three industrial centers are
under the control and supervision of Qatar Petroleum, a
semi-autonomous government organization whose CEO, Abdullah
bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, is also the Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Energy and Industry. Natural gas production is
primarily centered around the coast and offshore areas in the
northeast of Qatar, in and round Ras Laffan; while, oil
production is concentrated on the western coast near Dukhan
as well as offshore platforms.


4. (C) Ras Laffan is Qatar's flag-ship industrial center,
predominantly focused on the production of Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) and derivative petrochemicals obtained during the
natural gas extraction process. Destruction or an attack
disrupting production at RLIC would cause exceptionally grave
damage to the world market and U.S. national economic
security interests. Statements by Embassy contacts indicate
that as of early 2008, Qatar LNG production for export to
Japan and South Korean represented over 60 percent of those
respective countries internal natural gas consumption; by
2012 a third of Qatari LNG produced could be destined for the
U.S. market, at which time it is estimatedthat Qatar will be
the largest source of importe LNG to the U.S. market.


5. (C) Ras Laffan-based QatarGas production trains three and
four will produce 2.8 billion cubic feet per day of LNG, and
RasGas is currently building two trains at Ras Laffan with
7.8 million tons of annual capacity. ("Trains" are the
liquefaction plants which draw gas pumped at offshore
platforms, liquefy it, and load it onto LNG tankers.) All
four of these trains are allocated for U.S. markets and will
be among the largest in the world. In addition, major U.S.
energy companies such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips are
partners with Qatar and currently have $13 billion invested
in Qatar's natural gas industry. Therefore, Ras Laffan's
importance as a critical facility will continue to grow as
production and exports to the U.S. increase.


6. (S/NF) Mesaieed industrial city and port complex, located
approximately 40 km south of Doha, was established in 1996
and is the main shipping point for oil from Dukhan to the
international market. Destruction or disruption of port
services would effectively shut down oil shipments from
Qatar, affecting potentially around 60 percent of Qatar's
petroleum revenue. In addition, the port complex is a key
choke point for U.S. and coalition military equipment,
munitions and bulk aviation fuel delivery to Al-Udeid Air
Base and Camp As Sayliyah, the two Qatari military
installations hosting Coalition forces. Any disruption to
port operations would severally limit U.S. military
operations throughout the U.S. Central Command AOR. As an
example, in September-October 2007, strategic fuel reserves
at Al Udeid Airbase were depleted because unscheduled,
uncoordinated road construction caused increased transit time
for fuel tankers. The situation continued for 30 days until
resolved. Had the situation not been resolved, there would
have been an impact on theater-wide combat and airlift
operations.


7. (C/NF) Mesaieed is also the location of most of Qatar's
light, medium and support petrochemical plants; producing
fertilizer, fuel additives, lubricants, plastics and vinyl
for domestic consumption and export. The facility is
comprised of four major treatment plants as well as a
specialized holding area to store and export products.
Natural Gas Liquids Plants 1 and 2 are designed to separate
and fractionate LNG extracted from various production areas
into a number of fractionated final products. Natural Gas
Liquids Plant 3 is composed of separate units to treat gas
and condensates and plant 4 is an expansion and development
of QPs gas treatment capacity alongside the fractionation and
treatment facilities in Mesaieed. All of these plants are
directly adjacent to the port facilities, and a major
incident at any of them could effectively shut down port
operations.


8. (C) Dukhan industrial city currently accounts for the
majority of the 60 percent of revenue from the oil and gas
sector. While natural gas production and revenue will
overtake oil over the long term, the destruction or
disruption of production at Dukhan would have a severe impact
on the Qatari economy and may effect world and U.S. economies.

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USG ENGAGEMENT
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9. (C/NF) Post and Department have continued to identify
Qatar's increasingly important role as a world producer in
the oil and LNG sectors and its inherent high value as a
potential terrorism target as a point of concern. Qatar's
expectation of becoming the world's LNG and gas-to-liquids
(GTL) leader by 2012 necessitates a comprehensive energy
infrastructure security program that is currently lacking.
While the Qataris have adequately planned a production and
shipping infrastructure for the booming business, it appears
they are just beginning to consider how to protect it. Post
continues to engage GOQ officials on critical energy
infrastructure security, which remains a high priority for us.


10. (C) Per ref C, Post formed a DCM-led internal working
group comprising Pol/Econ, DAO, RAO, OMC, FCS, and RSO to lay
the ground work for engagement with the GOQ on critical
infrastructure protection. This group meets on an as-needed
basis. In March 2007, a U.S. Coast Guard International Port
Security Program inspection team analyzed Qatar's energy
security infrastructure, and in April, NAVCENT's Maritime
Liaison Office (MARLO) conducted a visit concerning energy
infrastructure protection, joint venture companies, and
international energy partners. An additional visit in June
2007 by S/CT and DS/ATA focused on the Critical Energy
Infrastructure program (CEIP) and surveying Qatar's
infrastructure for recommended improvements and
implementation assistance.

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U.S./QATARI JOINT EFFORTS
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11. (C/NF) As a result of the S/CT and DS/ATA visit, post
drafted a joint working group framework to continue dialogue
on energy infrastructure security. To date, the GOQ has been
slow in embracing the framework agreement; however, Post,
Department and USG concerns have not fallen on deaf ears.
GOQ officials have expressed their own concerns, identifying
a risk associated with critical infrastructure, during
meetings with Post officials and USG visitors since early

2007. In the most recent such meeting, described Ref B,
Department of Energy Assistant Secretary Kevin Kolevar met
with Minister of State for Energy and Industry Mohammed Saleh
Al-Sada and Qatar Petroleum Director of the Industrial
Security Directorate BG Abdulaziz Al-Ansari. Al-Ansari has
stated on several occasions since mid-2007 that the GOQ and
QP remain committed to working with the USG once security
personnel issues in his office have been rectified and the
appropriate staff are in place.


12. (C) The Qatari government's appreciation of U.S. training
and technology presents numerous prospects for U.S.
engagement. We know that Qatar will need trainers, physical
security improvements (such as delta pop-up barriers, fences
and anti-vehicle berms),weapons, and technological equipment
(CCTV, etc). Offshore protection is an area with the
greatest potential; Qatar will need additional and more
advanced offshore patrol vessels, plus enhanced maritime
surveillance and communications equipment, weapons and
trained crews. There is currently a lack of standardized
security practices; however, the Qatari government has
identified gaps in security infrastructure and has worked
with U.S. commercial firms to begin acquisition and training
in the use of technical security equipment.

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GOQ INTEREST AND PLANS
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13. (S/NF) In 2005, the GOQ contracted with a U.S. security
and safety company to perform a top-down, zero-based review
of critical infrastructure protection; the study encompassed
organizational lines of command and control for the security
services and industrial facility security at the three
facilities identified previously. The resultant report by
the U.S. company, which has not been shared with the USG and
remains highly classified by the GOQ, reportedly identified
and prioritized deficient areas and provided recommendations
in each. Also reportedly, the report has been used as the
grail stone from which the Heir Apparent has directed that no
deviations be allowed.

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Qatari Strategic Security Initiatives
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14. (S) According to Al-Sada during his January 22 meeting
with A/S Kolevar, the Heir Apparent recently established an
Industrial Security Steering Committee under the Ministry of
Interior charged with managing the current nationwide
industrial security apparatus and improving overall security
capacity. The creation of the steering committee was part of
the Heir Apparent's strategic security initiatives, which
include the planned establishment of an integrated National
Crisis Center (NCC) and development of the National Security
Shield (NSS). The NCC would provide coordinated command and
control of security and civil defense units in response to
national emergencies, while the NSS would create a series of
interconnected fixed and mobile radar platforms to identify
threats by sea, air and land.

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PRIORITY TWO - PANDEMIC DISEASE THREAT
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15. (S/NF) Post believes that the current threat posed by a
pandemic disease outbreak and the ability of the Qatari
government to contain and treat victims would be poor. While
there are three large hospitals in the city, the government
sponsored Hamad Medical Center (HMC) would be incorporated
into the national response plan and could be responsible for
treating over one million people in the event of an outbreak.
Military reporting, and November 2007 Embassy discussions
with the Director of Public Health at the Qatari National
Heath Authority, American Dr. Gail Fraser Chanpong (protect),
have concluded that the national health system, centered
around HMC would be poorly equipped to detect, isolate and
treat victims of a pandemic outbreak in Qatar, and the
hospital itself would be easily overrun by patients. Dr
Chanpong told PolOff and Amman Regional ESTH Hub Officer that
the National Health Authority was working on incorporating
preventive planning and emergency preparedness, but believed
that current detection, monitoring and notification at ports
of entry was poor. She was not confident that HMC could
treat a large scale pandemic outbreak, adding that there was
no national preparedness plan for bio-terrorism. She and her
colleagues at the National Health Authority would welcome USG
assistance. She stated that HMC, NHA and the GOQ, based on
current planning, would give priority to the treatment of
Qatari nationals (who constitute at most 20 percent of the
population) in the event of an outbreak.


16. (C) Press reports over the past four months have
indicated an increase in outbreaks of H5N1 Avian Influenza
cases in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia with some
reports of human transfer and death. With the plan to
increase airline traffic through Doha, and the increase of
travelers and transitory workers to Qatar and other Gulf
nations from countries affected by Avian Influenza, the
chances of an outbreak occurring in Qatar is ever present.
The increase of travelers from affected regions poses a
potential threat of transfer of the disease to the U.S. from
air travelers on one of the daily direct Qatar Airways
flights to New York and Washington. In addition, any AI
outbreak would also pose a direct threat to the thousands of
U.S. and coalition military members located in Qatar. They
are exposed to third country nationals from high threat
regions living off base but who work on base.


17. (SBU) Post has established an AI Working Group consisting
of representation from DAO, OMC, P/E, RSO, MED, and CLO. The
group meets quarterly to discuss trends and recommends posts
response action in the event of an outbreak affecting Qatar.
EconOff also works with the Amman ESTH Regional Hub Officer
and the Qatari NHA to increase interaction on the pandemic
disease and bio-terrorism threats.

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PRIORITY THREE -- TELECOMS AND FINANCE
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18. (SBU) Qatar is not a major hub for telecommunications,
network operating centers, or financial activity that support
and have a major effect on the U.S. economy. The
government-owned Qatar Telecommunications (QTEL) company
currently enjoys a monopoly on the telecom sector in Qatar
though a second mobile license was recently issued to a
consortium consisting of the Vodafone group and the
GOQ-funded Qatar Foundation. Qatar's telecom sector is
mostly insular and is not a regional hub, as evident by the
recent loss of one undersea telecom cable linking Qatar to
the UAE on February 4th that only resulted in a 40 percent
loss of internet and telephone capacity for Qatar, which
decreased to 30 percent after 24 hours. Experts concluded
that the design of the telecommunications infrastructure in
the Gulf would not be affected by loss of infrastructure in
Qatar. U.S. military and government operations in Qatar can
run independently of the Qatar telecoms grid with minimal
loss of bandwidth or connectivity.


19. (SBU) A significant disruption of the financial market in
Qatar is assessed to have a negligible affect on U.S.
national economic security. Plans are aloft to increase the
number of American and international companies resident in
the Qatari financial sector; however, currently, only the
destruction or disruption of the state-owned Qatar Investment
Authority (QIA) and its umbrella subordinate organs -- Qatar
Holdings and Qatari Diar -- could represent a potential,
although unlikely, threat to U.S. national economic security.
QIA CEO and Vice Chairman (and Qatar's Prime
Minister/Foreign Minister) Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani
(HBJ) announced at the 2008 Davos Economic Forum that QIA
planned to invest $15 billion in American and European banks
during 2008. QIA has an estimated $60 billion in assets,
with plans to double that amount by 2010.
RATNEY