Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DJIBOUTI764
2008-09-18 14:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER: EMBASSY DJIBOUTI WELCOMES BACK

Tags:  PREL PGOV MASS MOPS EAID DJ ER SO XA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5964
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDJ #0764/01 2621448
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181448Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9551
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000764 

SIPDIS

FOR AFRICOM COMMANDER GENERAL WARD
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MOPS EAID DJ ER SO XA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: EMBASSY DJIBOUTI WELCOMES BACK
GENERAL WARD

REF: A. DJIBOUTI 27

B. DJIBOUTI 393 (NOTAL) AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM ERIC WONG.
REASONS: 1.4 (B),(C) & (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000764

SIPDIS

FOR AFRICOM COMMANDER GENERAL WARD
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MOPS EAID DJ ER SO XA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: EMBASSY DJIBOUTI WELCOMES BACK
GENERAL WARD

REF: A. DJIBOUTI 27

B. DJIBOUTI 393 (NOTAL) AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM ERIC WONG.
REASONS: 1.4 (B),(C) & (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. A key regional partner in the Horn of
Africa, Djibouti hosts not only the sole U.S. military base
in Africa, but also broadcasting facilities used by the Voice
of America to reach Muslim audiences, one of USAID's primary
global warehouses for pre-positioned emergency food
stockpiles, and one of the world's only remaining live-fire
ranges used by the U.S. military. Djibouti thus plays a
significant role in U.S. efforts to combat extremism, fight
hunger, and pursue the global war on terrorism. Djiboutian
senior leaders currently have two key security concerns:
externally, border tensions posed by Eritrea's incursion into
(and continued occupation of) Djiboutian territory near the
strategic Bab-al-Mandab strait; and, internally, near famine
conditions caused by continued drought in the Horn of Africa,
reliance on food exports, and rising global commodity prices.
Despite these tensions, Djibouti remains arguably the most
stable country in the Horn of Africa, with world-class port
facilities and the potential to spur even more regional
economic growth by serving as a entrepot between sub-Saharan
Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. END SUMMARY.

--------------
MILITARY COOPERATION
--------------


2. (C) Djibouti is a peaceful, tolerant, democratic, Muslim
country that contributes significantly to the national
security of the United States as a key security partner. In
addition to hosting the only U.S. military base in Africa,
Djibouti refuels U.S. Navy ships, broadcasts the Voice of
America (VOA) in Arabic and Somali throughout the region, and
even provides the U.S. military with one of the few live
ammunition bombing ranges outside the U.S. In 2006, Djibouti

replaced Dubai as the location of USAID's global warehouse
for pre-positioned emergency food aid. Djibouti resolved its
own civil war in the 1990s through a series of negotiations
that led to an elected government that contains a coalition
of former government and opposition leaders. President
Ismael Omar Guelleh is the architect of Djibouti's
partnership with the United States, and of the private
investment-driven economic growth that is hanging the face of
this once sleepy, post-colonial port-city-state. In 2005,
President Guelleh was elected to a second and final six-year
term; in February 2008, his five-party coalition swept
parliamentary elections for seats in the National Assembly.


3. (C) Our presence in, and partnership with Djibouti,
significantly increase our capacity to project our principles
and defend our interests in Africa. Headquarters of 2,500
U.S. and coalition personnel serving with the Combined Joint
Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),Djibouti consistently
proves its value as a security partner in many other ways.
It is also home to 3,500 French armed forces personnel, many
of whom live here with family. When Djibouti won its
independence from France in 1977, the two nations entered
into an accord that obligated France to protect Djibouti's
territorial integrity.


4. (C) Djibouti is actively working to stop terrorists. To
increase its capacity to secure its borders, Djibouti
requires effective security assistance, as well as job growth
and investment in the welfare of Djibouti's people.
We are working to strengthen border security and information
systems with military, police, and other officials. With
CJTF-HOA and coalition partners, we also focus on improving
coordination of law enforcement efforts among the countries
in the region. We are using FMF and 1206 funds to bolster
Djibouti's maritime awareness (radar) and interdiction
capacity, including a recently approved USD 7.9 million
regional maritime awareness capability (RMAC) system, using
FY07 Section 1206 funds. The USG has provided Djibouti with
two small, new cutters and is working to build a navy pier in
the north of the country that will allow Djibouti's Navy to
project a presence in the Bab-al-Mandab strait, the entrance
to the Red Sea. With CJTF-HOA and U.S. Coast Guard help, we
are working with Djiboutians on small boat maintenance,

DJIBOUTI 00000764 002 OF 003


handling and tactics; and with CJTF-HOA in the lead, we are
bringing Djiboutians and Yemenis together to set the stage
for future cooperation monitoring the strait. On the land,
we are working to improve border security, providing training
and equipment to the military and improving systems for
tracking entrants. Often such efforts are joint ventures,
with different Djiboutian organizations benefiting from the
efforts of the Embassy Regional Security Office, Naval
Criminal Investigative Service, CJTF-HOA, and others.

--------------
BORDER CLASH WITH ERITREA
--------------


5. (C) In April 2008, the Government of Djibouti informed the
U.S. Embassy that Eritrean troops had taken up positions
along the frontier in the vicinity of Ras Doumeira, in
northeastern Djibouti--along the border with Eritrea, and
adjacent to the strategic Bab-al-Mandab strait (ref B). The
Djiboutian military mobilized, and the two forces positioned
themselves in close proximity along the border. In some
cases, they were arrayed just a few meters apart. Djiboutian
commanders approached their Eritrean counterparts to make
arrangements to separate the forces, but were rebuffed.
Subsequently, a number of Eritrean troops defected. An
estimated 20 Eritrean troops had crossed into Djibouti and
surrendered to Djiboutian authorities by late May 2008. The
disposition of Eritrean defector/deserters currently in
Djibouti remains under discussion among the GODJ, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).


6. (C) Fighting broke out in the vicinity of Ras Doumeira on
10 June 2008, reportedly as a result of continued defections.
The skirmish lasted approximately 36 hours, and left Eritrea
in control of the high ground at the border. Djiboutian
troops established positions approximately 5K south of the
border. The Djiboutians suffered an estimated 70 killed in
action; Eritrean casualties are unknown. A senior Djiboutian
officer, COL Aden Ali Ahmed, commander of the Armored
Brigade, was reported missing at the front and is presumed
dead or captured.


7. (C) In the aftermath of the conflict, French Forces in
Djibouti mobilized and took up positions in Moulhoule,
approximately 15K south of the border. Ras Doumeira, which
had previously been uninhabited, now remains occupied by
Eritrean troops. The situation has remained static, and
there has been no further fighting, as Djibouti seeks a
diplomatic solution. CJTF-HOA provided medical support and
limited logistical support through an ACSA agreement.
Fact-finding delegations from the Arab League, African Union
and United Nations have come to Djibouti for consultations.
So far, no delegation has been granted visas to Eritrea, and
Eritrea has continually downplayed the incident, failing to
acknowledge it at all immediately following the fighting.

--------------
HOSTING SOMALIA MEDIATIONS
--------------


8. (C) Djibouti shares cultural and economic links with
Somalia, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Faced with an
influx in early 2008 of refugees fleeing from fighting in
southern Somalia, the GODJ has worked with the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General (UN SRSG) to host
a series of talks between Somalia,s Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) and the moderate wing of the
Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, leading to the
signature of the "Djibouti Agreement" in August. Follow-up
talks occurring in Djibouti in mid-September aim at setting
conditions for a cease-fire in Mogadishu and possible
power-sharing arrangements.

--------------
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES
--------------


9. (SBU) Internally, Djibouti faces tremendous challenges,
including diseases such as tuberculosis and cholera; flows
of IDPs and refugees from neighbors such as Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Somalia; an unemployment rate of 60 percent; and

DJIBOUTI 00000764 003 OF 003


a limited industrial base. Recurring drought, low food
production, and rising prices have made dangerous
malnutrition a constant. According to analysis by the
USAID-supported Famine Early Warning Systems Network
(FEWSNET),340,000 Djiboutians--over half of the
population--need emergency food assistance. USAID is working
with UNICEF to provide therapeutic feeding for up to 25,000
malnourished children in Djibouti, and has made a USD2.7
million contribution in emergency food aid to support the
World Food Program's relief operations. USAID support have
helped Djibouti make significant gains in health and
education, but food insecurity remains a key concern.

--------------
HUB FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
--------------


10. (SBU) Djibouti is fast becoming a vital hub with the
potential to accelerate regional economic growth. After
France, Djibouti's next most important source of revenue has
been Ethiopia. Long one of Ethiopia's outlets to the sea,
Djibouti today handles almost all Ethiopia's oceangoing
commerce, and the volume is booming. Friction closed
Ethiopia's access to Eritrea's port, and instability in
Somalia chilled use of Berbera and Mogadishu. The boom in
trade volume reflects Djibouti's rapidly growing capacity as
well as demand. Emirati investors, led by Dubai, have
invested nearly one billion dollars into the port and other
infrastructure, with significant additional investment
likely. Djibouti knows that its future depends on
region-wide stability, economic growth, and integration.
Djibouti's port speeds trade, and its livestock quarantine
and export facility (that USAID launched) permits legitimate
exports from the Horn to key near Eastern markets for the
first time in decades.


11. (U) Djibouti's long-term plan is to diversify the work of
its port, so that it serves more as a regional
transshipment hub, than as a port dedicated to Ethiopia. In
addition, it hopes to maintain a strong banking sector,
with its convertible currency, pegged to the dollar since
1949, serving as a hard currency haven for people
throughout the region. Djibouti seeks to develop its own
mineral, maritime, and tourism resources. An Icelandic
energy company is currently working with the Government of
Djibouti to explore the feasibility of generating up to 100
megawatts, using geothermal energy sources near Djibouti's
Lac Assal.

--------------
BRIDGE BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
--------------


12. (U) In July 2008, a consortium led by Osama bin Laden's
half-brother, Tarek bin Laden, announced plans to construct
an intercontinental suspension bridge linking Djibouti and
Yemen. This "Al Noor" (Cities of Light) project aims at
constructing two new cities in Djibouti and Yemen, to be
linked by one of the world's longest suspension bridges. The
bridge would span the strategic Bab-al-Mandab strait, the
narrowest point between the waters of the Red Sea and the
Gulf of Aden. Construction of the bridge is estimated in 15
years; completion of the two new cities is an ambitious
40-year project, modeled after development in Singapore,
Dubai, and Hong Kong. Together, the cost of the bridge and
"Al Noor" cities project is estimated at USD 150-200 billion.
U.S. firms participating in this project include
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, AIG, and L3; L3 is serving as overall
project manager. The Government of Djibouti has
publicly announced its support of the project, and has
provided land in Djibouti for the consortium. Djibouti sees
its future as one driven by global economic growth, and sees
economic integration as essential to stability. Its success
would help inculcate similar values in the neighbors.
WONG