TIMOR-LESTE PRESIDENT RECALLS FEBRUARY 11; PLANS FOR THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000091

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/20/2018
TAGS: PREL TT
SUBJECT: TIMOR-LESTE PRESIDENT RECALLS FEBRUARY 11; PLANS FOR THE
FUTURE


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CLASSIFIED BY: Hans Klemm, Ambassador, EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary. President Jose Ramos Horta warmly thanks
President and Mrs. Bush for their recent statement of support.
During a March 18 meeting with the Ambassador in a Darwin
hospital, Timor's President, critically wounded during a
February 11 assassination attempt, said he was unable to explain
his attacker's motivation. Horta stated, however, he was
confident that he was the victim of "hostile intent" by Major
Reinado. President Horta intends to return to Dili by mid-April
and will seek to restart a political reconciliation process he
had overseen before February 11, as well as the delivery of an
amnesty for acts committed during the 2006 crisis. Although his
thoughts were still centered on the events of February 11, Horta
was in good spirits, resting comfortably and in no evident pain.
End Summary.


2. (C) President Jose Ramos Horta warmly thanked President Bush
for his "very kind" message of encouragement during a March 18
meeting with the Ambassador in Darwin. President Bush's words
"meant a lot to me," said Horta. He also fondly recalled a
get-well phone call from Senator Tom Harkin that he received
during the week of March 10. Horta appeared to have lost
considerable weight, but was in good spirits, ambulatory and
seemingly well on the way to recovery. Most of the extended
conversation surrounded his shooting, plus Horta's plans to
recontinue a broad political reconciliation process suspended by
February 11.


3. (C) His recounting of the morning of February 11 largely
tracked with second hand accounts that we have heard earlier.
Ramos Horta said he is convinced that Major Reinado came to his
residence with "hostile intent." Upon entering the President's
compound with force, Reinado disarmed several of Horta's
bodyguards, smashed open doors, roughly forced the President's
kitchen staff to lie face down on the floor, and aggressively
searched the compound for Horta. Fortunately, a neighboring
child who witnessed the commotion alerted one of the military
guards overlooked by Reinado, who then killed the intruder and
one of his men. Horta was about a kilometer away on a morning
walk at this point when he heard a burst of automatic weapon
fire.


4. (C) When he heard the shots, the President returned to his
residence followed by two military escorts and ran into an
Australian acquaintance. He told Horta that the shots were the
result of maneuvers being held nearby by the Australian-led
International Stabilization Force (ISF). This upset Horta as he
had not been notified of ISF maneuvers in the area. The
statement turned out to be false, but it led the President to
double his pace in order to find out what was going on.


5. (C) As he neared his home, Horta saw a military vehicle had
gone off the road right in front of his entry way (Reinado's men
had fired on the vehicle believing it to be military
reinforcements, but it had only been a soldier dropping off his
wife who worked at the President's home). As he walked in front
of his house, one of the President's guards alerted him to a
gunman. Horta stated he saw and recognized the shooter ("tall
for a Timorese and wearing a stocking hat"),but did not know
his name. As the President turned away from his assailant, he
was shot twice in the back. "If I hadn't turned away," recalled
Horta, "I would be dead."


6. (C/NF) President Horta then lay bleeding for "twenty or
thirty" minutes before a battered ambulance with a driver but no
medic arrived. Horta was sharply critical of the ISF and the
Ministry of Health for the poor emergency medial treatment he
received (he claimed to have lost four liters of blood) and for
failing to pursue his attackers. He said he would wait to read
the final reports of inquiry on the events of that morning, but
he is inclined now to ask SRSG Khare to dismiss the UNPOL
Commander and Deputy Commander, and ask Australia to recall the
ISF Commander for their poor performance. He acknowledged that
his Timorese military (F-FDTL) protection unit also failed to
perform to expected standards.


7. (C/NF) Ramos-Horta could not explain the motivation of Major

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Reinado except to speculate that his reputed lover, Angelita
Pires, inspired him to violence. Horta dismissed rumors that
FRETILIN was behind the attacks, stating leader Mari Alkatiri
was incapable of such an act. He said he had no confidence in
the ability of Timor's Prosecutor General to conduct a thorough
or professional investigation of the attacks. The President
strongly thanked the Ambassador for the FBI's quick assistance
and listened grimly as the Ambassador described their experience
in Dili.


8. (C) Horta confided he would move to a private residence in
Darwin on March 19 and hopes to return to Dili by mid-April in
time for the planned visit of Monaco's Crown Prince. The
President expressed optimism that he could restart the process
of reconciliation between the ruling and opposition parties that
he had led up until February 11 despite Prime Minister Gusmao's
reluctance (the PM, said Horta, believes FRETILIN leaders bring
no goodwill to the process). The President also said he would
press the parliament to enact a legal process leading to amnesty
for actors in the 2006 crisis. The Ambassador cautioned again
that the U.S. would oppose a general amnesty without the
establishment of full truth and justice. Horta acknowledged
this and said he envisions a process by which all those subject
to a 2006 UN Commission of Inquiry recommendation would testify
to a special council and accept responsibility for their actions
before receiving amnesty. Victims of 2006 violence would be
compensated generously.


9. (C) A key motivation for a process leading to an amnesty,
explained Horta, was to avoid the "utterly unthinkable" prospect
that Brigadier Taur Matan Ruak, commander of Timor's military,
might face jail time for his "unpolitical" actions during the
2006 crisis. An amnesty may not be ready by May 20 as
previously planned, but Horta hoped it might be in place by the
country's August 30 Independence Day celebrations.


10. (C) Comment. President Horta's thoughts were perhaps
unsurprisingly centered on the events of February 11. He
frequently spoke of what was to have taken place had his
initiative to bring Reinado to justice borne fruit instead of
himself becoming a victim of violence. He put blame directly on
Reinado for the attacks, rejecting the possibility of a
conspiracy, although he faulted those who had supported Reinado
(including several priests) for leading him astray. He showed
little interest in discussing post-February 11 developments,
such as the influx of petitioners into Dili. His heart belongs
instead, for better or worse, to political processes he
initiated prior to February 11, including reconciliation among
Timor's leaders and an amnesty for participants in the 2006
crisis.
KLEMM