WHEELS UP FOR TIMOR-LESTE CUBAN MEDICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000070

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STATE FOR EAP/MTS, WHA/CCA, AND WHA/FO - MCCARRY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2018
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM CU ID TT
SUBJECT: WHEELS UP FOR TIMOR-LESTE CUBAN MEDICS


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CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary. On February 24, the government of Timor-Leste
facilitated the departure of four Cuban doctors to the U.S.
under the Special Public Benefit Parole Program (SBPB).
Timor-Leste appreciates the support of the Cuban medical
mission's 200-plus doctors and nurses operating in the country,
and has 700 students currently studying in Cuba. Cuba therefore
enjoys considerable goodwill with the GOTL. However, in the
course of five months of diplomatic wrangling, Cuban Ambassador
Ramon Hernandez Vasquez managed to overplay his hand,
exasperating the GOTL leadership with his stubbornness and
ever-changing, unreasonable demands. Post notes that the United
Nations Integrated Mission In Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was helpful in
this affair, reminding the GOTL of its human rights obligations
under international agreements not to hinder the medics'
departure. End summary.


2. (U) In November 2007, the Ambassador informed Foreign
Minister Zacarias Albano Da Costa that we had received four
applications from Cuban doctors for entry into the U.S. under
the Special Public Benefit Parole Program. Da Costa thanked
Ambassador for his commitment to transparency in this matter and
designated the MFA's Director for Bilateral Affairs as our point
of contact.


3. (C) The three previous SPBP cases the embassy processed in
2006 and mid-2007 attracted the attention of the highest levels
of the GOTL, primarily due to their concern for the future of
the 200-plus strong Cuban medical mission in Timor-Leste and the
700 Timorese students studying in Cuba. Foreign Minister Da
Costa initially regarded this as a U.S.-Cuban bilateral problem,
telling the DCM in late November, "you will have to work this
out with the Cuban Embassy directly." When told that this would
be impossible for well-known diplomatic reasons, the GOTL
attempted to broker terms acceptable to the Cuban Ambassador in
Dili, Ramon Hernandez Vasquez.


4. (C) This proved impossible. Ambassador Hernandez was at
first intransigent, promising that the doctors would never leave
Timor-Leste. He then changed his tack slightly, maintaining
that the four Cubans were now stateless, and that the government
of Cuba did not want them back. This effectively stalled the
process. In early December, post contacted to the Human Rights
Unit of the United Nations Integrated Mission In Timor-Leste
(UNMIT) for its views on the matter. Its director, Wilbert van
Hoevell, immediately expressed his concern and directed his
staff to prepare a memorandum. This resulted in a non-paper
which argued that the GOTL was obliged by both its own
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights not to hinder the Cubans' departure. The
Ambassador made these points in a December 12 letter to the
Foreign Minister. We understand that UNMIT chief Atul Khare
also addressed the matter with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao at
about this time. Also at about this point, the Cuban medics'
predicament began attracting some coverage in the Australian,
U.S., and Portuguese media.

5.(C) This led the GOTL to take a firmer line with Ambassador
Hernandez, who then agreed to issue the medics travel documents
valid for return to Havana only. He also stipulated that the
GOTL would be required to purchase return tickets to Havana for
the four, which would presumably not be used. The GOTL
counter-offered to purchase tickets to a third country, which
Ambassador Hernandez rejected. Finally, the GOTL acquiesced to
Hernandez's conditions. The four Cubans would be required to
purchase return tickets to Havana, which they would present to
the Cuban Ambassador in exchange for travel documents to
facilitate their departure from Timor-Leste.


6. (C) It was at this point that Ambassador Hernandez overplayed
his hand. Citing instructions from Havana, he demanded that the
medics travel to Cuba via South Africa (allegedly in order to
avoid being waylaid by "counter-revolutionaries" in Europe),and
that they not depart Timor-Leste together, but rather one by one
over a period of a week. Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao and
Foreign Minister Da Costa then realized that Ambassador
Hernandez was negotiating in bad faith. The GOTL's point man on

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the matter, MFA Secretary General Joao Camara, told Hernandez
that this would be a human rights violation. He sent the Cuban
embassy a note verbale containing an ultimatum to the effect
that if the Cuban Ambassador did not provide travel documents by
February 20, the medics would be permitted to depart Timor-Leste
using a laisser-passer issued by the GOTL.


7. (C) In the end, the four Cubans departed on February 24 using
a Timorese laisser-passer. They transited Bali, Indonesia, and
entered the U.S. via Guam. This did not require an Indonesian
visa, but post anticipates that Havana may formally protest to
the Indonesian government.


8. (C) Comment. Post notes the constructive role played by
UNMIT's Human Rights office. We believe that the GOTL was not
aware of its obligations under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights until UNMIT brought them to its
attention. We understand that the current Cuban medical mission
will be rotated out in March, and we are not aware of any
changes that have been made in the terms of its replacement's
deployment here that might impact on future SPBP beneficiaries.
Secretary General Camara was reluctant to discuss this with us

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in detail. We hope, however, that the GOTL is now persuaded
that it is futile to attempt to broker a compromise with Havana
on this issue. End comment.
KLEMM