Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DILI231
2008-09-15 08:16:00
SECRET
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONAIRE (SEPQ) FOR FALL

Tags:  ASEC PTER TT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2674
RR RUEHDT
DE RUEHDT #0231/01 2590816
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 150816Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4083
INFO RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3554
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000231 

SIPDIS

FOR DS/DSS/IP AND DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/15/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONAIRE (SEPQ) FOR FALL
2008

REF: 07 STATE 52805

CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d),(g)



-------------------

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

-------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000231

SIPDIS

FOR DS/DSS/IP AND DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/15/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONAIRE (SEPQ) FOR FALL
2008

REF: 07 STATE 52805

CLASSIFIED BY: Henry M. Rector, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d),(g)



--------------

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

--------------


1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS


A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY
CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS?

No


B. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY
WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

No


C. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S.

DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?

Demonstrators at times pass the US embassy en route between
locations, but no demos have taken place in the areas around
diplomatic facilities.


D. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION?

N/A


E. ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY DOMESTIC
ISSUES?

N/A


F. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

Anti-government demonstrations in April 2006 turned into riots.
Both anti- and pro- government demonstrations that took place in
June 2006 were basically peaceful, but were accompanied by
increased security concerns and some incidents throughout the
city, although not at the site of the demonstrations. In some
demonstrations in 2007, violence was directed against
demonstrators. In one incident, a demonstrator traveling to Dili
from Liquica was struck by a rock thrown at him at the airport
roundabout. He subsequently fell out of the vehicle he was in
and was run over by another vehicle. Demonstrators were also
been attacked when returning from Dili back to the eastern
districts. Such events have occurred in both Metinaro and
Manatuto.


G. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG
PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES?

In 2007 several USG vehicles were were damaged by rocks thrown
by youth during episodes of political violence. There is no
evidence that USG vehicles or personnel are being targeted. In
these cases, the drivers unintentionally found themselves at the
disturbances in which rival gangs were throwing stones at each

other and randomly at passing vehicles.


H. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR
PERIMETER SECURITY LINE?

No.


I. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY
WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

Anti-government unrest followed the announcement of the new
government in August 2007. This was not been in the form of
demonstrations per se, but hostile groups burning buildings,
throwing stones at vehicles, etc.


J. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S.

DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?

No


K. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION?


DILI 00000231 002 OF 004


The largest demonstrations against the government in 2006 were
about 3-4,000. Average demonstrations are much smaller, wth 500
or fewer paticipants


L. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

Generally peaceful. In 2008, the few demonstrations that have
led to and arrests were exceptional.


M. IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG
PROPERTY?

See 5 G


2. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS


A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE
CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND
VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS).

No interstate conflict, with exception of occasional minor
cross-border problems involving smuggling and localized
disputes. The dissident military police commander implicated in
May 2006 violence as well as seizing weapons from national
police was killed during an attack on both the President and
Prime Minister in February 2008. His followers (numbering fewer
than 20) are all now in custody.


B. IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED TO A
SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR?

Issue mentioned in 6.A is generally not an active conflict and
is localized in western districts.


C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION?

No


D. HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS
SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION?

No


3. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES


A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED?

The National Police (PNTL) within the capital city disintegrated
during the 2006 crisis and under the leadership of the UN is
being gradually reconstituted. Most PNTL personnel are now back
on the job, but working under UN Police Command. As a new force
that has often been politicized they are still very much in
development and cannot be described as fully trained and
professionalized. Last year UNPOL granted the PNTL, independent
authority in Dili.


B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE
ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING.

Training has been provided by ICITAP in the past and was well
received. PNTL have also participated in FBI training and in
courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in
Bangkok. PNTL have responded well to such training, but much
more is needed.


C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS,
WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES?

Localized and petty corruption is a common problem. There are
unconfirmed reports of widespread corruption in the immigration
department.


D. ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF
DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS?

No. Intelligence services are essentially non-operational. The
National Intelligence Service (SNI) is undergoing reorganization
but faces a lack of qualified personnel. However, the
occupation-era clandestine network which branches throughout
society potentially has the ability of providing security and
political institution leaders with intelligence on opposition
operations.


E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S.

EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT?

N/A


F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN

DILI 00000231 003 OF 004


RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO
SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES?

N/A - no significant terrorist threats


G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE
SECURITY?

Yes


H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR
AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD;
GOOD/AVERAGE;POOR)

Average, new security requirments imposed by the GOTL and UNPOL
have been imposed with moderate success.


I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS AGENCIES?

(EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)

Average to ineffective; see 3.C.


J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE;

INEFFECTIVE)

Average to ineffective; see 3.C.

--------------

INDIGENOUS TERRORISM

--------------


4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS


A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN
COUNTRY?

No


B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.

NA


C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE LAST
12 MONTHS?

No


D. WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS?

N/A


E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS?

No


F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR
U.S.-RELATED TARGETS?

No


G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR DO
THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE?

N/A


H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S.

DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS?

NA


5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS


A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT ANTI-
AMERICAN)IN COUNTRY?

No.


B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.

N/A


C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS
WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED?

N/A

DILI 00000231 004 OF 004




D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE?

N/A


E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE
ATTACKS?

No

--------------

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

--------------


6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS


A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A PRESENCE
IN COUNTRY? PROVIDE NAMES.

No


B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL
CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL?

N/A


C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

N/A


D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN
THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS?

No


E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY THAT
ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

No


F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, SUDAN, ET.
AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI- AMERICAN TERRORIST
ACTS?

N/A. None of the above countries have diplomatic representation
in Timor-Leste and we are unaware of the presence of any other
nationals from these countries.


G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND
EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE
TERRORIST ELEMENTS?

Loose control of police weapons inventory within the country as
well as porous borders mean that availability of weapons is
likely. However, weapons assessed to be in country at this point
include primarily those purchased for police or military use,
but not sufficiently controlled, or left over from independence
conflict.
RECTOR