Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DHAKA775
2008-07-21 10:52:00
SECRET
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

CHIEF ADVISER "GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC"

Tags:  MARR PHUM PINR PINS PREL PTER PGON BG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKA #0775/01 2031052
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211052Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7082
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2275
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 9779
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0750
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T DHAKA 000775 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2018
TAGS: MARR PHUM PINR PINS PREL PTER PGON BG
SUBJECT: CHIEF ADVISER "GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC"

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


Summary
=========

S E C R E T DHAKA 000775

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2018
TAGS: MARR PHUM PINR PINS PREL PTER PGON BG
SUBJECT: CHIEF ADVISER "GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC"

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


Summary
=========


1. (C) Summary: The Chief Adviser told the Ambassador on
July 18 that he was "guardedly optimistic" that things were
headed in the right direction. Fakhruddin Ahmed hoped that
the United States and other major external players would do
what they could to help his efforts to get the parties to
endorse institutional reform. He reiterated Bangladesh's
strong commitment against terrorism and promised to look into
the question of possible U.S. human rights training for the
RAB (Rapid Action Battalions). End Summary.

The Arrest Campaign
======================


2. (C) On July 18, the Ambassador called on Chief Adviser
Fakhruddin Ahmed; Foreign Affairs Adviser Iftekhar Chowdhury
also sat in. The Ambassador began the meeting by noting that
he would be heading back for consultations and wanted to be
able to reassure Washington that Bangladesh was on track to
hold its national elections by the end of the year. Chief
Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed replied that the Caretaker
Government was determined to stick to the timetable he had
spelled out in April. He expressed concern that recent
articles in U.S. publications suggested that many Americans
did not understand the situation on the ground in Bangladesh.
For example, the much ballyhooed arrest campaign had not led
to a significant increase in the number of arrests in
Bangladesh, which continued to average around 1,400-1,600 per
day. Similarly, the number of prisoners detained in
Bangladesh's prisons had only increased slightly, from about
85,000 to about 87,000. Almost all those arrested were being
detained under court orders. Moreover, the Chief Adviser had
ordered a review of all cases of individuals being detained
under the Emergency Powers Rules: "We will either place
charges against them or release them."

The Political Process
=======================


3. (C) The Chief Adviser asserted that he was "guardedly

optimistic" that Bangladesh was headed in the right
direction. The Caretaker Government believed strongly that
the country's political institutions and culture needed
reforms, if democracy were to flourish in Bangladesh.
Accordingly, the CTG had sought to strengthen and
depoliticize the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Electoral
Commission, and the Public Service Commission. Similarly,
the Caretaker Government was moving ahead with sub-district
(upazilla) elections, in an attempt to decentralize power to
some degree. The question was whether the parties would
allow these reforms to move forward once an elected
government returned to power. (Note: Within 30 days of
convening, the new Parliament will have to endorse or reject
the various ordinances enacted by the Caretaker Government.)


4. (C) Fakhruddin acknowledged that the parties' actions to
date called into question their commitment to reform. They
were putting up extremely unattractive candidates for the
municipal elections occurring on August 4; many of the
candidates were currently in jail on corruption charges.
Fakhruddin asked that we pressure the parties to continue
down the path of reform, including by fielding better
candidates for the national election and by having the new
Parliament endorse the institutional reforms enacted by the
Caretaker Government.

The Optimal versus the Likely
===============================


5. (C) Foreign Affairs Adviser Chowdhury suggested that the
optimal way forward would be to have a government of national
unity following the election, with each party holding the
same proportion of ministries as seats in the Parliament.
This would be one way of convincing Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) not to boycott the election, since
the BNP would receive at least some ministries. Chowdhury
admitted, however, that to date the Awami League, which
expected to win the election, was not showing much interest
in this formulation.


6. (C) The Chief Adviser acknowledged that there needed to
be a plan B for moving the political process forward, in the
event the parties rejected a government of national unity.
With respect to pushing reform forward, he indicated that the
CTG was considering the possibility of appointing a
Constitutional Reform Committee that could provide proposals
for the Parliament's consideration. With respect to getting
the BNP not to boycott the election, he hoped that the
international community would pressure the party to
participate. He also agreed that there would be some
pressure on Khaleda Zia from the many politicians within the
party who hoped to win seats in an election. Unless the
government gave in to all the BNP's demands, Khaleda Zia's
party was unlikely to come to a decision on whether to
participate until the last possible moment before the
national elections were announced, i.e., sometime in late
October or early November.

Transferring Wealth to the Rural Areas
=======================================


7. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Bangladesh economy
appeared to be weathering both national disasters and rising
global food and fuel prices relatively well. The Chief
Adviser agreed, but warned that poorer Bangladeshis were
being hit hard by the price increases, despite the safety
nets the Caretaker Government had put in place. Still, there
was a silver lining to this cloud: rising prices for food
meant that, for the first time in decades, Bangladesh's
farmers were seeing their incomes increase more rapidly than
those of urban dwellers.

Bangladesh Committed to the Struggle Against Terrorism
============================================= =========


8. (S) The Chief Adviser expressed particular dismay over
recent articles in the U.S. media that had portrayed
Bangladesh as being soft on terrorism. He stressed that his
government was determined to do everything possible to root
out terrorism and had taken concrete steps such as outlawing
the HUJ1-B and arresting a large number of terrorists. The
Ambassador replied that the United States viewed Bangladesh
as a valuable partner in the War against Terrorism; the U.S.
Mission received excellent cooperation on counter-terrorism
from the concerned GOB agencies.

Working the Rapid Action Battalions
====================================

9. (C) To further strengthen counter-terrorism
cooperation, the United States was interested in seeing
whether it was possible to provide training to the RAB, the
Ambassador continued. To do so, however, would require some
improvements in RAB's transparency and accountability with
respect to human rights questions. A team from Washington
had been in Dhaka and had had good conversations with RAB on
this issue. In the team's final meeting, however, the Home
Ministry had indicated that there would be no changes in
current practices. The Chief Adviser heartily endorsed the
Ambassador's comment that he would not take this negative
response as the final answer. Fakhruddin agreed to look into
the matter and also noted that he hoped that the National
Human Rights Commission would help address issues such as
alleged violations of human rights by RAB, once the NHRC was
stood up in September.

Comment: On Track for Now
===========================


10. (C) The Chief Adviser appears committed to stepping down
by the end of the year - and leaving a stronger democracy
behind. He understands that he might not get everything he
wants in terms of reform but similarly understands that a
return to the scorched earth politics of 2006 would be
disastrous for Bangladesh. We should do everything possible
to help Bangladesh,s major political parties grasp this fact.
Pasi