Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DHAKA292
2008-03-05 07:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS REMAIN A TENSE AND TROUBLED

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KCOR KDEM BG 
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VZCZCXRO5553
PP RUEHCI
DE RUEHKA #0292/01 0650753
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050753Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6396
INFO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 8353
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2079
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 9578
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0547
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0217
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0216
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 0137
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0107
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 1202
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0104
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 000292 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KCOR KDEM BG
SUBJECT: CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS REMAIN A TENSE AND TROUBLED
CORNER OF BANGLADESH

Classified By: CDA a.i. Geeta Pasi; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 000292

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KCOR KDEM BG
SUBJECT: CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS REMAIN A TENSE AND TROUBLED
CORNER OF BANGLADESH

Classified By: CDA a.i. Geeta Pasi; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The political situation in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts (CHT) remains tense, and in spite of positive
statements by the government, the peace accord continues to
languish. POLOFF and AIDOFFs recently visited the CHT under
the auspices of the UN Development Program to assess the
human rights and political situation and assess the impact of
UN projects funded by AID in the area. The main problems
continue to be land rights and development. Ethnic Bengali
settlers continue to take (or be given) land traditionally
farmed by the indigenous population, resulting in tension and
occasional violence. According to local indigenous leaders,
the military, which exercises control over law and order,
involves itself in these local disputes, generally in favor
of the ethnic Bengalis. In addition, the three CHT districts
are cut off from the rest of the country, with no cellphone
coverage permitted by the government, ostensibly for security
purposes. We see an opportunity to reengage in the region
and have planned follow-up discussions with local officials
and UNDP. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) POLOFF and AIDOFFs visited two of the three CHT
districts in early January under the auspices of the UN
Development Program (UNDP). This was the first visit to the
area by embassy officers since 2005. The purpose of the
visit was to assess on-going U.S.-funded UNDP programming in
the area, as well as the political and human rights
situation.

BACKGROUND: A TROUBLED CORNER OF THE COUNTRY
============================================


3. (SBU) The Chittagong Hill Tracts consist of three
districts -- Rangamati, Bandarban, and Khagrachhari. Until
the partition of British India in 1947, 97 percent of the
population belonged to indigenous tribes, primarily the
Chakma, Tripura and Marma. Under the British, the CHT was an
"excluded area" exempt from the normal British administrative
system of Bengal. Although it had a minimal Muslim
population, the British gave the CHT to Pakistan as part of a

deal to prevent Pakistan from claiming Calcutta. Pakistan
removed the CHT,s "exclusive" status, opening it up to
Muslim settlement. In 1961 international donors, including
the U.S., funded the damming of the Karnaphuli River to
provide hydroelectric power for Chittagong. The dam flooded
the tribal capital of Rangamati town as well as some of
Bangladesh,s most fertile valleys. The displaced population
of Rangamati, which was mostly ethnic Chakma and Buddhist,
was forced to flee to the highest hilltops with little
notice. These hilltops are now a string of islands that form
Rangamati today. The flooding of the town, which most
tribals attribute to the Chakmas, pro-Indian orientation,
remains a source of bitterness to this day.


4. (SBU) After independence, open hostilities began between
militant tribal groups, led by the Parbattya Chattagram Jama
Songhat Sonniti (PCJSS -- the former Rangamati Communist
Party),and the government, which accelerated efforts to
settle ethnic Bengalis in the CHT. After over two decades of
increasingly violent clashes, the Awami League government
signed a peace accord with the PCJSS in 1997. The accord
created a new ministry for CHT Affairs, called for the
closure of most army bases in the region, and devolved most
government responsibilities to the local level. Almost from
its inception, the accords have been stymied by opposition
from local leaders from the Awami League and Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP),both of which saw implementation as
a threat to their parochial interests.

UNDER STATE OF EMERGENCY, NOT MUCH CHANGE
==========================================


5. (SBU) According to UNDP and local leaders, there has been
no measurable increase in the already heavy army presence in
the CHT since the declaration of a state of emergency. (NOTE:
The Bangladesh Rifles also has a strong presence in the CHT
and operates out of of number of counter-insurgency operation
camps. END NOTE.) Some policies of the caretaker government
that have disrupted life elsewhere, like slum demolition and

DHAKA 00000292 002 OF 004


evictions, have also been less common in the CHT, primarily
because they would adversely affect ethnic Bengali "settlers"
the government has encouraged to move to the area.


6. (SBU) The indigenous population welcomed some government
initiatives, such as the arrest on corruption charges and
murder of former Khagrachhari member of parliament Wadud
Bhuiyan, who is said to have been responsible for torching
the Chakma village of Lemuchhari in 2003. Local tribal
leaders complained to us, however, that in the sweep of
arrests, several innocent PCJSS leaders were also detained.
The state of emergency also has done nothing to slow the flow
of ethnic Bengali settlers to the area.

FOOD CRISIS PROMPTED BY BAMBOO FLOWERING
========================================


7. (SBU) While visiting Rangamati, we heard for the first
time about a serious food crisis in the CHT areas bordering
India. Every 40 to 50 years, a particular species of bamboo
flowers in the CHT and neighboring eastern Indian states.
The flowering unleashes an explosion in the rat population
which eats all the local crops, resulting in a food crisis.
The last such crisis, in the 1950s, prompted an insurgency in
the Indian state of Mizoram. The flowering has started
again, and according to Rangamati Hill District Chairman
Jagat Jyoti Chakma, this has prompted serious food shortages
that are affecting between 20,000 and 50,000 indigenous
Bangladeshis. USAID, working with the United Nations, is
developing a response to this situation. (Reftel)

DEFORESTATION ANOTHER CONCERN
=============================


8. (SBU) Control of land and natural resources is a major
source of friction between indigenous peoples and Bengali
settlers. The Kasalong Reserve Forest in Khagrachhari, and
other natural forests in the three hill districts, have been
dramatically deforested as a result of illegal logging and
land grabbing. Thousands of tribal people, driven from the
villages in Khagrachhari, were pushed into Kasalong, which
has resulted in a nearly 75 percent depletion of the forest.
During the visit, we discussed including protected areas in
the CHT under a new AID protected area co-management project
that would include a conflict mitigation element as well as
community forestry. A similar initiative has been
successfully implemented in northeastern Bangladesh and would
serve as a model. CHT and UNDP officials welcomed the
suggestion.

A NEGATIVE PICTURE PAINTED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS
=============================================


9. (C) The peace accord called for elections to three
district councils. These district councils would then
appoint members to a CHT Regional Council. Since elections
have not yet been held, the government has appointed members
to the district councils. Former PCJSS leader JB Larma
currently heads the Regional Council, although he complained
to us that he has no power and the Council, created by the
peace accord he helped negotiate, remains toothless.


10. (C) Larma was pessimistic about the overall situation. A
30-year veteran of the CHT insurgency and a senior leader of
the PCJSS, he has come under severe criticism from within his
party for signing the accord in 1997. Larma complained that,
contrary to the provisions of the accord, the military
exercises absolute control of the CHT, and that our
conversation and his "every move" were carefully scrutinized.
(NOTE: Our movements were heavily proscribed by police
during our entire trip. END NOTE.) He said that under the
accord the local councils, and not the deputy commissioners,
should be responsible for administration of the three
districts, including responsibility for law and order.
Nevertheless, the Council remains powerless and the deputy
commissioner and army call all the shots. The state of
emergency has only heightened his anxiety. "I am afraid any
day I could be arrested," he told us. He asked the U.S. to
use its influence with the government of Bangladesh to pull
back the army and begin implementing the accord.

DHAKA 00000292 003 OF 004



CHAKMA CHIEF CLAIMS SITUATION "WORSENING"
=========================================


11. (SBU) We also met with Raja Devasish Roy, the Chakma
circle chief and hereditary leader of the Chakma people. As
per the CHT peace accords, he, along with two other
indigenous circle chiefs, plays a key role in revenue
collection, land management, and conflict mitigation. Roy is
a prominent barrister-of-law and human rights advocate who
has served on several UN panels on indigenous rights. (NOTE:
Three days after we met with Roy, the caretaker government
announced he had been appointed Special Assistant to the
Chief Adviser with the rank and status of State Minister,
responsible for the ministries of CHT Affairs and Forestry.
END NOTE)


12. (C) Roy stressed the main problem in the CHT is the
Bangladesh government,s (and military,s) intentional
efforts to hamper development. As a result, the CHT has some
of the lowest development indicators in the country,
including the child mortality rate and education levels. Roy
cited the military prohibition on mobile telephony and
internet access in the CHT as an "enormous" hindrance to
development. It can take a full day to reach villages in
outlying areas with messages, and the detrimental effect the
communications blockade has on business development is
significant.


13. (C) According to Roy, in the past six to seven months the
situation in the CHT has deteriorated, with a spike in the
number of land conflicts between indigenous and settler
groups. The army often intervenes on the side of the ethnic
Bengalis, ignorant of the facts of the case and uninterested
in who holds title to the property. Roy shared with us his
concern that, given the heightened tensions, the situation
could grow violent again. Roy welcomed the U.S. presence in
the CHT, and emphasized as we departed all that is required
is a bit of good will on the part of the government. "The
Hill Tract problem doesn,t need as miracle to resolve," he
said. (NOTE: CDA a.i.'s subsequent meeting with Roy is
reported septel. END NOTE)

A VISIT TO THE CHT,S "FRONT-LINE"
=================================


14. (C) With UNDP, we visited two clusters of indigenous
villages in Khagrachhari district which are being engulfed by
new Bengali settlements. Lemuchhari village was
reconstructed in 2003 after a gang of settlers allegedly
under the control of former MP Wadud Bhuiyan torched all the
tribal homes and forced the entire population to flee.
Villagers told us the police tried to warn them, but were
powerless to intervene. The army camp, on the other hand,
played an active role in abetting the violence. The
international outcry against the then-BNP government was so
strong the secretary of the CHT ministry granted permission
for UNDP to commence reconstruction without consulting Prime
Minister Khaleda Zia. When we visited, villagers complained
they were once again at risk: all their land titles were
burned when the village was torched, and settlers are now
building on the villagers, farmland. We saw new settler
homes being constructed in fields as close as 200 feet from
the village in some areas. (NOTE: The leadership of this
village is very activist, and held a press conference in
Dhaka on the tenth anniversary of the signing of the peace
accords to protest the encroachment of their land by
settlers. END NOTE.)


14. (C) En route to the nearby indigenous village of Maddya
Lemuchhari, we saw brand new government-provided
pre-fabricated metal shelters on the side of the road, some
already partially assembled into homes. As we walked through
a Bengali settler village to reach of Lemuchhari, a crowd
formed and began asking why we were only assisting the tribal
people. "We are poor and need assistance too," said the
leader, a bearded man wearing an Islamic cap. UNDP later
pointed out that the government openly provided food
supplies, pre-fabricated housing and other subsidies to
settlers that the indigenous population did not receive.

DHAKA 00000292 004.2 OF 004




15. (SBU) We walked only a few hundred meters further, along
a narrow path through a rice paddy, to reach Maddya
Lemuchhari. We could see several new metal settler homes on
the hills right above the village center. When we arrived in
the village, the community committee implementing UNDP,s
quick impact fund project there briefed us on how their
project had been detrimentally affected by settler activity.
According to UNDP and the villagers, they had planned to
build a plant nursery on land near the village, but before
they could start construction settlers seized the land and
built homes on it. These new metal houses were visible about
500 feet away, towards the main road. (COMMENT: We found the
failure of this project particularly troubling since it was
being partially funded through AID funding to UNDP. END
COMMENT.)

COMMENT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT MAKES A DIFFERENCE
===========================================


16. (C) The CHT is often neglected, because of its remote
location and the difficulty getting government permission to
visit. The human rights situation in the area is the worst
in the country and in spite of lip service by the caretaker
government, there has been little movement to implement the
peace accords to date. With the appointment of Devasish Roy,
however, the government may finally be signaling a desire to
change the status quo.


17. (C) As with other issues, demonstrating U.S. interest in
the CHT sends an important message to the government. As a
donor to the UNDP,s programming there, the USG has a vested
interest in ensuring our money is well-spent and projects are
not blocked. The Country Team is discussing follow-up steps
to partner our human rights and governance concerns with
programs designed to mitigate conflict, such as the community
forestry project. We will also raise the issue, with our
Bangladesh government and military interlocutors, of lifting
the restrictions on cellphone and internet coverage, in an
effort to bolster development in the region. A follow-up
visit to the CHT, again under UNDP auspices, is planned in
the coming months.
Pasi