AMBASSADOR WARNS BANGLADESH INTELLIGENCE HEAD TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 001180

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PINS PGOV PINR KDEM BG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WARNS BANGLADESH INTELLIGENCE HEAD TO
END FLIRTATION WITH ISLAMIC DEMOCRATIC PARTY

REF: A. DHAKA 1138

B. STATE 116638

DHAKA 00001180 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
=========


1. (S) The Ambassador warned Bangladeshi Director General
for Forces Intelligence Golam Mohammad that the U.S.
government vehemently opposed the creation of the Islamic
Democratic Party (IDP),formed earlier this year by senior
members of Harakat ul-Jihad-Islami-Bangladesh (HUJI-B) with
DGFI support. The Ambassador expressed shock that the former
Director of DGFI/CTIB, Brigadier General A.T.M. Amin had
pressed Awami League (AL) President Sheikh Hasina getting her
to convince the USG to support the IDP. Mohammad told the
Ambassador he was unaware of Amin's actions, apologized
profusely and assured the Ambassador that the IDP would not
be registered. Mohammad asked the Ambassador and Regional
Affairs Counselor for assistance developing a plan to
integrate reform-minded HUJI-B members in to the folds of
politics and society.

Hasina's Conversations in Washington
====================================


2. (S) On the afternoon of 12 November 2008, the Ambassador
met with Director General, Directorate General Forces
Intelligence (DGFI),Major General Golam Mohammad and
Director, DGFI Counterterrorism Intelligence Bureau (CTIB),
Brigadier General Emadul Haque. During the meeting, the
Ambassador informed Mohammad of a conversation that had taken
place on 30 October in Washington between SCA A/S Boucher and
Awami League President Sheikh Hasina regarding the
registration of the Islamic Democratic Party (IDP),a group
tied to the terrorist organization Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami
Bangladesh (HUJI-B) (ref B). During their meeting, Hasina
told Boucher that Amin had contacted her requesting that she
urge the USG to support the registration of IDP. As Hasina
told Boucher and subsequently the Ambassador, she believed
IDP members were linked to past attempts to assassinate her
and other Awami League leaders. Understandably, Hasina was
uncomfortable trumpeting the cause of IDP with the Election
Commission (EC) or the USG. Furthermore, Hasina resented
Amin's attempts to blackmail her due to his former
negotiating role while she was imprisoned. Hasina did not
want to see the IDP registered and suspected Amin was acting
on his own accord and without the approval of the Caretaker
Government or his uniformed superiors.

IDP Registration
================


3. (S) The Ambassador informed Mohammad of a conversation
with Bangladesh Chief of Army Staff (CAS) General Moeen Uddin
Ahmed on 08 November, which Moeen noted he had interceded to
help block IDP's registration. Mohammad agreed when the
Ambassador pointed out that Amin's actions appeared to
undercut Moeen's efforts. Mohammad speculated that Moeen was
likely unaware of Amin's discussions with Hasina and his
continued efforts on behalf of IDP. Mohammad profusely
apologized for the miscommunication within the Bangladesh
Government on this issue and any negative repercussions from
Amin's communications with Hasina and her subsequent
conversation with Boucher. Mohammad took full responsibility
for the lack of coordination and reassured the Ambassador
that IDP would not be registered. Mohammad knew IDP had
resubmitted a revised constitution to the EC on 11 November
in the hopes that the EC would approve the revised documents
and register the party. Mohammad reaffirmed that DGFI and
the Government of Bangladesh agreed with the Ambassador's
assessment of the IDP and promised to speak with the Army
Chief and EC to ensure they were not registered.

IDP: Reformed members of HUJI-B?
=================================


4. (S) The Ambassador reminded Mohammad that a number of
IDP members had continuing ties to terrorist groups,
specifically HUJI-B. The Ambassador argued that allowing the
IDP to continue as a political entity would be a mistake
unless the Government of Bangladesh established well-defined
conditions. Such condition were akin to "lines in the sand"

DHAKA 00001180 002.2 OF 002


regarding the expectations and tolerance of the Government of
Bangladesh with respect to IDP activities.


5. (S) Mohammad agreed with the Ambassador's argument and
explained that he initially supported Amin's theory of
bringing HUJI-B members in to the fold through the
establishment of IDP or some other type of political
organization. Mohammad rationalized that in doing so the
Bangladeshi intelligence and security services could monitor
and co-opt IDP leaders and arrest those HUJI-B members that
remained outside of the political process. Mohammad thought
that excluding HUJI-B "reformists", those who would form the
core of IDP, from politics could force them back underground.
Mohammad admitted that while the theory was sound in
practice, the idea of the IDP failed and he now viewed the
IDP in the same light as the Ambassador. Mohammad sought the
Ambassador's guidance on the best course of action to take
with the IDP and other HUJI-B reformers who wanted to take a
more moderate stance and integrate themselves in to the
Bangladesh political system if establishment of the IDP party
was not an option. (Note: we will meet with DGFI in the
upcoming weeks to further discuss de-radicalization efforts
and other options. End Note).

COMMENT
=======


6. (S) We intend to discuss the IDP issue, and highlight
Amin's efforts to bypass normal channels to keep the party
alive, with the Army Chief during DASD Clad's upcoming visit.
Muhammad and others in the GOB (including the Caretaker
Advisers) have all professed shock at Amin's actions and have
distanced themselves from his attempts to support the IDP.
We will continue to press DGFI and others within the GOB to
come up with a better strategy for dealing with HUJI-B.
Moriarty