KHALEDA ZIA CONSOLIDATES LEADERSHIP AND BNP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 001120

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/PB AND SCA/FO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUM KDEM BG
SUBJECT: KHALEDA ZIA CONSOLIDATES LEADERSHIP AND BNP
ADJUSTS TO LIFE AFTER TARIQUE RAHMAN

REF: DHAKA 1069

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
=======


1. (C) Former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia has moved steadily
to consolidate control over the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP) since her release from prison on September 11. At her
direction, the BNP registered with the Election Commission
prior to the October 20 deadline and subsequently met with
the Caretaker Government Advisers to continue negotiations on
the roadmap towards the December 18 elections. Internally,
former "Reformist" elements of the party worry about their
future even as the BNP leadership decides how to respond to
the Government's proposed "negative list" of potential
candidates to be barred from the election. Meanwhile, the
BNP's alliance partners jockey for position. The BNP's
prospects for winning the December elections have diminished,
but the party will remain a major factor in the country's
politics regardless of how many seats it wins.

BNP Registers and Continues to Negotiate
========================================


2. (C) Those hoping for broadly inclusive elections in
December breathed a collective sigh of relief when the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its principal alliance
partner the Jamaat Islami Bangladesh (JIB) submitted their
registration forms to the Election Commission on October 20.
In a sign of its flexibility, the Election Commission had
earlier extended the deadline by one week to accommodate the
BNP and its ally, but the EC had also signaled it would not
consider further delays. At the deadline, the BNP blinked
and agreed to register, albeit only after the party's
recalcitrant Secretary General clarified publicly that the
decision to register did not mean the BNP had renounced the
option of boycotting the elections at a later date. Still,
in order to comply with the registration requirements, the
BNP amended its constitution to bring it in line with the
requirements of the new political party law.


3. (C) Following the party's decision to register, a BNP
delegation met on October 23 with the Caretaker Government's
negotiating team led by Education Adviser Hossain Zillur
Rahman. After the meeting, a BNP spokesman announced that
the two sides had agreed "in principle" to six of the seven
BNP demands. While others in the BNP later backtracked, the
result was an uncharacteristically positive public tone from
the BNP leadership regarding the political reform process and
the implementation of the electoral roadmap. While she did
not participate in either meeting, Khaleda Zia's hand was
clearly evident behind the shift in the party's position.
The BNP's newfound spirit of cooperation was foreshadowed by
Khaleda's two meetings with Hossain Zillur Rahman and her
conversation with the Ambassador on October 6 (reftel). As a
result, the threat of a BNP boycott of the elections has
become both less likely and less credible.

Pressure to Exclude both Reformists and Bad Actors
============================================= =====

4.(C) While Khaleda Zia has reactivated the party's formal
decision making structures, most notably its Standing
Committee, she has been slow to welcome former "reformists"
back into the fold. Standing Committee members Saifur
Rahman and Lt. Gen. (ret'd) Mahbubur Rahman have been allowed
to participate in formal meetings, but have not been involved
in any of the negotiations with the Advisers. Instead,
Secretary General Khondker Delwar Hossain, Office Secretary
Rizvi Ahmed, Assistant Secretary General Nazrul Islam Khan,
and other loyalists have been at the forefront. Prominent
BNP reformists like former Education Minister Dr. Osman
Farook and former Food Minister Kamal Yusuf have complained
to us that they are unsure about their future within the
party. While some (including Yusuf) have been able to meet
with Khaleda, others (such as Farook and reformist Secretary
General Hafeez Uddin Ahmed) have been unable to get audiences
with the party Chairperson. Some reformists fear Khaleda may
deny them nominations for parliamentary seats as punishment

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for their disloyalty. While assuring us they are not
prepared to sacrifice their dignity by "crawling back" to
Khaleda, these reformists are worries about being left out if
the BNP returns to power. In a telling move, the BNP's
delegation to a National Democratic Institute Conference on
October 27 did not include any reformists.


5. (C) At the same time, the BNP and Awami League
leaderships have received from the Directorate General of
Forces Intelligence (DGFI)"negative lists" of individuals
whom DGFI does not want to see receive nominations from the
parties. Reportedly, more than twice as many former BNP
parliamentarians are on the negative list than Awami League
former parliamentarians. Some BNP supporters fear that by
excluding these candidates, and given the tenuous standing
within the party of the reformist faction, the BNP might have
difficulty in putting forward a credible slate of candidates.
Moreover, in several key areas (including Sylhet,
Chittagong, and Dhaka),the local BNP party structures have
suffered serious divisions between reformists and loyalists.
As a result, some BNP supporters now believe their party has
no chance of winning in December. Some argue that as a
result the party should seek a delay or cancellation of
elections.

Khaleda Establishes In-House "think tank"
=========================================


6. (C) Much of the criticism of the 2001 - 2006 BNP
Government centered around the parallel administration
established by Tarique Rahman and his cronies at the
notorious "Hawa Bhaban" (BNP Headquarters). Senior BNP
officials complained that Hawa Bhaban controlled access to
Khaleda Zia and provided her with advice on national and
political issues. Tarique Rahman left Bangladesh on
September 11, and the party offices moved out of Hawa Bhaban,
but Khaleda Zia continues to rely on an informal network of
advisers. These advisers have set up shop in a residential
area located in the Diplomatic Enclave, where Begum Zia has
established her private office. The team of advisers, who
act as the BNP's in-house think tank, is led by former Energy
Adviser Mahmudur Rahman, and includes former bureaucrat
Mushfiqur Rahman, former Ambassador to the U.S. Shamsher
Mobin Chowdhury, and a handful of other individuals with
personal ties to the Party Chairperson. Zia has entrusted
this group with drafting the Party's election manifesto, and
it also appears to have a role in setting her schedule.

Four Party Alliance Looks at Division of Seats
============================================= =


7. (C) During the BNP's darkest hours, when Khaleda Zia and
her son were in prison and DGFI was trying to splinter the
party, the Jamaat Islami Bangladesh (JIB) remained loyal to
the BNP Chairperson and committed to the alliance. The
government's inability to break not only the BNP but also its
alliance with JIB helped convince the CTG and Army
leadership that they had to cut a deal with Khaleda Zia and
allow Tarique Rahman to go free. Now, many JIB leaders are
expecting to be rewarded for their loyalty. Seeking to take
advantage of the vacuum within the BNP which might be created
by the negative list and by Zia's presumed disdain for the
reformists, the JIB wants to increase the number of alliance
nominations for its supporters. One senior JIB official
recently told us his party wants to get the alliance's
support to contest 80 seats in the coming campaign--a
significant increase over the 30 seats it was allocated in
the 2001 polls. While the BNP is unlikely to give in to this
demand, many have pointed to an enhanced role for the JIB
within the Four Party Alliance in the future. The two junior
members of the Four Party Alliance (a faction of the Islamic
Oiko Jote and a faction of the Bangladesh Jatiya Party) also
hope to gain an increased number of seats.

Comment
=======


8. (C) In the immediate aftermath of her release from
prison, Khaleda Zia and the BNP enjoyed a boost in
popularity. The BNP's strategy remains simple--to run
against the CTG and to paint the Awami League as

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collaborators with the military-backed government. While
this strategy could succeed given the widespread unpopularity
of the regime, the BNP's most significant weakness is its
internal disarray. Regardless of whether it wins these
elections, however, the BNP will remain a major force in
Bangladeshi politics. For the medium term, Khaleda Zia's
strategy may simply be to keep the party together and keep
open the possibility of her son Tarique's return to power.
It is in our interest that the latter not happen. Our best
chance of averting Tarique's return is to see alternatives
develop within the BNP and to see internal party reform
continue. The stakes are huge in this large Muslim-majority
country with a history of both internal and transnational
terrorism.
Moriarty