COAS PLEDGES TO BLOCK IDP REGISTRATION; DGFI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 001108

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DEPT FOR S/CT AND SCA/PB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR PINS KDEM BG
SUBJECT: COAS PLEDGES TO BLOCK IDP REGISTRATION; DGFI
PROMISES BROADER CT COOPERATION

REF: A. DHAKA 1078

B. DHAKA 1037

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Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary:
=========


1. (S) The Ambassador, on October 22, phoned Bangladesh
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Moeen Uddin Ahmed (then on
an official visit to Pakistan) to convey deep concern about
the Islamic Democratic Party's (IDP,s) attempt to register
to participate in the 18 December parliamentary elections.
Moeen promised to immediately do everything within his power
to help address the issue. During an earlier, October 21
breakfast meeting with the Director General of the
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI),Major
General Golam Mohammad, the Ambassador told Mohammad in no
uncertain terms the U.S. government did not support the
creation of the IDP (which was formed earlier this year by
senior members of Harakat ul-Jihad-Islami-Bangladesh
(HUJI-B)). Mohammad noted the Ambassador's views on IDP and
directed his note-taker to work with the Election Commission
(EC) to ensure IDP's 20 October application to participate in
the 18 December national elections was not approved. The
Ambassador noted his dissatisfaction with DGFI's cooperation
on regional terrorism issues; Mohammad promised to improve in
this area.

Phone Call to COAS
=================


2. (S) On the afternoon of October 22, the Ambassador
called General Moeen who was on an official visit to
Pakistan. The Ambassador told Moeen that he wanted to convey
strong USG opposition to the creation of the IDP and the
IDP's attempt to register to run in the upcoming elections.
The Ambassador noted that registration of this party would be
"dangerous" both for Bangladesh and the United States.
(Note: The Election Commission was scheduled to rule on the
IDP's application by October 30, before Moeen's projected
return to Dhaka. End Note.) Moeen said he understood the
seriousness of the issue. While noting that the Election
Commission was an independent body, he promised to call Dhaka
immediately and do everything in his power to ensure the
registration did not move forward.

Meeting with Director General of DGFI
=====================================


3. (S) During the breakfast meeting at the Ambassador's
Residence a day earlier, Mohammad asked the Ambassador for
his assessment of IDP (which submitted an application to
register for the 18 December parliamentary elections on 20
October). The Ambassador said he was appalled by IDP's
creation and application to participate in upcoming
elections. The Ambassador and RAO Counselor noted that due
to IDP's close links to HUJI-B, there was a strong chance
Washington would consider the IDP to be an alias for HUJI-B
which could lead to the designation of the IDP as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO). The Ambassador worried there
could be consequences to the bilateral relationship if the
IDP were allowed to move forward. Interestingly, Mohammad
tried to distance himself from the formation of the IDP and
without naming him directly, blamed former DGFI Brigadier
General A.T.M. Amin for miscalculating in allowing HUJI-B to
form a political party. Mohammad asked the Ambassador not to
make his complaints about the IDP public. Mohammad said he
understood the USG position and would attempt to block
registration by the IDP.

Continued Support for the State of Emergency
=============================


4. (S) Mohammad sparred with the Ambassador on the
necessity of maintaining the State of Emergency (SOE).
Mohammad tried to make the case that it was only the SOE that
had allowed Bangladesh to experience a relatively calm period
since its implementation on 11 January 2007. Indeed,
Mohammad said the SOE was required to prevent the political
parties' "muscle men" and "black money" from creating an

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atmosphere of fear and intimidation. The Ambassador
countered that Bangladeshi laws should be sufficient to
prevent vote buying and thugs from influencing the elections.
The Ambassador reiterated the U.S. position that the SOE
should be lifted before 18 December in order for the
elections to be perceived as fully credible. Mohammad
acknowledged the caretaker government would likely lift the
SOE after the registration of candidates for parliament had
been finalized (circa three weeks before 18 December).

Multiple Issues with BNP and AL Remain Unresolved
============================================= ====


5. (S) Mohammad said that, at the end of the day, both the
Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
would participate in the 18 December elections. He assessed
the BNP would keep everyone guessing about whether it would
participate until the last minute. This was a BNP tactic to
continue to extract concessions from the caretaker
government. Regarding the Upazila (i.e., county) elections,
Mohammad noted it was absolutely vital to have the elections
held as soon as possible so newly elected parliamentarians
would be unable to influence the process. While 24 and 28
December remained the scheduled dates for the Upazila
elections, Mohammad conceded the dates were still up for
negotiation and could slip.

Looking forward to Post-Election Period
=======================================


6. (S) Mohammad noted that while stability and
participation of all parties (minus the IDP) in the elections
were important issues, he was looking beyond 18 December to
the post election period. Mohammad and senior caretaker
government advisers were working hard to bring the BNP and AL
together so the two parties could agree on the following: the
losing party on 18 December would act professionally and not
launch hartals (nationwide strikes) to protest their loss;
the new Parliament would make permanent the 87 ordinances
enacted by the caretaker government; the power of the
President vis-a-vis the Prime Minister would somehow be
increased; the new Parliament would establish a National
Security Council as an advisory body to the Cabinet; and, the
next political government would not seek retribution against
the Army high command. (Note: Mohammad confided the AL had
accepted the NSC as being in the national interest, but the
BNP had not yet agreed. End Note.)

Promise of Improved Counterterrorism Cooperation
============================================= ===


7. (S/NF) The Ambassador told General Mohammad the USG was
dissatisfied with DGFI cooperation against specific terrorist
targets, particularly ones related to Pakistan-based groups.
The Ambassador told him the USG wanted to see more from DGFI.
General Mohammad promised "From today on, you will see
improvement." Mohammad praised the incoming Director of
DGFI's Counterterrorism Intelligence Bureau (CTIB),Brigadier
General Emadul Hoque. Mohammad intimated that he had not had
much control over CTIB when Amin was director, but now that
Amin had moved to another unit, he could more effectively
control CTIB through Emadul.

Comment
=======


8. (S) The very fact that the IDP moved ahead with filing
papers to register for the upcoming elections suggests that
COAS Moeen was not aware of our reservations about the move.
Indeed, the Indian High Commissioner told the Ambassador on
October 21 that General Amin had recently told him that the
USG had chopped off on the creation and registration of the
IDP. In any event, Moeen is now on notice regarding the USG
position. We will see if he uses his influence with the
Election Commission to keep the IDP from being registered.
The pledge of enhanced DGFI cooperation on counter-terrorism
is welcome. It was no secret that DG Mohammad felt
undermined by his former subordinate's penchant for
independent action. We will look for signs that Mohammad
plans to fulfill his pledge to begin a new era of CT
cooperation.

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Moriarty