TANZANIA: MINISTER MEMBE DEFENDS TO DIPLOMATS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAR ES SALAAM 000224

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/E FOR JLIDDLE, SHAMILTON
AF/RSA FOR MBITTRICK
ADDIS FOR AU MISSION
LONDON, PARIS, BRUSSELS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2018
TAGS: KDEM PHUM PREL PGOV TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIA: MINISTER MEMBE DEFENDS TO DIPLOMATS
CCM'S CALL FOR A REFERENDUM; CUF INSISTS ORIGINAL AGREEMENT
MUST BE HONORED

REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 0206

B. 07 DAR ES SALAAM 1581

C. 07 DAR ES SALAAM 0888

Classified By: Ambassador Mark Green for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) The Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation, Bernard Membe, defended to Dar es Salaam-based
diplomats on April 4 the decision of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi
(CCM) party to insist on a referendum among Zanzibari voters
on a powersharing agreement within the Government of Zanzibar
(GOZ). In a short briefing during which he also outlined the
African Union (AU) positions in the Comoros and Zimbabwe,
Membe asked diplomats to "urge the leaders of the opposition
Civic United Front (CUF) party to return to the talks" in
order to discuss this new proposal.


2. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador Green earlier the same
day, Dr. Ibrahim Lipumba, the CUF National Chairman, said CUF
leaders were caught completely by surprise by the March 31
move from the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the CCM
to call for a referendum on the powersharing arrangement for
the GOZ which senior leaders from the two parties had
negotiated over a period of some fourteen months. CUF sees
this proposal as a delaying tactic to avoid making a decision
about any interim power- sharing arrangement within the GOZ
before the 2010 elections. Lipumba confirmed that the
agreement the two parties reached would require changes to
the Zanzibar Constitution, but the modality to ratify
constitutional amendments is a two-thirds majority in the
Zanzibar House of Representatives. In other words, even if a
referendum could be agreed upon, there would still need to be
legislative action. The constitution is silent on
referendums and in the 46-year history of both Zanzibar and
Tanzania Mainland there has never been a referendum.


3. (C) Minister Membe told the diplomats that the March 24-25
invasion of Anjouan by the Comoran army and assisted by AU
troops was successful, appreciated the international
community's support and publicly thanked the United States
and France for their commitment, especially within the P-5.
He confirmed that at least half of the 1,000 AU troops in
Anjouan will stay until the new elections are completed,
which needs to be within 90 days (ref A). Privately,
Ambassador Green asked Minister Membe if he had the
specifications the USG needed in order to provide the vessel
the GOT had previously requested to support the ongoing AU
operation. Membe said he thought they "were on my desk" and
he would send them right away. However, Minister Membe did
not subsequently send this information to the Embassy that
day.


4. (SBU) Membe confirmed that the situation in Zimbabwe
remains extremely tense. The AU election observation team in
Zimbabwe has made no statement regarding the elections and
will not do so until the results are announced. President
Kikwete, as the AU Chairman, is in daily consultations with
other key African leaders, especially President Mbeki,
exploring ways to assure the elections will conclude
successfully. End summary.

Rift between CCM Zanzibar and CCM Mainland members deepens
-------------- --------------

5. (C) While Minister Membe attempted to tell the diplomatic
community that a referendum on a powersharing agreement was a
"democratic approach" to resolve the impasse in Zanzibar, and
encouraged the Ambassadors to convince CUF leaders of the
same, a CCM insider told Ambassador Green April 2 that the
suggestion for a referendum originated with President Karume,
who to date has made no public statement indicating that he
would accept any type of transitional or powersharing
government in Zanzibar. A personal assistant to President

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Kikwete confided to the Ambassador that an already bitter
divide between CCM Zanzibar and CCM Mainland members deepened
during the March 29 to 30 NEC meeting, held in northern
Tanzania, near President Julius Nyerere's hometown. The
debates were intense and emotional with senior CCM Zanzibar
members considering any powersharing arrangement to go
completely against the "spirit of the Zanzibar revolution."
According to sources, CCM Zanzibar even threatened to leave
the CCM and return to their original Afro Shirazi Party (ASP)
revolution-era party, although it is hard to know how
seriously that treat should be taken. (NOTE: In 1977, the
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) led by Julius
Nyerere joined with the ASP which had come to power during
the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar, to form the Chama Cha
Mapinduzi (CCM). End note.) It appears that CCM Mainland
leaders, including President Kikwete, supported President
Karume's call because they were unable to produce any other
solution that CCM Zanzibar would accept at the NEC meeting.

Referendum unprecedented in Tanzania
--------------

6. (C) To date, CUF leaders have refused any consideration of
a referendum, nor of returning to the negotiating table. In
their view, after 14 long months, an agreement was reached in
early March 2008, that only needed to be approved by the
central committees of both parties. In an April 1 statement,
CUF accuses the CCM of going back on its word to reach and
sign an accord between the senior party leaders. Both sides
had agreed that any changes to the Zanzibar constitution
needed to put that agreement into effect would be ratified
according to the law by a two-thirds majority of the Zanzibar
House of Representatives; never once in 14 months was a
referendum mentioned. As CUF officials point out, no
referendum was used when the switch was made to multiparty
democracy or when Tanzania decided to join the East Africa
Community or even when the constitution was changed to add
the requirement that Tanzania's vice president come from
Zanzibar.


7. (C) Although President Kikwete in his April 2 address to
the nation and Minister Membe to the diplomats tried to make
the case that bringing the issue to the people is
"democratic", Dr. Lipumba, Chairman of CUF, was adamant that
his party considers the suggestion for a referendum to be
unconstitutional; but more importantly, CUF considers this
"surprise" from CCM leaders to be a severe breach of faith,
especially in the trust CUF leaders have had in President
Kikwete's sincerity to achieve reconciliation in Zanzibar.
Based on that trust, CUF leaders have encouraged their
members to be patient for the past two years.


8. (C) During Minister Membe's briefing, Ambassador Green
asked if an agreement approved by the referendum would go
into place before 2010 and Membe replied: "Yes." However,
the President's assistant told the Ambassador that same day
all discussions at the NEC meeting were only about power
sharing "post 2010 elections." CUF leaders themselves have
no idea what the referendum would entail. The only official
letter they have received from CCM since April 1 is an
invitation to come back to the negotiating table, with no
details and no mention of a referendum.

CUF's election concerns
--------------

9. (C) While some diplomats expressed to the Ambassador their
view that a referendum on a powersharing agreement might be a
"fair approach," few if any CUF leaders or members would
agree. After seeing severely rigged elections in 1995, when
the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) stopped the election
in the middle of the day and in 2000, when ballot boxes were
removed from polling stations by the police, CUF has little
faith in the electoral process and a truly independent ZEC
unless they are also participating in the government. Even
in 2005, when the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and

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other observers' reports noted that voting procedures in
Zanzibar had improved slightly, once the ballot boxes left
the district counting stations, the tabulation of votes did
not proceed at the ZEC, but at a heavily guarded
government-owned hotel. When the final result was announced,
CCM's candidate, Amani Karume, was said to have received 53
percent of the vote. Many observers believe if the vote had
been completely transparent and fair, it would have been a
dead heat, possibly requiring a recount. The election
results were so clearly flawed, that then U.S Ambassador
Michael Retzer, did not attend President Karume's
inauguration.


10. (C) The Zanzibar Electoral Commission is appointed by
President Karume; the ZEC is responsible to ensure that the
voters register is up to date. The register was not fully
vetted and "cleaned up" when the 2005 elections took place
and CUF has no reason to believe that the register has been
improved in any way. A referendum would basically be an
election and could very likely split right down party lines,
unless both CCM and CUF went to their party members and asked
them to support it. The reason that there is a need for
reconciliation is that there has not been a multiparty
election yet in Zanzibar that observers have concluded was
free and fair. CUF leaders have a hard time supporting what
would essentially be yet another election to solve the
injustices they felt they suffered as a result of past
elections. If, however, some kind of modest power-sharing
agreement were put in place prior to the next election,
whether a referendum or a regular election, CUF might begin
to have some confidence that President Karume and CCM
Zanzibar were sincere about reform and that the election
process would be conducted in an impartial manner.


11. (C) CUF might also be more inclined to support a
referendum if this included a powersharing structure on the
ballot that would go into effect before 2010, as Minister
Membe mistakenly said in response to Ambassador Green's
question. After all, in previous discussions with the
Ambassador, CUF leaders said they believed that "confidence
building measures" in the form of modest pre-2010
powersharing were close to being finalized, and the only
thing standing in the way of an agreement.

Heightened tension in Zanzibar
--------------

12. (C) During his visit to Pemba on April 5, Ambassador
Green met with two CUF Members of the Union Parliament and
five members from the Zanzibar House of Representatives who
gave him a copy of a paper that was circulated widely in
Stonetown the previous evening. The three lines stated
tersely that all Pembans should pack up and leave Unguja (the
large island where Stonetown is located) within 30 days; if
Pembans do not heed this warning, then "look for consequences
like in 1964" -- a reference to the Zanzibar revolution.
The legislators, particularly those from the House of
Representatives, bemoaned that the cooperation between CCM
and CUF had been increasing over the past months in the House
while the inter-party negotiations were in progress; now
those gains appear to be vanishing. The Ambassador was told
that almost at the same moment that CCM Mainland announced
its call for a referendum, CCM Zanzibar core party members
were called to the Zanzibar State House for a "victory
celebration" that became so boisterous it overflowed into the
streets of Stonetown. He has not been able to verify this.
While in Pemba, Ambassador Green also heard, but did not
actually see, that petitions were circulating on the Island
for Pemba to secede from Zanzibar.
Comment: Next steps
--------------

13. (C) Dr. Lipumba has yet to make a public statement in
response to President Kikwete's April 2 speech. The
Secretary General of CUF and three-time CUF presidential

SIPDIS
candidate in Zanzibar, Malim Seif Hamad, left for Europe

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April 3 to meet with leaders in capitals that support the
democratic process in Zanzibar. In Ambassador Green's
discussions with Dr. Lipumba and Ismail Jussa, CUF's
International Affairs Advisor, there was clearly both shock
that what appeared to CUF to be a final deal has fallen apart
and a new mistrust toward President Kikwete. In addition,
President Kikwete left April 5 for a two week trip abroad;
about the same time he is scheduled to return, President
Karume will leave the country. Thus the two leaders cannot
meet face to face for at least four weeks.


14. (C) Since losing the elections for the Zanzibar
presidency in 2005, CUF has managed to keep its rank and file
members in line, with the promise that serious reconciliation
discussions were proceeding that would lead to an equitable
resolution with the CCM. While we trust that Dr. Lipumba and
his deputies will continue to project this message, it could
appear to many CUF members that the bar has suddenly been set
much higher, a test of patience for any political party that
believes it has been marginalized. That being said, we also
believe that the Ambassador and Embassy officials are in a
good position to talk with both CCM Tanzania and the CUF
leaders. We will continue to try to persuade President
Kikwete and our CCM contacts to include a pre-2010
powersharing arrangement in a referendum or any final
reconciliation agreement because it would appear essential to
building some confidence amongst CUF leaders in future
transparent elections and to long-term stability in Zanzibar.
GREEN