GAZA: MUALLIM PUSHING HUMANITARIAN TRUCE, CLAIMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000919

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA AND IPA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2018
TAGS: PREL KPAL PGOV IS SY
SUBJECT: GAZA: MUALLIM PUSHING HUMANITARIAN TRUCE, CLAIMS
TO HAVE HAMAS AGREEMENT

Classified By: Classified by CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 b and d
.


1. (C) Summary: FM Walid al-Muallim told Senator Specter
December 30 that Syria wants to help broker a humanitarian
truce in Gaza. After a series of contacts with his European
counterparts, Muallim met with Hamas leader Khalid Mesha,al
and other Palestinian faction heads to ask if they would
agree to a humanitarian truce and to talks later on a
cease-fire with Israel. He claimed that Mesha,al had agreed
on both counts. Muallim planned to report back to his
European counterparts; he did not clarify what he thought the
next steps would be to broker a humanitarian truce. Muallim
leaves December 31 to attend the AL ministerial in Cairo; he
was non-committal as to whether an AL summit would follow.
End summary.


2. (C) Coming directly from a December 30 meeting with
Hamas leader Khalid Mesha,al, Muallim told visiting Senator
Arlen Specter over lunch he would be leaving the following
morning for Cairo to attend the AL ministerial on Gaza.
(Maullim's remarks on Iraq, U.S.-Syrian relations, Iran and
human rights will be reported septel.) Hamas,s morale was
"high," Muallim reported. Though Israel was out to "change
the landscape" in Gaza by eradicating Hamas, Hamas was
fighting back and would endure.


3. (C) Muallim said he had also met with or called
Syria-based Palestinian leaders after conferring with German
FM Steinmeyer and others on the question of whether Syria
could help in reaching a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel,
and whether Hamas would guarantee cessation of missile
attacks during a ceasefire. (Note: European diplomats here
told us EU foreign ministers would be meeting later in the
day to discuss this proposal. According to an evening al
Jazeera report from Paris, the EU ministers had agreed to
support a humanitarian truce.)


4. (C) Muallim said he had agreed to check with Hamas on
two issues: (1) would Hamas agree to respect a humanitarian
cease-fire? And (2) would Hamas agree to talks on a longer
ceasefire with Israel? He claimed Hamas (and other
Palestinian faction leaders in Damascus) had said yes to
both. Pressed by Charge, Muallim said that "Hamas agreed to
accept a truce and implement it." He would be relaying these
commitments back to his European counterparts. (Muallim
confirmed he had spoken with FMs Moratinos, Kouchner, and
Store and would be talking to FS Miliband.) In response to
a question about what Syria saw as the next step toward a
ceasefire, Muallim replied Syria saw three phases: (1) a
humanitarian truce that would address the immediate
humanitarian needs on the ground and allow diplomacy a chance
to work; (2) a truce between Hamas and Israel; and (3)
resumption of talks on the Syria and Palestinian tracks.


5. C) Muallim commented Syria had hoped the new U.S.
administration would open opportunities for peace with
Israel. Israel,s siege of Gaza and its brutal military
assault on Palestinians there had obliged Syria (and Turkey
as well) to suspend indirect peace talks with Israel. It
would be critical not to lose the opportunity for progress if
the U.S. were to support the peace process and the Israeli
elections produced a government willing to negotiate.
Muallim was less clear on how to get to the first stage and
who, if anyone, would be speaking for the Palestinians in
Gaza. Syria would help but could only speak for itself,
Muallim maintained. Others, such as the Europeans, might be
willing to speak to Hamas, he implied without saying so
directly.


6. (C) Asked whether there would be an AL summit, Muallim
explained that several countries had expressed a preference
to let the ministers decide the appropriate next steps. He
said that, if a summit were to take place, it was not yet
agreed whether it would take place in Cairo or Doha. He
claimed venue was not important to Syria. In response to a
question regarding Syria's relations with Egypt, Muallim and
his aides tried but failed to stifle laughter. "I have great
regard for Mubarak as a man," commented Muallim, "but not as

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a leader."


7. (C) Finally, Muallim observed that Hamas and PIJ leaders
had told him during their conversations that day that they
knew Israel wanted to eradicate them but Israel should
consider what would follow. If Israel should eradicate them
(but it would not, Muallim averred),they would be replaced
by Al-Qaeda, a prospect worse, apparently, in the eyes of
Hamas, PIJ, and Muallim than the status quo.


8. (C) Comment: Clearly eager to discuss Gaza, Muallim
seemed to be pursuing some sort of plan but, as he noted, was
not asking the U.S. administration to assist. Muallim went
to great lengths to emphasize the independence of Hamas and
other Palestinian militant groups, all the while touting
Syria's ability to win their support for a cease-fire.
Muallim's close coordination with European foreign ministers
not only vindicated his efforts to end SARG isolation, but it
appeared to be aimed at putting Western pressure on Israel to
end the military operation in Gaza. We believe a central
element of Muallim's strategy is to portray Hamas as a
responsible party willing to negotiate with Israel. Left
unsaid is that such a role for Hamas would come at the
expense of the Palestinian Authority. Muallim and his aides
barely tried to conceal distain for Egypt and their pleasure
over mounting public pressure on moderate Arab countries to
side with Hamas. It remains unclear how Syria would actually
go about achieving a humanitarian truce, but with the French
and EU now on board with the concept, the SARG can let others
do the heavy lifting while offering a direct line of
communication to Hamas.


9. (SBU) CODEL Specter did not have an opportunity to clear
this cable.

CONNELLY