Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DAMASCUS896
2008-12-18 16:45:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR SPECTER'S DEC. 29-31 VISIT

Tags:  PREL PGOV LE IR FR IZ SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9938
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0896/01 3531645
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181645Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5702
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000896 

H PASS
NOFORN
SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV LE IR FR IZ SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR SPECTER'S DEC. 29-31 VISIT
TO DAMASCUS

Classified By: Classified by CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 b and d
.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000896

H PASS
NOFORN
SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV LE IR FR IZ SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR SPECTER'S DEC. 29-31 VISIT
TO DAMASCUS

Classified By: Classified by CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 b and d
.


1. (C) Summary: Embassy Damascus looks forward to your
visit. You will find President Asad and his regime more
confident and self-assured since your meetings in December

2007. In the last year, Syria has successfully maintained
and even deepened relationships with Iran, Hizballah, Hamas,
and foreign fighters transiting the country en route to Iraq.
At the same time, Asad announced in May Syria's
participation in the first of four rounds of indirect peace
talks with Israel, was one of President Sarkozy's guests of
honor at the July Mediterranean Union conference in Paris,
established formal diplomatic relations with Lebanon after
Lebanese President Sleiman's August visit to Damascus, hosted
President Sarkozy in September, and received UK FCO David
Miliband in November. On December 14, despite EU concerns
about human rights abuses and Syria's alleged noncompliance
with its IAEA safeguards agreement, Syria and the EU
initialed an updated version of Syria's 2004 EU Association
Agreement, which now must be considered by the EU foreign
ministers and eventually ratified by the EU's 27 member
states. While most Syrians were thrilled by the election of
Barak Obama, the Syrian regime remains hostile to the current
administration and guardedly optimistic about the next. The
Syrian Government demanded but received no U.S. apology or
explanation for an alleged October 26 U.S. raid near the
border town of Abu Kamal, which the Syrians contend killed
only innocent civilians. In response, the SARG ordered the
closure of the American School and the Embassy's Cultural
Affairs Center. Your visit presents an opportunity to press
Asad for concrete steps on a wide range of issues (see para
10) to signal Syria's desire for better relations to the
incoming administration and new Congress. End Summary

--------------
Israel and France Help Syria Erode Isolation
--------------


2. (C) Syria's central geographic location and its

potential as a spoiler in the region continue to threaten
Israel's security, Lebanon's fledgling democracy, and the
emergence of a stable, democratic Iraqi government. Through
dangerous liaisons with Iran, Hizballah, Hamas/PIJ/PFLP-GC,
and former Iraqi regime elements and foreign fighters, Syria
compensates for its relative political-economic-military
weakness by supporting surrogate militias that it plays as
cards to block U.S. regional initiatives.


3. (C) President Asad appears smugly confident that his
regime's strategy -- maintaining ties to Iran, Hizballah, and
Hamas while attracting European engagement with low-cost
gestures toward Israel and Lebanon -- has worked to erode
Syria's isolation and bolster the regime's prestige and
credibility. In the last nine months, Syria's participation
in four rounds of indirect peace talks with Israel and
commitment to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon
convinced France, the UK, the EU, and others to re-engage
Syria. As an incentive to Syria to adopt more constructive
regional policies, President Sarkozy hosted Asad at Bastille
Day celebrations in Paris (where Asad pointedly turned his
back to avoid conversation with PM Olmert). After Lebanese
President Sleiman and Asad formally agreed in August to
restore diplomatic relations between their two countries,
Sarkozy then traveled to Damascus in September. During
Sarkozy's visit, Asad committed to exchanging ambassadors
with Lebanon by year's end. As of mid-December, Asad has not
yet fulfilled this commitment. Though Syria may yet meet the
December 31 deadline, FM Muallim and others are suggesting
that "bureaucratic and other" issues may "slightly delay"
Syria's appointment of an ambassador.


-------------- --------------
Syria Resists Calls for Gestures to New U.S. Administration
-------------- --------------


4. (C) For now, Syria has no real incentive to abandon its
relations with Iran and non-state surrogates in the region,
or even to show it is ready to make nice with the U.S. In
recent visits, UK FCO David Miliband and Elysee advisor
Claude Gueant urged Asad to take full advantage of Europe's
opening to Syria by continuing negotiations with Israel,
supporting Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen, and
signaling to the next U.S. administration Syria's desire for
better relations. They urged concrete Syrian steps on

DAMASCUS 00000896 002 OF 004


foreign fighters, human rights, and ending the SARG's order
to close the American School and Cultural Affairs Center that
came in response to an alleged October 26 U.S. military
attack near the border town of Abu Kamal.


5. (C) Bashar's regime has coolly fended off these
suggestions, arguing Syria will not make nice with the
current U.S. administration. Bashar has insisted that any
further talks with Israel be conditioned on Israel's reply to
a Syrian paper deposited with the Turks regarding the June 4,
1967 line of withdrawal from the Golan. The paper reportedly
seeks Israel's views on six geographical points that include
the shoreline of Lake Kinneret. We understand Israel has
deposited its own paper with Turkey regarding its own demands
concerning Syria's relations with Iran and Hizballah (to
which Asad claims Syria has provided a response and deposited
it with the Turks.) The Israeli government, however, appears
unprepared to respond to Syria's points in the run-up to
Israel's February 2009 national elections.


6. (S/NF) Regarding Iraq, Syria has maintained relations
with former Iraqi regime elements and sought to deepen ties
to Jaysh al-Mahdi leader Muqtada Sadr and Supreme Islamic
Iraqi Council chief Abdul al-Hakim. At the same, Damascus
has signaled to PM Maliki's government a desire to improve
ties. During an early November visit by Iraqi FM Zebari,
Damascus agreed to re-schedule a PM-level trip it had
canceled in protest of the October 26 Abu Kamal incident and
did not recall its recently-assigned Ambassador to Baghdad.
Nonetheless, Syria remains an outspoken critic of the
recently ratified SOFA/SFA, calling the accords "instruments
to legitimize the illegal U.S. occupation of Iraq." Syria
denies any collusion with foreign fighters transiting its
territory en route to Iraq, even as senior security officials
confide to UK and French counterparts that some FF
facilitators mysteriously were released after being arrested.
While Damascus claims to visiting European leaders that it
shares the West's view of extreme Islam as a common threat,
Syrian operatives continue to facilitate foreign fighter
transit into and operations in Iraq.

-------------- --------------
Despite IAEA Concerns, The EU Initials Association Agreement
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The European Commission, acting on the impetus of the
French Presidency, resumed negotiations with Syria to revise
Syria's 2004 Association Agreement in late November and sent
a team to Damascus to initial the accord on December 14. We
understand EU Foreign Ministers have yet to schedule a
meeting to review the accord and sign it before submitting it
to member states for ratification. Such a meeting will most
probably occur after the Czech Republic assumes the EU
presidency on January 1, 2009. Local diplomats tell us there
remain some concerns about Syria's human rights record and
Syria's lack of cooperation with the IAEA regarding Syria's
alleged construction of a nuclear reactor at al-Kibar.


8. (C) Syria allowed the IAEA to send an inspection team to
examine the al-Kibar site in June. The team took soil and
other samples, which yielded traces of enriched uranium. The
Syrians adamantly claim Israeli bombs with depleted uranium
account for this phenomenon, but the IAEA has sought
follow-up visits to Damascus to clarify this and other
evidence supporting U.S. contentions that al-Kibar was a
nuclear reactor. The November 28 IAEA Board of Governors
meeting ended up discounting a report raising questions about
Syria's nuclear program but calling on Syria to cooperate
with the IAEA in resolving outstanding questions. Syria thus
far refuses any further inspections, but Syria remains on the
IAEA Board of Governor's agenda.


9. (C) Syria's human rights record, also of concern to at
least some EU members, remains abysmal. Syrian courts
sentenced 12 leaders of the Damascus Declaration National
Council to two-year terms in September. While granting an
early release to economist and political reform advocate Aref
Dalila, who was sentenced in 2001, Syrian courts rejected a
petition on December 15 -- just one day after the Association
Agreement's initialing ceremony -- to grant early release to
prominent Syrian journalist Michel Kilo. Syria's security
services launched a widespread crackdown earlier this year
and rounded up hundreds of would-be activists, many of whom
were Kurds. Meanwhile, severe overcrowding and mistreatment
of prisoners at the maximum security Sedniya prison led to a
prison riot and takeover and subsequent crackdown. Several

DAMASCUS 00000896 003 OF 004


guards were reportedly killed, along with prisoner fatalities
estimated as high as 200-300. Another uprising occurred in
mid-December, again the likely result of harsh conditions and
perceived regime persecution of Syrian Islamists.


--------------
Issues to Raise with Syrian Officials
--------------


10. (C) We believe Asad and Syrian officials will be
looking for your assessment of the next administration's
Middle East agenda. Syria very much wants Washington to
return an ambassador to Damascus, take a more active role in
promoting regional peace initiatives, lift economic
sanctions, acknowledge positive Syrian behavior in Lebanon
and Iraq, and end the USG's public confrontation of Syrian
policies. Your views of how Washington in general and the
U.S. Congress in particular will frame Syria's aspirations
will provide a level of sophisticated analysis that Syrian
leaders generally lack. We would be grateful if you would
consider raising points on several issues:


-- Foreign Fighters and October 26: Asad may raise the
alleged October 26 U.S. raid at Abu Kamal. Based on press
reports and information available in Washington, you can
share your understanding that the target of this alleged raid
was reportedly Abu Ghadiya, a facilitator who has operated in
Syria for at least a year. Asad should know that American
military and diplomatic officials will remain concerned about
Syria's turning of a blind eye (to put it most charitably) to
the presence of such networks. These facilitators are
responsible for attacks on U.S. troops and Iraqis. Syria's
denials are not convincing, and its hopes for better
relations with us and Iraq will not be realized until we see
evidence of Syrian attempts to roll up these networks.

-- Supporting Lebanese Sovereignty: As of December 18, Syria
has not yet fulfilled its pledge to exchange ambassadors with
Lebanon. If Asad has not yet made good on his promise to
Sarkozy by your meeting, you should press him on the
importance of doing so. Not only does it send a signal about
how serious Syria is about promoting regional stability;
progress on improving bilateral relations will be viewed in
Washington as one of several indicators about whether U.S.
engagement can produce tangible results. You can also press
Asad and Muallim on the importance of demarcating borders,
supporting free and fair elections by not interfering, and
continuing to deepen cordial relations with President Sleiman
and the current Lebanese government (not just those in
opposition to it.) You could also make the point that
Congress and the next administration will expect Syria to
cooperate fully with the International Lebanese Tribunal's
proceedings regarding the assassinations of former Lebanese
PM Rafiq Hariri and over a dozen other Lebanese politicians
and activists.

-- Indirect Peace talks with Israel. Now that it appears
neither Syria nor Israel intend to resume indirect talks
until after the February 2009 Israeli elections, you might
ask Asad about what role he would like to see the U.S. play
in advancing regional peace talks and what other countries he
envisions joining the process. Syrian officials have hinted
they would like the Obama Administration to play the role of
honest broker in peace talks with Israel, but it is unclear
whether that role includes direct mediation in addition to
acting as a guarantor. You might also note continuing doubts
in Washington and Israel about how seriously Syria desires
peace and try to draw out Asad and Muallim on whether there
is any flexibility to Syria's all-or-nothing position.

-- Syria's influence over Hamas and rejection groups:
Syria's willingness to allow Hamas Politburo leader Khaled
Mesha'al a platform to denounce the Palestinian Authority's
negotiations with Israel undermines the PA's legitimacy. A
recent Iranian-financed "Right of Return" Conference
organized by Hamas brought 4,000 Palestinians and others to
Damascus to denounce Israeli-PA peace negotiations. Hamas
continues to reject extending a ceasefire in Gaza, which
expired December 19. We suspect Asad and Muallim will defend
their relationship with Hamas by pointing out Syria's dubious
efforts to promote Palestinian reconciliation. You can
present Congressional concerns about Hamas' destructive role
in Gaza, its impact on upcoming Israeli elections, and the
negative regional impact of a collapse in PA-Israeli peace

DAMASCUS 00000896 004 OF 004


talks.

-- Cooperating with the IAEA: The outcome of the November
28 IAEA Board of Governors meeting put Syria on notice that
the international community expects Syrian cooperation.
However, some officials here are reading the BOG's decision
to move forward with technical cooperation as a sign that
Syria can evade IAEA requests for further inspections. Since
decisionmaking on this issue is limited to a small circle
around President Asad, your meeting represents an opportunity
to press him on the importance of cooperating fully with the
IAEA.

-- A New Embassy Compound: Last year, you raised this
subject with President Asad, who brushed it aside as a
"technical administrative matter" that would be resolved in
due course. For 10 years, the SARG has stymied our efforts
to secure a Syrian commitment to identify suitable land and
permission to build a new embassy. Our current facility has
zero setback, fails to meet Inman standards, and represents a
host of security and safety challenges. In October, we met
the MFA on this issue and the SARG showed us the same plans
for a diplomatic enclave in which a new embassy might be
built. These were the same plans shown to embassy officials
two years and four earlier. You might suggest that Syria's
positive response on this technical (not political) issue
would help to favorably shape discussion on returning a U.S.
ambassador.

-- Reopening the American Cultural Center (ACC): Though the
ACC is "closed to the Syrian public," we continue to organize
exchange programs (e.g., Fullbrighters and individual
visitors),American speaker programs, and other cultural
activities. The closure of the American Language Center,
which was teaching English to some 2,000 Syrians annually,
should be reversed. You might ask Asad and Muallim about
their intentions to allow the Embassy to re-open the ALC, and
when they expect it to happen.

-- The Damascus Community ("American") School: Unless the
Syrian Government indicates a willingness to allow us to
re-open the school in the coming week or two, the School
Board will most probably have voted to put the school in
prolonged closure by the time of your arrival. That means
teachers and administrative staff will have officially been
released from their contracts and received severance pay.
Even if Asad were to reverse the SARG's decision on or
shortly after January 20, the School would be not be able to
reopen for the 2009 Spring term and probably would be hard
pressed to open its doors by Fall 2009. Most of the school's
Syrian students, who comprised more than half of the school's
high school student body, have moved on to accredited
boarding schools in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. Other
diplomatic and UN missions are allowing affected parents to
curtail. All of which is to say, DCS' student base will have
shrunk considerably to the point where the school would
probably not be financially viable unless the SARG allows
Syrian students to enroll. We ask that if you raise this
issue, you firmly inform Asad that it was a mistake to close
the school. Restoring more normal diplomatic relations will
require Syrian steps to allow a fully accredited school to
teach a U.S.-based curriculum without harassment from the
Ministry of Education.



CONNELLY