Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DAMASCUS843
2008-11-26 08:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SYRIAN DISSIDENTS INDICATE GAP EXISTS BETWEEN

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KPAO SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0033
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0843/01 3310829
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260829Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5622
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEFLGX/SAFE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000843 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, DRL
LONDON FOR WALLER, PARIS FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KPAO SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN DISSIDENTS INDICATE GAP EXISTS BETWEEN
KURDISH AND ARAB CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 00842

B. DAMASCUS 00788

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000843

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, DRL
LONDON FOR WALLER, PARIS FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KPAO SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN DISSIDENTS INDICATE GAP EXISTS BETWEEN
KURDISH AND ARAB CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 00842

B. DAMASCUS 00788

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Syrian dissidents Aref Dalila, Muhanad
al-Hasani, and Fawaz Tello (all strictly protect) met with
Poloff on November 19 for a wide-ranging discussion on the
current state of civil society activism in Syria (ref A).
During the meeting, the three men spoke briefly about a
recent Kurdish protest in Damascus, the lack of non-Kurdish
participation, and the disparate views among many
pro-democracy advocates and Kurdish rights organizations.
Dalila was released from prison on August 7 after serving
over six years for his role in the 2001 Damascus Spring
movement. Al-Hasani is Dalila's lawyer and also the president
of the Syrian Human Rights Organization in Damascus. Fawaz
Tello, a Damascus Spring activist who spent five years in
prison, is now involved with the Damascus Declaration. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (C) A group of approximately 200 Kurds demonstrated in
Damascus against Legislative Decree 49 on November 2 (ref B).
The event was quickly suppressed by SARG police, who detained
192 individuals overnight. Following the protest, Kurdish
contacts expressed disappointment over the lack of
participation by non-Kurdish Syrian political opposition
groups. Damascus representative of the Kurdish Future
Movement Party Hervin Ose (protect),who participated in the
protest and was detained by police, expressed resentment over
the lack of interest of non-Kurds in joining the effort. She
also noted that the signs and chants employed during the
demonstration were not Kurd-specific but pan-Syrian. Poloff
raised this subject with Dalila, al-Hasani, and Tello during
a November 12 meeting, asking why no other Syrians had joined
the Kurds and whether this signified discrepancies in how
Kurds and Arabs approached civil society issues and Decree 49
in particular.

-------------- --------------
DISSIDENTS' VIEWS ON KURDISH REACTION TO DECREE 49
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Regarding the November 2 protest, Dalila said there
had been no coordination between the Kurdish groups and other
Syrian civil society groups. "They (Kurds) have not demanded
different things from Syrians. And the Arabs agree with
their demands; there are no differences in human rights (for
Kurds and non-Kurds)."


4. (C) Tello tried to find a distinction between human rights
and politics vis-a-vis the Kurdish demonstration, arguing
that the Kurdish demonstration was purely political. He
added that had he participated, he probably "wouldn't have
come back," meaning SARG police would have dumped him back in
a prison cell.


5. (C) Al-Hasani spoke longest and most pointedly about
Kurdish civil society groups and their ambitions. He began by
asserting they (non-Kurdish civil society groups) did not
boycott the demonstration. He had discussed Decree 49 with
Kurdish activists and agreed (with them) that the law was
illegitimate. However, he disagreed with the Kurds on how
the SARG was applying the new law. "The Kurds think they are
targeted, but the point is to determine whether the law is
against the interests of all people." The Kurds, al-Hasani
continued, try to use this law for their own political
interests. He did not elaborate on what those interests were.


6. (C) Multiple diplomatic contacts who have recently visited
the border region in northeastern Syria agree that Decree 49
has jeopardized the economic well-being of Kurds in the
region. One diplomat told poloff that an estimated 20 percent
of the Hassake governate (approximately 200,000) have left
for other parts of the country, mainly Damascus and Aleppo,
this year. This figure is not based solely on the imposition
of Decree 49, but reflects the impact of severe drought
conditions as well. Nevertheless, the numbers point to
economic depression and the lack of opportunity in the area.
While Arab tribes in the region have been displaced by the
drought, and even perhaps the decree, they are in the
minority. The vast majority of those affected are Kurds.

DAMASCUS 00000843 002 OF 002




7. (C) COMMENT: As previously reported, the size of the
November 2 demonstration relative to the capacity Kurds have
for putting boots on the street may suggest differing
opinions among the Kurdish community itself on how best to
tackle the problem. It may very well be, in the end, that
Tello's rationale is closest to the truth for Kurds and
non-Kurds alike: people are too afraid of SARG reprisals to
join forces on any issue whatsoever. END COMMENT.
CONNELLY