Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DAMASCUS841
2008-11-25 14:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

UNSCO SERRY: SARG VIEWS ON SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN

Tags:  PREL KWBG PBTS TU IS UN SY 
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0841/01 3301434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251434Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5618
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000841 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PREL KWBG PBTS TU IS UN SY
SUBJECT: UNSCO SERRY: SARG VIEWS ON SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN
TRACKS, PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000841

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PREL KWBG PBTS TU IS UN SY
SUBJECT: UNSCO SERRY: SARG VIEWS ON SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN
TRACKS, PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: UN Special Coordinator Robert Serry
concluded a two-day visit to Damascus by briefing diplomats
on his discussions with FM Muallim and VFM Miqdad. According
to Serry, Muallim signaled continuing SARG interest in the
Syrian-Israeli track but conditioned the holding of a fifth
round of talks upon receipt of an Israeli response to Syria's
six points on territory. Muallim also said that the Syrian
and Palestinian tracks were "mutually reinforcing" and that
one could not proceed without the other. On Gaza, Muallim
claimed a personal role in persuading Hamas to stop firing
Qassam rockets. Muallim supported the Hamas decision not to
attend the Egyptian-sponsored Palestinian reconciliation
talks, charging that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud
Abbas was not "ready to meet (Hamas leader) Khalid Mesha'al
on equal terms" and that Egypt's bias toward Fatah had
resulted in a process tantamount to a "diktat" to Hamas.
Serry advised the SARG to continue taking constructive steps
as it attempts to establish a better relationship with the
new U.S. administration; Muallim acknowledged that an
improvement in relations was not likely to be a rapid
process. End summary.


2. (C) UN Special Coordinator (UNSCO) Robert Serry briefed
diplomats November 25 on his meetings with SARG officials the
previous day. Serry met with FM Walid al-Muallim and was
hosted for lunch by VFM Faisal Miqdad as part of his second
visit to Damascus as UNSCO; he was promised a meeting with
President Bashar al-Asad on his next visit. Serry's briefing
for diplomats was hosted by the Netherlands ambassador. Also
attending were the ambassadors of Spain, UK, Russia, and
Turkey, the UN country team and UNDP head, and the charges
d'affaires of France, Germany, and the U.S.


3. (C) Serry referred to the SARG's somewhat strained
relations with the UN in recent years, noting that the UN had
always formed one of the "pillars" of the SARG's foreign
policy. In his meeting with Muallim, the FM referred once
again to the SARG's unhappiness that Terje Roed Larsen

continued in New York as a "counterpart" to newly-designated
UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams. Serry
commented that he intends to visit Damascus as often as every
three months in order to build better relations between the
SARG and the UN and to monitor developments on the
Syrian-Israeli indirect talks.

SARG IS WAITING FOR GOI ANSWERS FOR FIFTH ROUND


4. (C) Admitting he had avoided the topic of Lebanon, Serry
said that he and Muallim had devoted most of their time to
discussing the Syria ) Israel track. Muallim told him
clearly that the SARG was conditioning its participation in a
fifth round of indirect talks on receiving the GOI's response
to the six points (on territory) the SARG had sent some time
ago via the Turks. The SARG was prepared to continue the
process but was interested only in substantive meetings.
There had been some pressure from the Israeli side to meet,
according to Muallim, but the SARG had learned "from history"
that the difficult issues related to territory had to be
dealt with up front. He also said that the SARG had
deposited with the Turks its own response to Israel's six
points (on security) and that the Turks understood they were
to provide them to the GOI once the GOI had responded on the
SARG issues. Muallim had also said that the Syrian and
Palestinian tracks were to be "mutually reinforcing" and must
proceed simultaneously ("one track cannot go forward without
the other"). The SARG had had "good contacts" with
Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas, Muallim
said, and they had agreed that they "can't go forward alone."


ISRAELI VIEWS OF THE TWO TRACKS


5. (C) Serry also reported that, in their last conversation,
GOI advisor Shalom Tourgeman argued that outgoing PM Ehud
Olmert may well want to concentrate on the Syrian track
since, according to Tourgeman, the Palestinians "had missed
another chance by not accepting Olmert's 'generous' offers."
Serry commented that Tourgeman has consistently demonstrated
a bias in favor of pursuing the Syria track. Upcoming
elections in Israel, however, had complicated the issue with
FM Tzipi Livni appearing to distance herself even further
from Olmert's position, particularly in the wake of his late
October interview in which he reportedly said Israel must
return to the 1967 borders. Serry believed it was unclear as
to what Livni's preferences were at the moment in pursuing
either track.

SITUATION IN GAZA


6. (C) With a long preamble regarding the difficulties for

DAMASCUS 00000841 002 OF 002


UNSCO and other UN operations in Gaza as a result of the
Israeli closure, Serry recounted that UNSYG Ban had called PM
Olmert the previous week and found Olmert's promise to look
into the situation promising. A subsequent call from Livni
had not gone as well, Serry said, and had prompted Ban to
issue a statement critical of the GOI's actions. According to
Serry, the UNSYG "had not appreciated" the tough conversation
he'd had with Livni.


7. (C) Serry said that Muallim had claimed a role in
stopping the firing of Qassam rockets from Gaza into Israel
and asked if that claim was valid. UK Ambassador Simon
Collis recounted the chain of events during FS David
Miliband's November 19-20 visit during which Muallim called
Miliband to report that he had asked Hamas leader Khalid
Mesha'al to stop the rockets in response to Miliband's
comment that the Qassams were building support for Likud
leader Binyamin Netanyahu. Serry said he believed that the
SARG wants the tahdiya (calming) to succeed but remains
worried about the internal Palestinian political situation.
The West Bank and Gaza, he said, are like two ships heading
off in different directions; in UNSCO's view, the Palestinian
divide must be tackled as a fundamental element of any
progress in the peace process.

PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION


8. (C) Serry said Muallim had been "surprisingly open" about
the emergence of two blocs in the Arab world regarding the
Palestinians. One the one hand, supporting Hamas, were
Syria, Qatar, and Algeria, and on the other, supporting
Fatah, were Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Muallim
reportedly lamented the divide but also noted that it would
limit any progress at the November 26 Arab League Ministerial
in Cairo. Muallim commented that the SARG finds that Mahmoud
Abbas is "not sufficiently ready to meet Khalid Mesha'al on
equal terms" and found that the planned, ultimately canceled
reconciliation meeting in Cairo had resembled a "diktat" from
the Egyptians. The mediator, opined Muallim, should be
equidistant from the two parties and the "Egyptians are too
close to Fatah." As evidence, Muallim asked why couldn't
Egypt open up the Rafah crossing more frequently as a means
of reducing the pressure on Hamas in Gaza. Muallim expressed
SARG concern that Hamas should have real influence in a
future PA government. The Cairo document, which Serry
described as merely an "annotated agenda," would entail the
creation of five committees that would take, as Palestinian
negotiator Ahmad Qurei'a told Serry, "five years to work
through," and would take a long time to achieve results. In
the context of relating the SARG's concerns, Serry observed
that there were also hard-line Fatah figures who saw the
reconciliation process as a "ploy" that would enable them to
continue their current roles. He noted that Palestinian PM
Salam Fayyad, however, seemed genuinely interested in
reconciliation. Regarding the Syrian approach, however,
Serry concluded that the SARG still sees Hamas as a valuable
tool and a card they can play in any future
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

U.S. ) SARG RELATIONS


9. (C) Muallim told Serry that the SARG wants to establish a
better relationship with the incoming Obama Administration
but realizes that the process will not be rapid. Serry
advised Muallim that the SARG should continue the
constructive steps it had taken recently since the new
administration will be watching SARG behavior already. If
2009 was indeed to be an important year in the region, Serry
told Muallim it was important that all the tracks be
preserved until the new administration was in a position to
begin working on them. The UNSYG, he said, had been sending
a similar message in his contacts with the Obama transition
team ) there were fragile and disparate elements of
peace-making in the region (Syrian-Israeli and
Palestinian-Israeli tracks, Annapolis, Arab Peace initiative)
that needed to be preserved until the U.S. was ready to move.


10. (C) Comment: Serry's briefing was candid but, given his
disparate audience, essentially uncritical of SARG positions,
particularly concerning Hamas's role in Gaza violence and in
obstructing the Palestinian reconciliation process. Serry
remarked that he had found his discussions with Muallim to
have been quite useful in clarifying SARG views on the
Syrian-Israeli track and that he had even obtained Muallim's
direct phone number which he thought would be useful in
building better lines of communication between UNSCO and the
SARG.
CONNELLY