UK FOREIGN SECRETARY MILIBAND'S NOV. 17-18 TRIP TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000821

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL UK IZ LE IR SY
SUBJECT: UK FOREIGN SECRETARY MILIBAND'S NOV. 17-18 TRIP TO
DAMASCUS

REF: LONDON 2755

Classified By: Classified by CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 b and d
.


1. (S/NF) Summary: UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband
urged Syrian President Bashar Asad and FM Walid Muallim to
take positive steps now on Iraq, Iran, Lebanon,
Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, and indirect Syrian-Israeli
peace talks. Doing so would help shape coming regional
political changes and provide the next U.S. administration
with a strong reason to engage, argued Miliband. Asad and
Muallim objected to the alleged October 26 U.S. military
operation at Abu Kamal and expressed reluctance to go further
than Syria had gone already in Lebanon and in Syria's
indirect talks with Israel. In response to Miliband's
comments on Syria's damaging relationships with Hamas,
Hizballah, and Iran, Asad and Muallim defended the right of
legitimate resistance against Israeli occupation, arguing a
deal on the Golan would remove Syria's principle motive for
maintaining relations with these actors. Asad and Muallim
also pushed Miliband to urge changes in U.S. policy "in a
language Washington understands." Miliband's visit provided
a modest SARG propaganda boost for little in exchange. End
Summary



2. (S/NF) UK Embassy DCM Irfan Saddiq and later UK
Ambassador Collis briefed us November 19 on Miliband's stop
in Damascus, the first UK cabinet-level official visit to
Syria since 2001. Miliband was making his first trip to
Damascus and holding his first meeting with Asad. He had met
Muallim five times in the last 18 months (two on the margins
of UNGA, two on the margins of Iraq Neighbors Conference
gatherings, and during Muallim's October 27-28 visit to
London.) Prior to his stop in Damascus, Miliband had been
to Israel and the Palestinian territories and would be headed
to Beirut before returning to London. Miliband's entourage
included FCO A/S NEA-equivalent John Jenkins, a press
adviser, a Labour Party political advisor, and two other
assistants. Contrary to press reports, there were no
intelligence or security officials on the manifest (head of
the British Secret Service was here a couple of weeks ago and
met with GID chief Ali Mamluk.) Jenkins planned to travel to
Washington later in the week or early next and would seek to
brief A/S Welch, according to Saddiq.


3. (C) Miliband arrived 1845 November 17 and departed 1640
November 18. After a tour of the Old City, Miliband had
dinner and a private one-on-one with Muallim November 17. On
November 18, he held meetings with Asad that included a
45-minute one-on-one session. Afterwards, Miliband joined
Muallim for a joint press conference and met with a group of
religious officials, including the Muftis of Syria, Damascus,
and Aleppo. He also had a roundtable with a group of Syrian
opinion makers and met Syrian youth exchange program
participants.

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Miliband to SARG: Take Positive Steps Now
--------------


4. (S/NF) The Foreign Secretary's central message was
political change would be coming in the region (elections in
Israel, Lebanon, and Iran) and globally (new U.S.
administration taking office January 20). Syria should not
wait to position itself favorably and would benefit from
better relations with the next U.S. administration if it made
moves now toward comprehensive peace, better relations with
Iraq, following up with Lebanon, and playing a positive role
with Iran. The SARG needed to focus on creating momentum to
capitalize on any changes that might be coming in Washington
and should understand that any actions it took now will be
seen as directed toward the new administration, not the old
one.

--------------
Comprehensive Peace

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--------------


5. (S/NF) Miliband pressed Asad to agree to holding a fifth
round of indirect talks with Israel, to support a
re-packaging and new presentation of the Arab League peace
initiative, and to support Palestinian reconciliation and
talks with Israel. Muallim's November 17 response started
with a &45-minute history lesson8 on Israeli obstruction,
failed U.S. policies to isolate Syria, and missed
opportunities to heed Syrian foresight. Asad argued the
following day that Syria had negotiated 10 years with Israel
over the Golan, only to see the talks fail because the two
sides could not agree on final borders. Syria wanted to
avoid this fate again and wanted to reach agreement on the
line of withdrawal before proceeding with direct
negotiations. Thus far, Israel had not replied to Syria,s
six points. Moreover, the current Israeli government was on
its way out and could not make commitments that would stick.



6. (S/NF) Regarding re-launching of the Arab League peace
initiative, Bashar demurred, noting the Israelis had not
responded seriously to the original. (Bashar reportedly
&made noises8 about the Saudis as the originators of the
proposal, and the UK side understood that a re-launch
involving working with the Saudis was unpalatable.) During
the discussions, the Syrians repeatedly emphasized their
focus on the return of all of the Golan, for which they
implicitly recognized they would have to give something in
return. Muallim noted that Syria maintained relations with
Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran as a function of its national
interests central to which was the return of Syrian land.
Once that goal was achieved, Syria's relations with other
parties could be susceptible to change.

--------------
Iraq/CT Issues
--------------


7. (S/NF) Miliband opened by asking why the SARG continued
to refer to the "resistance" and the "occupation" in Iraq,
despite the exchange of ambassadors and other areas of
cooperation. Receiving no answer, he observed that the
Status of Forces Agreement provided Syria an opportunity to
change its rhetoric on Iraq to a more constructive language.
He said he had received positive readouts on Iraqi FM
Zebari's visit to Damascus and the SARG's decision to host
the Border Security Working Group as scheduled (November
22-23). He asked Asad to move forward with sending PM Otri
to Iraq and take advantage of the positive mood opened up by
the Council of Ministers approval of the SOFA. Bashar
reportedly complained about the October 26 U.S. military
operation at Abu Kamal. Miliband replied the U.S. had hit
known FF facilitator Abu Ghadiyah. What Syria needed to do
was to cooperate with the U.S. and West. Miliband asked why
Syria had not taken action against Abu Ghadiya when the U.S.
had provided a lot of information regarding his presence in
Syria. "Even if Abu Ghadiya was there (in Abu Kamal)," the
U.S. strike was not the way to deal with the issue, replied
Asad.

--------------
Iran
--------------


8. (S/NF) Miliband briefed Asad on the UK and West's view
that Iran,s nuclear program appeared to have no civilian
application. Miliband's impression was that Bashar and his
advisors were not fluent in the substantive details of the
issue. Asad did not respond with a flat rejection of
Western allegations as he had done previously, noting only
that the standoff with Iran was compounded by Tehran's lack
of trust. The Foreign Secretary offered to provide a more
substantive briefing for Muallim and Asad (probably by FCO
political director) in the next 30 days so that Syrian
officials had a better grasp of Western concerns by the time
former Iranian negotiator Larajani is scheduled to visit
Damascus.

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--------------
Lebanon/Hizballah
--------------


9. (C) The Foreign Secretary complimented Syria,s move to
establish diplomatic relations and urged Syria to take
advantage of the new relationship to address the issue of
Hizballah's arms. Muallim and Asad argued Hizballah was a
political actor in Lebanon. While not directly acknowledging
Syria's role in funneling arms to Hizballah, Asad stressed
the importance of Hizballah's legitimate resistance to
Israeli occupation. Hizballah's arms could only be
addressed in the context of comprehensive peace, Asad
maintained.


10. (C) On the subject of relations between Lebanon and
Syria, Asad said Syria was happy to work with President
Suleiman and would even work with Sa'ad Hariri, should he be
elected Prime Minister. He minimized the importance of
diplomatic relations to the Syrian and Lebanese populations,
since the existence of ambassadors (Syria's is not yet
selected) and embassies would not change the normal
interaction between the two countries. Asad warned, however,
that he viewed Lebanon as a "detonator," where civil war
could break out in a day, and in that context he remained
worried about north Lebanon.

--------------
Hamas/Palestinian Track
--------------


11. (C) Miliband urged Muallim to push Hamas toward
preventing another outbreak of violence in Gaza and working
with the PA. Muallim defended Hamas as a legitimate
Palestinian party that held a majority of parliamentary seats
and was facing a humanitarian blockade of Gaza. The current
surge of violence in Gaza had begun with Israeli military
actions and Hamas had no choice but to defend itself. Syria
had done its best to facilitate reconciliation, but the PA
seemed determined to block this process. Miliband advised
Asad that each rocket that entered Israel from Gaze increased
support for Benjamin Netanyahu and the hard liners in Israel.
After the meetings, Muallim called Miliband to say he had
called Khalid Mesha'al to talk about ending the rocket
attacks. Mesha'al reportedly responded Hamas would do so, if
Israel ceased "assassination squads" and "ended the blockade"
of Gaza.


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Human Rights
--------------


12. (C) Referring to their previous discussions, Miliband
told Muallim that HMG remained concerned about human rights
issues in Syria. The SARG's decision to sentenced Damascus
Declaration leaders to prison had prompted strong objections
by the EU, U.S., and other countries. Asad replied he did
not want to see these leaders sentenced to jail, but they had
challenged the regime's authority and he was under pressure
from public opinion to respond.

--------------
The American School
--------------


13. (C) Miliband expressed his disagreement with the
SARG,s decision to close DCS. Bashar replied, "I'm a
civilized man...I didn't want to close the school." Asad
explained he was under severe pressure from Syrian public
opinion to respond to the October 26 Abu Kamal raid. He
could have recalled Syria's Ambassador to the U.S. or PNG'd
the American Charge in Damascus, but he wanted to avoid
harming bilateral relations irrevocably. Closing the school
was not an irreversible step, said Asad, and the regime might
look at trying to do something to reverse this order.
Subsequently, Muallim told the UK Ambassador that he hoped to

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receive a proposal regarding the establishment of a new
international school from local diplomats as early as
November 20.


14. (S/NF) Comment: The UK Embassy here frames Miliband's
visit as the product of a gradual process of engagement that
has led to an opportunity to share frank views with the
Syrian regime at a critical moment. Miliband reportedly left
Syria with no illusions of any sudden breakthroughs. The
trip nonetheless reaffirmed his belief that Syria is an
important regional player that can swayed to help regional
peace initiatives. While Miliband delivered the right
messages, Bashar and his regime appear content to wait until
the new U.S. administration takes office before making any
strategic decisions. Even then, it would be uncharacteristic
of the SARG to make any commitments before seeing what the
other side would be willing to give up front.



CONNELLY