SARG LAUNCHES NEW PR CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISLAMIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000814

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PTER PGOV SY
SUBJECT: SARG LAUNCHES NEW PR CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISLAMIC
EXTREMISM

REF: A. DAMASCUS 790

B. IIR 7 102 0154 09

C. DAMASCUS 482

D. DAMASCUS 517

E. DAMASCUS 723

F. DAMASCUS 714

G. DAMASCUS 679

H. DAMASCUS 678

I. 2004 DAMASCUS 4068

Classified By: CDA George Novinger for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: In a November 7 special Syrian TV
broadcast, Fatah al-Islam members confessed to their
involvement in the September 27 bombing of a SARG
intelligence facility (REF A). This program appeared to be
part of a broader Syrian propaganda effort to portray Syria
as a victim, not a sponsor, of terrorism. Many local
observers, however, believe that the SARG's complicated ties
to Fatah al-Islam are part of a murkier world in which Syrian
officials have selectively sought to crack down on some
Islamist groups while tacitly allowing others, such as
foreign fighter facilitators, to operate. Though Syria still
remains the primary hub for Al-Qaida facilitation into Iraq
(REF B),the SARG is now trying convince E.U. and other
governments that Islamic extremist elements represent a
shared threat and a common ground for counterterrorism
cooperation. End Summary

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TV CONFESSIONS
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2. (S/NF) Syrian TV broadcast a November 7 program featuring
the confessions of some 20 Fatah al-Islam members, including
the daughter and son-in-law of Fatah al-Islam leader Shakr
al-Absy, of their involvement in a September 27 attack
against a prominent SARG military intelligence installation.
Diplomatic and Syrian contacts point out that Syria's
relationship with Fatah al-Islam dates back several years, to
when Shakr al-Absy maintained ties to Intifadah al-Islam, a
Palestinian terrorist group which reportedly trained in
Syria. Under Absy's leadership, offshoot Fatah al-Islam
operated in Syria before moving to Jordan, where Absy was
believed to have been involved in the 2002 murder of USAID
Officer Laurence Foley. A few years later, after the SARG
denied Jordanian efforts to extradite Absy, Absy moved to the
Nahr al Bared camp in northern Lebanon. After a two-month
confrontation with Lebanese Armed Forces, Absy reportedly
returned to Syria, where he mysteriously disappeared.


3. (S/NF) Absy's turbulent relations with the Syrian regime
provide a momentary glimpse into the SARG's effort to manage
relations with extremist groups. Since the 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq, the Syrian Government has sought to exploit
anti-Western Islamic extremists to lessen U.S. influence in
the region, while ruthlessly cracking down on any groups that
might represent a threat to the minority and largely secular
Syrian Allewite regime. As then-FM Shara stated in 2003,
"Syria's interest is to see the invaders defeated in Iraq."
Though U.S. and Western pressure helped convince the SARG to
take some steps to crack down on these movements, the SARG
continued to turn a blind eye to chosen facilitator networks.
Embassy contacts report that the SARG made a calculation to
ignore, and at times support, foreign fighters in order to
keep Coalition forces bogged down so that the U.S. could not
set its sights on "regime change" in Damascus.

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WORLDS COLLIDE
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4. (S/NF) On September 27, the line between the SARG's
support of some extremist groups and its crackdown on others
blurred when unknown terrorists bombed a SARG intelligence
facility in the greater Damascus. According to diplomatic
and other contacts, Fatah al-Islam undertook the attack in
revenge for a recent SARG roundup of its members, including
Fatah al Islam leader Sahkr al-Absy and the government's
heavy-handed tactics at Seidnaya prison, which houses
detained Islamic extremists (REFs C & D).


DAMASCUS 00000814 002 OF 002



5. (S/NF) After enjoying a long relationship with the SARG,
many here believe Fatah al-Islam elements turned their sights
on the regime and lashed out at one of the main pillars of
Syrian stability and security - the SARG intelligence
apparatus - specifically striking the SARG security element
responsible for said crack-downs, the Palestine Branch of the
Syrian Military Intelligence Service.


6. (S/NF) In the wake of the bombing, which reportedly
killed more than 17 individuals, SARG officials swiftly
branded the attacks as the work of "Islamic extremists,"
orchestrated and funded by outside elements. News outlets
were unusually quick to broadcast scenes from the bombing
site and release details about the attack, including the fact
the vehicle used in the bombing came from a "neighboring
country." The SARG conducted a series of visible security
sweeps and broad-daylight raids of neighborhoods suspected of
housing terrorist cells (REFs E & F) and televised the
confessions of arrested individuals the SARG claims were
involved in the September 27 bombing, all in what appeared to
be an effort to not only demonstrate that Syrian intelligence
services remain firmly in control of the security situation
but also to project blame outward so as to down-play Syrian
complicity with extremist elements.


7. (S/NF) The November 7 Syrian TV broadcast represented
SARG obfuscation at its finest. The confessions featured
Wafa al-Absy, daughter of Fatah al-Islam's leader Shaker
al-Absy. Al-Absy's Syrian spouse was also among those who
confessed publicly. A number of the confessors made claims
of a direct connection between Fatah al-Islam and Saad
Hariri's Future Movement (Mustaqbal) in Lebanon. As the
Syrian reports indicate, many of those involved in the
bombing were in fact Syrian. The reports in essence
showcased home-grown extremists, who may have been inspired
by foreign extremist elements the SARG allowed to live among
its own people.

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SARG: WE'RE WITH YOU IN THE FIGHT AGAINST EXTREMISM
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8. (S/NF) The SARG has expressed its concerns over the rise
of extremism to visiting foreign dignitary since the
explosion. According to Danish Embassy contacts, for
example, President Asad told Danish FM Moller that fighting
extremism was the number-one priority of his government and
went on to accuse Saudi Arabia as being the main financier
and actor behind the rise of violent extremism in Syria.
Also, at the conclusion of FM Muallim's October 27 visit to
London, both he and U.K. FM Miliband released a joint
statement which stated that "both ministers agreed that
tackling al-Qaida and groups inspired by it was a high
priority and agreed to work more closely together to tackle
this threat." A Palestinian American academic who enjoys
frequent access to Syrian FM Muallim told us in early
November that SARG senior leadership had grown increasingly
concerned about extremism, seeing it as a threat to the
regime itself. He also reported that while senior Syrian
officials "blamed" the United States for the rise of Islamic
extremism, they believed that only the U.S. could assist in
ridding Syria of these elements.


9. (S/NF) Comment: The SARG conveniently defines terrorism
as threats against the Syrian regime while upholding Syria's
long-standing support of "resistance" groups fighting outside
invaders. Fatah al-Islam was able to dwell in both worlds
and is now being used to advance the SARG's desire to
cooperate with the West while blaming Saudi Arabia,
al-Mustaqbal, Lebanon and the U.S. At the same time, the
SARG continues to tolerate foreign fighters and other
extremists heading to Iraq. The SARG publicly plays the
victim in an attempt to obfuscate its involvement in playing
the spoiler. But if the cost of doing business with such
elements begins to soar, i.e., future successful attacks
against the regime or Western targets within Syria, the SARG
may have little choice but to take on foreign fighter
elements residing within Syria's borders.
NOVINGER