ZEBARI CONDEMNS 10/26 ATTACK, SEEKS TO RE-ASSURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000800

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/I, AND NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER SY IZ
SUBJECT: ZEBARI CONDEMNS 10/26 ATTACK, SEEKS TO RE-ASSURE
SARG ON SOFA

REF: DAMASCUS 793

Classified By: Classified by CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 b and d
.


1. (C) Summary: In a hastily arranged November 11-12
visit to Damascus, Iraqi FM Hoshyar Zebari delivered a letter
to a skeptical President Asad from PM Maliki reassuring
Syrian leaders the SOFA would not allow U.S. troops to launch
attacks on Iraq's neighbors. Zebari publicly "rejected" the
October 26 Abu Kamal operation, while privately telling FM
Muallim and Asad the Iraqi government had received no advance
warning of the alleged U.S. raid. According to the Iraqi
Charge in Damascus, Syrian officials put heavy pressure on
Zebari to denounce the October 26 attack, while apparently
asking the GOI to convey a demand that the USG "consult" with
the SARG in any future counter-terrorist operations. Asad
told Zebari that Syria would host the November 22-23 Border
Security Working Group (BSWG) meeting as planned, and that
Syrian PM Otri would reschedule his visit to Iraq "sometime
after (President-elect) Obama takes office." Bashar also
extended an invitation to PM Maliki to visit Damascus after
Otri visits Baghdad. We expect the SARG will use the BSWG to
denounce the October 26 operation and attempt to discredit
the SOFA and U.S. military presence in Iraq. End Summary

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SARG Frames Zebari Visit As Conciliatory Gesture
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2. (C) Iraqi FM Hoshyar Zebari visited Damascus November
11-12 and held meetings with FM Muallim and President Asad.
Presidential Advisor Buthayna Shabban and D/FM Faisal Miqdad
joined Zebari's November 12 meeting with Asad, after which
Zebari and Muallim held a joint press conference. The Syrian
press highlighted Zebari's rejection of the October 26 U.S.
military strike at Abu Kamal and Iraqi reassurances contained
in a letter from PM Maliki to Asad that the SOFA would not
allow for permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq or the use of
Iraqi territory to launch U.S. attacks against neighboring
countries. Syrian press accounts framed the visit as a
conciliatory gesture by Iraq to restore relations with Syria.


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Zebari Faces SARG Anger over Abu Kamal
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3. (C) According to Iraqi Charge Hassan Abd al-Aziz,
Zebari's visit came in response to intense SARG pressure for
the GOI to condemn the October 26 Abu Kamal attack and to
revise the SOFA explicitly to prevent any U.S. military
attacks on Iraq's neighbors from Iraq. Abd al-Aziz said
Syrian V/FM Miqdad had threatened a strong Syrian response
(to include cessation of Syrian cooperation in assisting
Iraqi refugees and even ordering Abd al-Aziz to return to
Iraq.) Zebari responded positively to the Iraqi Embassy's
request for a visit and message from PM Maliki to calm
bilateral tensions.


4. (C) In what Abd al-Aziz described as a tough meeting,
Asad pressed Zebari on the October 26 Abu Kamal operation,
calling it an attack on the Syrian people. Asad demanded
Zebari publicly condemn the American administration for its
"attack against the Syrian people." He also conveyed Syria's
strong opposition to a SOFA that would undermine the GOI's
legitimacy by allowing permanent American military bases in
Iraq and granting the U.S. military unlimited ability to
launch attacks on Iraq's neighbors. The U.S. was dealing
with Iraq "as children" rather that treating it as a
sovereign government, alleged Asad. Bashar said Syria
opposed the security agreement and did not trust U.S.
promises to withdraw its troops by 2011.


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Zebari Condemns U.S. Attack But Defends SOFA
--------------


5. (C) Zebari pushed back, telling Asad he would not take

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orders from the Syrian government on what to say publicly.
Iraq wanted better relations with Syria and to reassure Asad
that the SOFA posed no threat the Syria or Iraq's neighbors.
But Asad's November 9 speech (ref A) criticizing the Iraqi
government for supporting the SOFA had not helped. The Iraqi
government was working with the U.S. military to stabilize
the security situation and had negotiated one of the most
host-friendly SOFAs in the world. The U.S. had committed to
withdrawing its troops by 2011 and Iraq expected it to
fulfill its obligations.


6. (C) On the Abu Kamal attack, Zebari told Asad that no
one in the Iraqi government had advance knowledge. Only the
head of Delta Force knew, Zebari insisted. The Abu Kamal
attack was not the first such case of U.S. Special Operations
actions in the region, continued Zebari. Delta Force had
also launched a raid in Irbil during which several Iranian
diplomats were apprehended. No one in the Iraqi government
had received advance warning in this instance, claimed
Zebari. In both cases, the American military had targeted
individuals believed to be supporting the insurgency in Iraq.



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Bashar Wants CT Coordination?
--------------


7. (C) According to Abd al-Aziz's account, Bashar replied
the U.S. had no right to conduct attacks unilaterally. Syria
had demonstrated its intent to crack down on foreign fighters
seeking to enter Iraq and had arrested some 1,300 extremists,
250 of whom were linked to al-Qaeda. Asad complained that
the U.S. had failed to live up to its promises to cooperate
with the SARG during previous Border Security Working Group
meetings. He implied that Zebari should pass a message that
Syria insisted that any future counterterrorism actions would
require advance coordination, arguing that Syria could take
actions that would ensure that all the extremist elements
could be "rolled up."


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Tensions Defused, Suspicions Still Linger
--------------


8. (C) Abd al-Aziz assessed Zebari's visit had succeeded in
defusing growing bilateral tensions, but Asad and the Syrian
regime continued to harbor deep suspicions about American
ambitions in Iraq, he said. The letter from PM Maliki
provided the SARG with sufficient cover to resume better
relations without damaging the regime's image. In return,
the SARG was willing to signal its willingness to proceed
with normalization of relations, but only "sometime after
(President-elect) Obama takes office." Abd al-Aziz predicted
Syrian PM Otri's trip to Iraq would probably not take place
until at least February, and that a PM Maliki visit to
Damascus might occur a few months after that.

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SARG Wants to use BSWG to Hammer SOFA
--------------


9. (C) In the meantime, Abd al-Aziz predicted little
movement in the SARG's willingness to grant agrement to
Iraq's Ambassador-designate to Syria, Alaa al-Jawadi.
(Comment: Iraqi Embassy sources erroneously told us in late
October that agrement had been granted to al-Jawawdi. End
Comment.) Abd al-Aziz also confirmed press reports that
Syria would be hosting the November 22-23 BSWG as previously
planned. "The Syrians are going to use the event to come
after you," he predicted.



10. (C) Comment: If the Iraqi Charge's account is accurate
(as it has been in the past),Zebari's visit gave the SARG a
modest PR victory, but the Syrian regime failed to obtain any
concessions on the SOFA. We find it interesting that Asad's
call for U.S. cooperation in future CT operations tacitly
acknowledged the presence of foreign fighter facilitators in

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Syria. Regarding the November 22-23 BSWG, Abd al-Aziz'
assessment is spot on: Syria can and no doubt will use the
meeting to bash the Abu Kamal operation, SOFA, and continuing
U.S. military presence in Iraq. As one of the countries that
urged the creation of the BSWG, we would find ourselves in an
awkward position were we not to attend, particularly if our
allies did. At the same time, showing up without talking
points on Abu Kamal and a coordinated position with the GOI
and friendly countries would leave us vulnerable to
unchallenged SARG accusations.



CONNELLY