DAMASCUS EAC 10/23/2008

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000739

SIPDIS
NOFORN

FOR DS/IP, DS/IP/NEA, DS/TIA/ITA, DS/SPC/MSG, NEA/EX,
NEA/ELA, CA/OCS/ACS
ABU DHABI FOR MCESG REGION TWO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2028
TAGS: ASEC PTER SY
SUBJECT: DAMASCUS EAC 10/23/2008

REF: A. TDX-315/077086-08

B. STATE 737

C. STATE 99467



1. (S/NF) The Damascus Emergency Action Committee (EAC) met
October 23 to review the potential threat information in Ref

A. Charge, chaired the meeting; A/DCM, MGT, POL/ECON, PAO,
RSO, DAO, CONS, MSGDETCMDR, IMO, and GRPO attended.


2. (S/NF) GRPO briefed EAC on ref A, which contained
information pertinent to the security of the Embassy. EAC
members observed that Post's working assumption had long been
that any extremist group seeking to attack the SARG security
infrastructure may also attempt to attack USG targets in
Damascus, including the Embassy. EAC members noted that the
additional security measures put into place following the
September 27 attacks, including the requests to limit access
to the streets outside the Chancery (denied) and to stop and
search suspicious vehicles at access routes to our facilities
(apparently granted),had been based on the operating
assumption that Mission facilities were a logical target for
the extremists who attacked the SARG last month. EAC members
also noted that the ongoing security crackdown (ref B)
appeared to have put extremists on the defensive, as
evidenced by the lack of a follow-on attack in the nearly
four weeks which have elapsed since September 27.


3. (S/NF) In light of the considerations above, the EAC
agreed that Mission facilities and services should remain
open. EAC members discussed possible follow-on actions to be
taken in case more detail is developed in connection with ref
A, or in case of a more specific threat to the Mission:

--Closure or restriction of services requiring the screening
of unknown visitors, including visa operations and the PD
Information Resources Center;

--Implementation of the "Critical Staffing Pattern," designed
to allow for skeleton staffing of key Post functions by a
selected group of pre-designated personnel.

--EAC also discussed on possible additional measures
requiring longer-term planning and coordination, to include
the possible deployment of a DS/MSD Security Support Team in
case of more sustained future threat reporting and/or an
intensification of the SARG/extremist conflict. RSO briefed
EAC on the very initial steps taken to research the possible
deployment of signals-jamming equipment to Mission facilities
in order to inhibit certain types of IED detonations, noting
that the technical feasibility of, and USG approval for, such
equipment remained to be determined.


CONNELLY