SARG ANTI-TERROR CRACKDOWN - A VIEW FROM THE

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000723

SIPDIS
NOFORN

FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/TIA/ITA, NEA/ELA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2028
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PTER SY
SUBJECT: SARG ANTI-TERROR CRACKDOWN - A VIEW FROM THE
SECURITY SERVICES - CORRECTED COPY

REF: A. DAMASCUS 720

B. DAMASCUS 678

C. DAMASCUS 696

CORRECTED COPY of Damascus 720 - added NOFORN caption


1. (S/NF) Summary: The SARG remains committed to its
gloves-off crackdown on Salafist terror cells within Syria
following the September 27 VBIED attack on a Syrian Military
Intelligence (SMI) branch office (ref A). While the security
services have scored successes in raids on suspected safe
houses and bomb-making facilities throughout Syria,
authorities are concerned that many extremists capable of
executing attacks similar to the September 27 bombing remain
at large and that al Qaeda and its inspired/affiliated local
variants now view Syria as a legitimate front for jihad in
the wider Levant battleground. While our security service
contacts agree that security precautions undertaken by the
Embassy during this period are appropriate, they believe that
the regime itself, and not the Embassy or other U.S. targets,
is the extremists' primary focus for attack.


2. (S/NF) Over the weekend of October 9-11, senior security
service contacts told RSO that the SARG has reacted to the
September 27 bombing by moving aggressively against suspected
Salafist groups operating within Syria:

--According to one senior officer, several suspected
terrorists have been killed or arrested in at least five
separate raids conducted throughout Syria since late
September.

--A variety of weapons, suicide belts, and explosives-rigged
vehicles have been seized in these raids. One contact told
RSO that a raid o/a October 10 in the Damascus suburb of
Sayidah Zeinab yielded 1200 kg of explosives (NFI) divided
among nine agricultural containers designed for milk storage.
According to this officer, the explosives had been packed
but not outfitted with detonators or triggering mechanisms.
He related the security services' theory that terrorist cells
in Syria are highly compartmentalized, with different,
mutually unknown individuals responsible for different stages
in the bomb-making process.

--A contact advised RSO that the security services lack
clarity regarding the potential number of VBIEDs, explosives,
and terrorists still operational in Syria, and that claims of
specific numbers of "at large" vehicles and terrorists should
be viewed with a healthy skepticism.


3. (S/NF) Two contacts independently told RSO that Sunni
extremists appear to have shifted strategy from a "hands off
Syria" approach to one that apparently includes Syria as part
of the wider campaign for jihad in the Levant. These
contacts told RSO that the shift follows over a year of SARG
crackdowns against extremist activities, including what they
described as SARG measures to limit the Iraq-bound foreign
fighter flow.


4. (S/NF) A senior contact told RSO he does not believe the
Embassy or other U.S.-affiliated sites (including the
USG-supported Damascus Community School) are specific targets
of the extremists' latest efforts. Rather, he believes that
current terrorist efforts are focused on the regime, and
especially against the security services. Based on
investigation following the September 27 bombing, he believes
the perpetrators specifically chose to attack on a Saturday
so as to minimize the possibility of casualties at a nearby
Syrian school.


5. (S/NF) COMMENT: Even if true, the assertion that the
Embassy and other U.S. sites are not the primary target of
terrorist attention does not fully mitigate the dangers
inherent to any further anti-regime violence in Syria. As is
the case in general for a city with such a pervasive "police
state" apparatus as Damascus, the Embassy, school, and other
USG facilities and residences are set cheek-by-jowl among
high-value regime and security service targets. While it is
encouraging that two weeks have elapsed without a follow-on
incident to the September 27 bombing and that the SARG
appears determined in its efforts to crack down on violent
anti-regime activity within Syria's borders, the continuing
discovery of additional terrorists and equipment highlights
the risks of operating in this environment. The Damascus
Emergency Action Committee continues to meet frequently to
evaluate the security implications of the current situation,
while the Country Team will provide a more in-depth analysis
regarding to what extent recent changes in the security
environment reflect any major change in Syria's policy
outlook or place in the region-wide struggle against
extremist violence (septels). END COMMENT.


CONNELLY