Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DAMASCUS636
2008-09-10 14:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV PINR KVPR ASEC KHLS SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0636/01 2541424
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101424Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5352
INFO RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000636 

SIPDIS

S/CT FOR KEN MCKUNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR KVPR ASEC KHLS SY
SUBJECT: HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION
COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING

REF: A. 06 STATE 190832

B. STATE 133921

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b/d

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000636

SIPDIS

S/CT FOR KEN MCKUNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR KVPR ASEC KHLS SY
SUBJECT: HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION
COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING

REF: A. 06 STATE 190832

B. STATE 133921

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (U) Summary: The following is submitted in response to
the Department's request (ref B). Due to the difficult
bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the SARG, Post
does not have the full access necessary to give a complete
picture of Syria's information collection, screening and
sharing procedures. The below information is compiled from
our limited interaction with the SARG and observations at
Post.


2. (C) Watchlisting:
--Yes, Syria maintain several watchlists, which are made up
of terrorist and political-related hits. Due to Post's
difficult bilateral relationship with SARG we do not have
access to this list or know the number of records. Each
security agency maintains and jealously guards its own
watchlist in addition to Passports and Immigration. The SARG
selectively targets subjects on these watchlists when it is
in its national interest - based largely on perceived threats
to regime preservation and the ongoing unresolved state of
conflict with Israel. Hezballah operatives probably would
not make the watchlist while Sunni extremists and political
activists who are critical of the regime would be flagged.
This system may seem primitive and at times ineffective.
When focused, the security services nonetheless have the
talent and capability to protect against perceived threats to
the regime. These efforts may occasionally overlap with U.S.
interests but not always.


3. (SBU) Traveler Information Collection:
--Immigration collects information from passengers entering
Syria from cards filled out by passengers at the POE. This
includes basic biographic information, itinerary and purpose
of travel. Post believes the information gathered is entered
into a computer system. The Immigration officers have
computers at the POE, but they are not always working and are
only sometimes used. The information usually makes it into

the system if it is derogatory. It is unclear how connected
the systems are from the various POEs or if there is a delay
in the information being shared. There are paper-logs at the
borders that appear to be divided into Syrians, Arabs,
Foreigners, and Diplomats.
--Post does not know of different policies for data
collection at the different POEs.
--Travelers' information is collected by Immigration and SMI
officers at land borders and other security organizations are
present at the airport. Post has no knowledge of data
collection at the sea port.
--Post has no knowledge of formal agreements between foreign
governments and the SARG to share information collected at
the POEs. Post assumes that there is limited sharing of the
information collected by the Syrian security agencies with
other governments, unless the SARG perceives it is in its
best interest.
--Post assumes that the SARG collects Passenger Name Records
(PNR) data on incoming flights and vessels. Post assumes
that this information is used for intelligence or law
enforcement purposes.
--Post does not believe the SARG has access to APIS, IAPIS or
electronic travel authority systems.


4. (SBU) Border Control and Screening:
--Yes, the SARG uses computers at the POE to screen travelers.
--It appears that all travelers are tracked electronically.
Post does not know the frequency with which travelers are
"waived through" at the POE.
--Post assumes that Syrian Immigration officials have the
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on
who can enter Syria.
--The Immigration and Security officers at the POE regularly
question, detain and at times deny entry into Syria to
travelers. Usually no explanation is given as to the reason
behind the decision.
--Post does not know the extent of information sharing within
the SARG.


5. (U) Biometrics Collection:
--No biometric systems have been observed at the POE.


6. (SBU) Passports:
--The SARG has expressed interest in using a machine-readable
passport containing biometrics information in the future.
--If the passport is lost outside of Syria the Syrian must
obtain a laissez passer from the Syrian Embassy in the
country where he lost the passport. Upon return to Syria he

will be sent to secondary for a very thorough interview.
Depending on the result of this interview there could be
follow-up investigations. It is not uncommon for Syrians to
be questioned on this subject when they apply for other
passports in the future. If the passport is lost in Syria
then the Syrian will only need to produce a Syrian police
report. There could be a follow-up investigation depending
on situation. The replacement would most likely be for full
validity.
--Post does not know of any official policy for "habitual"
losers of passports. The environment in Syria would not
encourage habitual losers of passports.
--Replacement passports have no differentiating features.
--Replacement/emergency passports have no differentiating
features.
--Post is unable to differentiate replacement passports.
Post does not view this inability as an area of significant
concern because of the negative attention a Syrian would
receive from the SARG if he became a habitual loser of
passports.
--No, replacement passports are not assigned a special number
series or otherwise identified.


7. (SBU) Fraud Detection:
--Post has no knowledge of how robust fraud detection
activities are in Syria and how focused they are on
fraudulent documents. Post asks for document verification of
civil documents related to visa cases at Post. This process
can take around six months per document. Recently the SARG
has requested the return of original civil document when the
documents have been confirmed to be counterfeit. Post has
heard that some of the individuals who submitted confirmed
counterfeit documents have been arrested by the SARG.
--Post does not know of any actions by the SARG to take
fraudulently issued documents out of circulation on a large
scale. Occasionally document vendors are arrested, but due
to corruption in the legal system they seem to be back in
business in no time.


8. (SBU) Privacy and Data Security:
--Post has no knowledge of SARG policies concerning
information gathered at the POE.
--Post does not know of any restrictions the SARG places on
the collection or use of sensitive data.
--Post does not know of any accountability placed on the SARG
to provide notice to the public on the implementation of new
databases of records.
--Post does not know of any laws relating to security
features for government computer systems that hold personally
identifying information.
--Post does not believe individuals have the right/ability to
access data that homeland security agencies hold on them.
--Post does not know of any different rules that are applied
to raw data versus case files.
--Post does not know if a non-citizen/resident has the right
to sue the SARG to obtain data from security agencies, but we
doubt that it would be the case.


9. (C) Immigration Data Bases:
--The SARG has computerized immigration databases used to
track entries and exits. They do not appear to be directly
connected so there can be a delay in information
dissemination.
--Post observes that information is collected at all POEs -
either by computer or manually.
--The system is very basic, but effective. The drawbacks are
that Immigration and the security services each keep their
own watchlists and do not share information. There can be a
delay in disseminating information. For example, Post has
noticed that travel holds that are entered in Damascus are
not immediately visible at the border. Post has also seen
individuals that are identified as being of interest at the
POE sent to security offices in Damascus for further
investigation. The POE has usually written a number and/or
note in their passport so they cannot exit at another POE
without attending the security interview. This approach may
seem low-tech, but is very effective.
--Post does not know how often SARG immigration databases are
updated.


10. (C) Watchlist and Information Sharing:
--Yes, there is a name-based watchlist system used to screen
travelers at POEs.
--The watchlist is made up of deported persons, terrorist
lookouts, criminals and individuals who could be seen as a
threat to the regime.
--The SARG participates in a variety of Interpol programs,
although the degree to which the SARG is willing to arrest
"red notice" subjects is unknown. Our assessment is that

they will arrest individuals who are perceived threats to
regime interests and simply monitor others.
--Syria has signed security protocols and MOUs with GOI
through the Border Security Working Group. Post does not
know if these protocols have moved from paper to reality.
Post is aware that the SARG has an agreement with Turkey
regarding their shared border, but does not have access to
the specifics of this agreement.


11. (SBU) Biometrics:
--No biometrics systems are in place at any POE in Syria.
Post does not know if the SARG is planning on introducing
biometrics at the POE.
--The host government does not issue a machine-readable
passport containing biometrics information.


12. (C) Identifying Appropriate Partners:
--Post does not feel that the SARG would share or use U.S.
watchlist data appropriately. Information provided to the
SARG would be used to further Syria's best interest, which
usually differs greatly from U.S. national interest.
Political dissidents are included on government watchlists.
--Syria's legal system is not sufficiently developed to
adequately provide safeguards for the protection and
nondisclosure of information.
--There is no single consolidated database that the SARG uses
as a watchlist.
--To Post's knowledge Syria doesn't have a legal definition
that it uses to define terrorism, but the SARG draws a
distinction between "terrorism" and "resistance" that
generally puts it at odds with the U.S.
CONNELLY