PALESTINIAN CONFERENCE PRODUCES HARD RHETORIC AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000063

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN CONFERENCE PRODUCES HARD RHETORIC AND
MISHAL GOES TO EGYPT

REF: DAMASCUS 48

Classified By: Classified by CDA Todd Holmstrom for reasons 1.5 b and d
.


1. (C) Summary: SARG efforts to spin the three-day
Palestinian conference as an event for "domestic consumption"
and a call for Palestinian solidarity conveniently overlook
the harsh anti-U.S., Israeli, and Palestinian Authority
rhetoric during the conference and in a seven-page communique
(translated version e-mailed separately to NEA/ELA). Hamas
leader Khaled Mishal -- who defiantly asserted the right of
return for Palestinian refugees, the necessity of an
undivided Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state,
the right of resistance, and the existence of Palestine "from
the river to the sea" -- eagerly announced his acceptance of
an Egyptian invitation to meet with Fatah and Egyptian
officials in Cairo to discuss the crisis in Gaza and "unity
talks" with the Palestinian Authority. End Summary


2. (C) As some of our contacts predicted (reftel),the
conference organized in the name of re-establishing
Palestinian unity actually served to launch a harsh
rhetorical assault on Oslo and other initiatives like the
Annapolis Conference that had allegedly divided the
Palestinian community. Though the final communique astutely
avoided criticism of PA President Mahmoud Abbas or other Arab
governments, speakers criticized the Palestinian Authority,
PA-Israeli negotiations, and asserted the right of armed
resistance. The seven-page conference communique emphasizes
the return of all occupied lands (from the "river to the
sea") before the establishment of a state and demands
resistance before formation of a Palestinian government. It
also calls for the absolute rejection of the policy adopted
by the Oslo team against the resistance, "especially Salam
Fayadh and the security forces."


3. (C) The Dutch Ambassador, providing a readout to us on
Dutch FM Verhagen's January 23 trip to Damascus, reported
that President al-Asad had downplayed the conference to
Verhagen as an event for "domestic consumption." Asad also
reportedly said Syria supported Abbas and "would work on
Hamas." Verhagen reportedly confronted FM Muallim on the
conference, accusing the SARG of "lying" about the attendance
of high-level Syrian officials. The Dutch told us the
attendance of Minister of Expatriates Bouthayna Shabban and
Minister of Information Mousam Bilal, who were seated in the
front row of opening ceremonies, had contradicted Syrian
assurances and embarrassed the Dutch FM greatly. Muallim,
according to the Dutch ambassador, retorted that Syria had
successfully postponed the conference to a "less sensitive"
time and had successfully diverted efforts to organize a
conference in Tehran, which would have been more provocative.
Regarding the attendance of SARG ministers, Muallim and
others "unconvincingly" tried to explain away their presence.
Before departing, Verhagen publicly criticized the
confrontational tone of the conference and Syria for allowing
it to be held on its territory.


4. (C) According to contacts who attended, the
participants, especially Hamas leader Khaled Mishal, played
on outrage over the Gaza crisis to transform "the Palestinian
National Conference" into a reassertion of Hamas' role in the
Arab-Israeli conflict and Syria's role as a center of the
Arab resistance. According to al-Hayat journalist Ibrahim
Hamidi, Mishal successfully re-directed the political aims of
the Palestinian diaspora away from the Arab League peace
initiative, which calls for a Palestinian state demarcated by
1967 borders. "The language represents a significant
political shift," in Palestinian objectives, asserted Hamidi.
He added that the conference occurred under the approving
eyes of high-level Syrian ministers who attended and by the
Syrian public who watched it on Syrian TV.


5. (C) Other contacts argued that, despite the harsh
rhetoric, the significance of the conference paled in
comparison to the immediacy of events in Gaza. PA President
Abbas' condemnation of the conference probably called more
attention to the event that it would have received had he
ignored it, commented International Crisis Group analyst
Peter Harling. While the Palestinian Authority sought to
play up the death of PFLP leader George Habbas in Jordan and
the 60-something crowd in Damascus chanted slogans from the
1970s, the real action was occurring in Gaza, agreed Reuters
journalist Khaled Oweiss.


6. Still, continued Oweiss, the conference vaulted Hamas and
Mishal back into the center of Palestinian politics. The

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message from the conference to PA President Abbas was clear,
in that "Hamas is not going away," because Syria and other
Arabs now backed efforts to broker a PA-Hamas reconciliation.
The conference, Oweiss suggested, also allowed Mishal and
Syria to bury their differences over Syria's presence in
Annapolis. For Hamas, the conference represented an
affirmation of its decision to revoke its mandate for Abbas
to negotiate with Israel and to assert that any deal by Abbas
without Hamas' consent would be tantamount to a Palestinian
surrender. For Syria, the conference symbolized the return
of Syria as the center of the resistance and signaled to the
West and Arab countries that no deal could be achieved on the
Palestinian track without Syria's assent, asserted Oweiss.


7. (C) Egypt's January 25 invitation to Hamas to meet with
Fatah and Egyptian officials on the Gaza border crisis was
evidence that Mishal's efforts succeeded, at least in part,
according to foreign policy analyst and MFA advisor Samir
al-Taqi. Already en route to Riyadh, Mishal was now playing
a central role in re-engaging the Arab world working to unite
the feuding Palestinian factions.


8. (C) At the same time, Mishal's trip to Cairo might
eventually create a fissure between Hamas and the SARG,
suggested al-Taqi. Syria's permission for and association
with the conference reflected its interest in re-asserting
its own role in the Palestinian issue, he said. Negotiations
between Mishal and Abbas that included the possibility of a
renewed mandate for Abbas to negotiate with Israel would
trigger Syrian concerns that the Syria-Israeli track could be
left out. If Syria received the right signals from the West
that indicated a readiness to leave the door open on the
Golan track, then it might be willing to play a constructive
role on the Palestinian track, said al-Taki. "It might be
possible for Mishal to fly to Cairo, and after that, board a
plane for Doha rather than return to Damascus." Al Taqi's
comments on Lebanon (reported septel) suggested a deal to
select a Lebanese president within the context of a "freeze"
in the Lebanese balance of power would reassure the SARG and
provide a motive for acting constructively on the Palestinian
track.


9. (C) Comment: Though it was arguably the crisis in Gaza
rather than the Palestinian conference that vaulted Hamas'
Khaled Mishal back into the thick of Palestinian politics,
the timing of the event from the organizers' perspective
could not have been better. From their vantage -- and
Syria's, by extension -- Gaza has provided an opportunity to
transform for Arab audiences the conference's rejection of
PA-Israeli negotiations into a more palatable endorsement of
Palestinian unity. Given the SARG's propensity to play to the
Arab street, we would be surprised to see Syrian efforts to
sideline Mishal in the near term, especially as Syrians now
perceive that other Arab countries are actively courting him.

HOLMSTROM