Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DAMASCUS609
2008-08-27 10:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

FM KOUCHNER VISIT SETS AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 3-4

Tags:  PBTS PGOV PHUM PREL SY FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000609 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PHUM PREL SY FR
SUBJECT: FM KOUCHNER VISIT SETS AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 3-4
SARKOZY TRIP TO DAMASCUS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000609

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PHUM PREL SY FR
SUBJECT: FM KOUCHNER VISIT SETS AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 3-4
SARKOZY TRIP TO DAMASCUS

DAMASCUS 00000609 001.2 OF 003


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ZFR ZFR DAMASCUS CABLE MRN 609 AND THE USER WILL SEND A CABLE
WITH NEW MRN.



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1. (C) Summary: According to a French Embassy readout,
French FM Kouchner's August 22-23 discussions with President
Asad and FM Muallim focused on Lebanon, Russia/Georgia, human
rights, Syria's indirect talks with Israel, and Iran in
advance of President Sarkozy's September 3-4 visit to
Damascus. Publicly, Kouchner declared France had "not placed
conditions" for advancing bilateral relations with Syria, but
privately he expressed "mild disappointment" that Lebanon and
Syria could not exchange ambassadors more quickly than
two-to-three months. Asad signaled no change in Syria's
policy regarding demarcation of the Syrian-Lebanese border
near Shebaa Farms. Kouchner reportedly called on Bashar and
Muallim to release the 15 Damascus Declaration National
Council members currently on trial. No longer claiming this
to be a strictly internal issue, Asad indicated he might
consider clemency if the accused were to appeal directly to
the President via letter. Muallim informed Kouchner that the
next round of indirect talks with Israel had been postponed
to September 7 because of Israeli PM advisor Turbowitz's
resignation. Asad reportedly left Russia disappointed after
PM Olmert intervened directly with President Medvedev and
convinced him to forgo an arms deal with Syria, an outcome
that Kouchner saw as "just." End Summary


2. (C) According to French DCM Nicholas Surran, French FM
Kouchner arrived in Damascus August 25, and held meetings
with President Asad and FM Muallim in advance of President
Sarkozy's September 3-4 visit to Damascus. Kouchner also met
with French NGOs working with Iraqi refugees in Syria before
departing August 26. The visit occurred as part of the deal
reached between Presidents Asad and Sarkozy during their July

meeting in Paris to hold two preparatory rounds, one in Paris
(led on the Syrian side by D/PM Dardari) and a second in
Damascus led by Kouchner. According to MFA advisor (and
Orient Center Director) Samir al-Taqi, Syrian officials were
nonplussed by Kouchner's August 24 remarks in Lebanon
suggesting linkage between French-Syrian and Syrian-Lebanese
relations. President Asad, al-Taqi added, also did not
appreciate Kouchner's unfriendly remarks prior to Asad's July
12 arrival in Paris but saw Kouchner's visit as a "necessary
evil" in advance of his summit with Sarkozy.


--------------
Israeli Track Main Syrian Concern
--------------


3. (C) Asad told Kouchner that the next round of indirect
talks with Israel had been postponed until September 7
because of Israeli PM advisor Yoram Turbowitz's resignation,
Surran recounted. (Note: This information contradicts what
Samir al-Taqi told us August 25 -- namely, Turbowitz would
continue his role in the indirect peace talks.) Surran also
noted that, should there be direct talks between the two
sides, the Syrians wanted to hold them in Paris with French
and American participation. The Syrian President and FM
expressed their concerns that the Golan track might be headed
toward failure and urged Kouchner to use France's influence
with Israel to keep the talks alive. Kouchner replied that
Syria needed to remain committed to these discussions out of
self-interest and because the talks had improved regional
stability, according to Surran. Kouchner then asked Bashar
what Syria had hoped to gain by pursuing an arms deal with
Russia at the same time that it was seeking to preserve the
Golan track. Bashar sheepishly said Syria was looking to
augment its air defense system and hoped to exploit the
crisis in Georgia to obtain Russian weapons it had long
pursued. Hours after Asad left Russia, however, PM Olmert
contacted Russian President Medvedev and urged him not to
sell weapons to Syria. Medvedev agreed, and the Syrians were
reportedly disappointed after having so little to show for
their efforts to ingratiate themselves with the Russians.
Kouchner later told French Embassy staff that this outcome
seemed to be "just," claimed Surran.

--------------
Lebanon on the Right Track, Sort of
--------------


4. (C) Surran told us Asad was upbeat about the exchange of
embassies and ambassadors with Lebanon, which he indicated
would probably take two-to-three months. Lebanese FM

DAMASCUS 00000609 002.3 OF 003


Salloukh was due to visit in the coming week to meet Muallim
and continue discussions narrowly focused on this agenda.
Kouchner's public remarks were positive on movement toward
establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and
Syria, but privately the French FM expressed "mild
disappointment" that the exchange of ambassadors would take
so long. Kouchner also saw no signs of change in Syria's
position regarding Shebaa. President Asad reiterated his
categorical insistence that demarcation of the borders around
Shebaa Farms could occur only when Israel ended its
occupation of the Golan, reported Surran. Muallim suggested
Syria would consider favorably the idea of an interim UN
force in Shebaa if Israel were to withdraw, but this would be
as far as Syria would go.


5. (C) Regarding border demarcation and security, Secretary
General of the Syrian-Lebanese High Council Nasri al-Khouri
told us August 21 that Lebanese President Sleiman and Asad
had agreed to resurrect an independent bilateral committee
(which ran from 1964-1973) to review previous agreements and
recommendations on this issue. (Note: According to Khouri,
this independent committee had conducted many geographical
surveys and drafted a list of recommendations for their
capitals to consider. During the course of the committee's
work, the members discovered that Shebaa Farms was actually
Lebanese territory. Neither government had taken action on
the committee's work after it disbanded in the wake of the
October 1973 War.) Syria had favored creating a new
committee but conceded in the end to Lebanese demands.
Al-Khouri warned, however, that both sides would have to
appoint members to staff the committee, and Syria would be
likely to resist any efforts to do so until ambassadors had
been exchanged.


6. (C) As-Safeer journalist Ziad Haydar told us August 26
that Kouchner also raised French concerns about mounting
violence in northern Lebanon and the possibility the
situation there could escalate. Asad reportedly replied this
was a regional problem requiring French involvement,
particularly since Israeli officials were publicly
threatening to destroy Lebanon. Regarding release of
prisoners and resolution of "missing" cases, the two sides
have agreed to revise the 2005 bilateral committee created
under the auspices of the High Council, an organization
created by treaty between Lebanon and Syria in 1991 to
oversea bilateral relations.


--------------
Kouchner Raises Human Rights
--------------


7. (C) FM Kouchner pressed for the release of Damascus
Declaration National Council (DDNC) members currently on
trial, Surran told us. Departing from previous talking
points, Bashar replied he would give consideration to this
request if the accused sent him a letter asking for clemency.
Subsequently, Muallim suggested that he would do his best to
use such a letter to advocate a decisive intervention by
President Asad. (Note: Kouchner's visit coincided with the
August 26 session of the trial against the 15 DDNC leaders.
As expected, the trial was again postponed until September
26, well after Sarkozy's planned visit.) Surran thought the
SARG's shift from "this is an internal matter we will not
discuss" was a useful one that perhaps signaled a desire to
find a solution. At the same time, Paris remained reluctant
to issue any statements regarding Syrian human rights abuses,
Surran said.


--------------
Iran Nuclear Program "Peaceful"
--------------


8. (C) Kouchner pressed Bashar and Muallim on their August
2-4 discussions with Iranian officials in Tehran and whether
Syria judged Iran's refusal to cease enrichment to be a
constructive move, relayed Surran. Bashar insisted Iran had
provided every reassurance that its nuclear program was
peaceful, and Syria took these words at face value. Kouchner
asked whether Syria had asked Iran to provide tangible
indicators of its peaceful intentions, as Sarkozy and Asad
had discussed in Paris. Asad demurred, saying he had raised
the issue in Tehran as promised and believed there to be no
Iranian nuclear threat. Surran suggested that Kouchner did

DAMASCUS 00000609 003 OF 003


not press the point vigorously because he wanted to discuss
the issue further with President Sarkozy before recommending
how to proceed.


--------------
Sarkozy-Asad Agenda Crystallizing
--------------


9. (C) Surran said Kouchner's discussions with Asad and
Muallim established the key topics for follow-up during
Sarkozy's visit to Damascus:

-- Lebanon would take center stage, and Sarkozy would echo
his FM's public praise of advances in bilateral relations
while privately urging Bashar to do more to speed up the
process of exchanging embassies and demarcating/securing
borders, without going into great detail about the
composition and mandates of bilateral committees charged with
doing the work.

-- Sarkozy would push Syria to remain committed to the Golan
track and was considering Syria's request to lobby Israel.

-- On Iran, Kouchner assessed Syria's mediation role as
lacking seriousness, according to Surran. It remains unclear
in the French camp here whether Sarkozy will focus heavily on
this subject for follow up.

-- Sarkozy is intent on briefing Asad on his efforts to
secure a ceasefire and Russian withdrawal from Georgian
territory, without directly confronting Bashar on his
lopsided rhetoric blaming the U.S., Israel, and others for
provoking Russia's "just" response.

-- It is likely Sarkozy will press Bashar on human rights
issues to see whether there is more give in Syria's position
with regard to the possibility of the release of DDNC
leaders.

-- Sarkozy's main press events here will be a dedication
address at the Charles DeGaulle Lycee and a meeting with the
French expat community.

--------------
Protocol and Other Details
--------------


10. (C) A tired Surran told us Sarkozy's advance team would
be arriving August 26 to begin prolonged discussions on
protocol and security issues. Sarkozy had decided to stay in
the Four Seasons Hotel instead of the Presidential guest
palace, touching off what will likely be a week of delicate
negotiations with the Presidential Protocol office. The
French President's decision to travel with FM Kouchner and no
other ministers also had raised concerns that France was
losing interest in deepening commercial and cultural ties.
Surran said a French developmental assistance team was in
Syria to look at potential water and other projects, but
Syria continues to hope for more signs of French interest in
investing in Syria. There had been no discussion on a joint
Sarkozy-Asad statement during Kouchner's visit, reported
Surran, but the French fully expected the Syrians to make a
request for one at the last minute.


11. (C) Comment: Surran's account of Kouchner's visit was
punctuated by body language and snappy ripostes that
indicated growing French Embassy amusement and perhaps
frustration with Bashar and his staff. Some of this no doubt
can be attributed to visit fatigue, and the French may be
telling us what we want to hear, to a certain extent. But
while the French Embassy remains the envy of many in the
Damascus diplomatic community for its unrestricted high-level
access to the SARG, the French themselves seem to see this as
a mixed blessing and are openly acknowledging the uncertain
durability of French-Syrian rapprochement and the willingness
of the Syrian side to take positive concrete action. In
particular, Asad's public statements in Russia regarding the
crisis in Georgia prompted French Embassy eye-rolls and
shoulder shrugs that conveyed astonishment with the
unpredictable nature of Syrian policy declarations.
CONNELLY