BASHAR WAITING ON SLEIMAN'S VISIT, FOCUSED ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000526

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE
SUBJECT: BASHAR WAITING ON SLEIMAN'S VISIT, FOCUSED ON
SATISFYING FRENCH

REF: A. BEIRUT 1075

B. BEIRUT 1068

C. DAMASCUS 498

Classified By: Classified by CDA Michael Corbin for reasons 1.5 b and d
.


1. (C) Summary: From the SARG's perspective, FM Muallim's
July 21 trip to Beirut provided another step toward
expanding its new relationship with France, and it paved the
way for the next Syrian "deliverable," namely -- Lebanese
President Sleiman's upcoming visit to Damascus. Though some
within the SARG reportedly expressed reservations that
Muallim's trip would risk appearing too conciliatory, the
majority of our contacts believe the FM successfully conveyed
Syria's desire for a new chapter in bilateral relations,
while signaling the process of formalizing diplomatic
relations will require lengthy and complicated negotiations.
Observers here are focused on the "mechanism" for reaching
agreement to establish embassies, ratification procedures,
and what to do with the 22 bilateral agreements under the
Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council framework. Muallim's approach
to the Lebanon file and beyond will likely continue to
exploit the novelty of these high-level Syrian-Lebanese talks
as an ersatz for tangible action. End Summary

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Syria's Approach to Lebanon All About Satisfying the French
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2. (C) According to sources who traveled with Bashar July
12-15 to Paris, President Asad used the visit to formally
designate FM Muallim as the Syrian executive authority for
negotiating an exchange of embassies with the GOL and to
reach agreement on the legal framework for conducting future
bilateral relations. Asad also pledged to send Muallim to
Beirut to invite President Sleiman to Damascus, which he did
July 21 (refs a and b).


3. (C) According to Orient Center Director and informal MFA
advisor Samir al-Taqi, there were concerns within some
quarters of the SARG (read security services) that Syrian
prestige might suffer if Muallim appeared too deferential
during his trip to Beirut. In particular, some SARG
officials were reportedly worried there might be efforts by
March 14 politicians to embarrass Muallim. Bashar overruled
these reservations before returning from Paris to Damascus.
Nonetheless, continued al-Taqi, the SARG gave careful
consideration to the exact wording Muallim would use in
discussions of specific bilateral issues, such as Lebanese
prisoners in Syria, border demarcation, and Shebaa farms.
Muallim's instructions were to meet the French desire for a
significant expression of Syria's desire for a new era in
bilateral relations, without "bowing to March 14," he said.


4. (C) Muallim achieved this balance "splendidly," assessed
al-Hayat Bureau Chief Ibrahim Hamidi, who accompanied
Bashar's party to Paris and has been tracking the Lebanon
track carefully. Muallim fulfilled Bashar's commitment to
the French by declaring a desire for a "new chapter" in
bilateral relations and emphasizing the "equal footing"
between the two countries. He also mitigated hard-liner
concerns that Syria was being weak by issuing cutting remarks
on Lebanese prisoners in Syrian jails (they "have waited more
than 30 years...they can wait a few more weeks"),the status
of Shebaa Farms (UN custody "does not mean the end of
(Israeli) occupation),and borders ("there is nothing to
prevent the demarcation of borders but me must take into
account the fact that many Syrian and Lebanese villages are
intertwined...")


5. (C) Muallim's visit, according to Syrian contacts
emerging July 22 from a meeting with a visiting French
Parliamentary delegation, fulfilled part of Bashar's deal
with Sarkozy. The overwhelming buzz among European and Arab
diplomatic contacts was that Muallim had succeeded and was in
control of the process. French diplomatic contacts in
particular were pleased with the visit, and the French Charge
told us July 22 that it was all but certain that "Sarkozy
(would be) coming to Damascus."

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Next Step: Sleiman Visit and the Search for A "Mechanism"
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DAMASCUS 00000526 002 OF 002



6. (C) SARG officials expect Lebanese President Sleiman to
visit Damascus after the Lebanese cabinet issues a policy
declaration. Though everyone here acknowledges this might
take time, Syrians in general seem willing to patiently wait
for the Lebanese to complete this step. Once here, Sleiman
is expected to name Lebanon's counterpart to FM Muallim to
begin talks on a mechanism to pursue bilateral relations,
Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council SecGen Nasri al-Khoury told us
July 23. In addition, Muallim introduced the idea in Beirut
(which Bashar plans to explore further) of creating an ad hoc
working committee co-chaired by Muallim and his Lebanese
counterpart to proceed with examining the steps necessary to
sign an MOU to exchange embassies.


7. (C) Exactly how negotiations will proceed is uncertain,
Hamidi told us. "Bashar wants to demonstrate he's ready to
follow through on his commitment to Sarkozy," he said. The
Lebanese, however, "could debate a Cabinet statement
forever." The key SARG priority will be to demonstrate to
the French and international that it is seriously engaged in
and committed to a process to establish embassies. "That
will keep the Syrian-French relationship moving forward,"
Hamidi said. If the process slows, he added, the Syrians
want to be in a position to argue persuasively that the delay
is due "internal Lebanese machinations."

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Whither the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council?
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8. (C) Related to the issue of reaching an MOU on
establishing embassies is the future legal framework for
bilateral relations. Al-Khoury has argued (and reiterated to
us July 23) that the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council
represents a long-standing bilateral structure that has
worked to the mutual benefit of both countries. While there
was no consensus in either Syria or Lebanon on the Higher
Council's future, Al-Khoury argued that the easiest and most
viable way to achieve an MOU to exchange embassies would be
to amend the Higher Council's provisions regarding the
functions of the General Secretariat, in a way that specified
the mandate and functions of embassies in Lebanon and Syria.
Al-Khoury indicated there had already internal SARG
discussion on pursuing such an approach, but there remained a
great deal of work to do in specifying how much
country-to-country business to conduct through embassies, and
how much to preserve the existing Higher Council's structure
of 22 separate agreements.


8. (C) Al-Khoury cautioned that this approach was only one
possible scenario likely to be discussed by Asad and Sleiman.
He conceded that many Lebanese saw the Higher Council an
"instrument of Syrian occupation" and wanted to abolish it.
Some prominent Syrians were just as eager to see the Higher
Council go away because it would allow Syria to abrogate
agreements on water, electricity, and other bilateral issues
which benefited Lebanon, he observed.


9. (C) The most likely scenario, al-Khoury suggested, was
that Asad and Sleiman would examine a number of options but
eventually agree to pursue an MOU to establish embassies
within a modified Higher Council framework. Even this
approach, however, would require prolonged bilateral
negotiations followed by internal domestic debates in both
countries. Al-Khoury declined to estimate how long the
process would take, but suggested that debate among Lebanese
politicians would likely prolong the process considerably.
The ratification process in Syria would not likely be "as
dramatic," he said.


10. (C) Comment: Bashar's decision to delegate negotiating
authority to Muallim indicates the FM's expanding control of
not just the Lebanese file, but Syria's broader engagement of
the West. Key to Muallim's approach is to use the novelty of
direct, high-level talks with Lebanon to depict the illusion
of serious intentions and concrete action. As
Syrian-Lebanese discussions begin to address complicated
issues that will take likely take prolonged negotiations to
resolve, we should continue to demand tangible evidence of
Syria's desire for improved relations -- not just progress on
borders, Shebaa Farms, and Lebanese prisoners, but also
curtailing the arms flow. We should also stress the
desirability of preserving existing bilateral agreements that
work to Lebanon's favor.
CORBIN