TIME FOR TALKING POINTS TO COUNTER SYRIA'S "CHARM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000491

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA
PARIS FOR JORDAN
LONDON FOR TSOU
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2028
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAL SY IS LE IZ
SUBJECT: TIME FOR TALKING POINTS TO COUNTER SYRIA'S "CHARM
OFFENSIVE"

REF: A. DAMASCUS 427

B. DAMASCUS 471

C. PARIS 1261

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Eager to exploit growing European interest
in engaging Syria, Damascus is taking credit for recent
"stabilizing" regional developments, such as the Doha accord
on Lebanon, peace talks with Israel, the Hamas-Israeli
"calming," and even Israeli-Hizballah prisoner exchanges.
Some UN and European diplomats now suggest Syria's indirect
talks with Israel and support for the Doha accord represent
concrete action by the SARG deserving a "response" from the
international community. After FM Muallim's July 4 trip to
France and as President Asad prepares to travel to Paris, we
need to develop counter-points for use with the international
community to convey that the Syrians are trying to convert a
change in atmospherics into a mirage of concrete positive
actions. For example, despite its rosy rhetoric, the SARG
condoned and likely facilitated the extremely negative May
24-25 visit of Hamas political chief Khaled Meshal to Tehran.
Further, while the SARG allowed an IAEA team to conduct a
strictly limited June 22-25 visit, Syria's WMD record,
including its undeclared CW stocks, refusal to sign the CWC,
and whatever we can release publicly about SCUD missile
modifications, should not be conveniently swept under the
carpet by the Syrians. As usual, the SARG is seeking to get
something for nothing. While we cannot easily turn off the
European push to engage, we should publicly and privately
make clear what the SARG has and has not done, and challenge
the illusion of action the SARG seeks to present. End Summary


2. (C) Two months since Bashar Asad announced the opening
of indirect talks with Israel to the Syrian Baath Party
Central Committee and six weeks after the Doha agreement that
led to the election of a Lebanese President, Syrian officials
have overcome the government's perennial PR incompetence and
begun to exploit these developments with foreign audiences.
Syrian officials are claiming profound policy changes and
taking credit for supporting positive trends in the region
and are finding receptive audiences in many quarters.


3. (C) Syrian FM Muallim reiterated to French officials in
Paris July 4 that the SARG desires a peace agreement with
Israel, is seeking constructive bilateral relations with
Lebanon, and is looking for an alternative to its strategic
relationship with Iran. Muallim's visit met with huge press
pools that soaked up and reported every word. In the
build-up to Asad's July 12-14 trip to Paris, the Syrian
President told Le Figaro in an interview published July 7
that the trip to Paris "opens a large door to the
international community." He characterized indirect talks
with Israel as "testing their intentions" in search of a
common basis and called for international support for the
talks. In one telling comment, Bashar said Syria was waiting
for a new U.S. administration and that "the role of the
United States is essential, but that of Europe is
complementary, and when we talk of the political role of
Europe, France is in the avant-garde."


4. (C) Syrian officials are even going as far as to suggest
that indirect negotiations with Israel and Syria's "new"
policy toward Lebanon have contributed to Israel's tahdiyya
(calming) with Hamas in Gaza and the exchange of prisoners
between Hizballah and Israel. We see little evidence that
Syria actually contributed to these negotiations, but the
SARG is nonetheless suggesting that these "breakthroughs" are
improving regional stability.


5. (C) Encouraged by this rhetoric, a number of our local
diplomatic counterparts have argued that Syria's new stance
reflects concrete actions to which the international
community "should respond." We have forcefully argued that
rosy assessments of Syrian intentions lack any concrete

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basis, and that thus far, Syria's claims of a new policy
orientation come in the absence of any tangible actions on
either the areas the SARG claims or on the key issues of
human rights or Iraq.


6. (C) Nonetheless, German, Italian, Spanish, Norwegian,
French, UN, and other European contacts suggest a new urgency
to the ever-present interest in their capitals to pursue
engagement. This information will particularly useful for
newcomers to the Syrian spider web. We note Icelandic FM
Gisladottir's June 25 visit to Damascus as part of a Middle
East tour to prepare for Iceland's 2009-2010 UNSC membership.
Post suggests Washington develop clear talking points for
capitals (particularly for neophytes such as Iceland) on the
facts of Syrian behavior.


7. (C) Suggested themes follow. Post suggests an IC scrub
for each subject -- particularly regarding Syria's WMD and
missile programs and its relations with Iran and Hizballah --
to see whether more specific information might be released to
strengthen our arguments.

(C) SARG RHETORIC MUST BE MATCHED BY CONCRETE ACTIONS

-- (C) The SARG has a history of suggesting it will take
actions in the hope of winning foreign policy concessions in
exchange for little action on its part. As the SARG presents
a new public relations face and seeks to expand dialogue, we
see little evidence that it has actually backed up this
rhetoric with concrete steps. In fact the SARG has so far
done little. In some cases, it continues to adopt negative
policies that must be factored into any dialogue.

-- (C) PALESTINIAN ISSUES: The SARG states it supports
Palestinian-Israeli peace talks and reconciliation among
Palestinian factions. Rather than taking any concrete
actions in support of the Palestinian-Israeli track, Syria
continues to allow HAMAS and other Palestinian rejectionist
groups to take steps to undermine the legitimacy of the
Palestinian Authority and derail the PA-Israeli peace talks.
The SARG, which we know can control the activities and travel
of Palestinian groups residing in Syria, not only allowed but
encouraged Hamas leader Khalid Meshal to travel to Iran May
24-25, where he made public statements critical of Israel and
the Palestinian Authority and thanked Iran for its support of
the Palestinian armed resistance. The SARG hosted PA
President Mahmoud Abbas in Damascus July 6-8 and pressured
the Palestinian leader to meet with Meshal despite Abbas'
insistence on avoiding such a meeting until Hamas returned
control of Gaza to the PA and agreed to accept previous
Palestinian peace agreements with Israel. Subsequently, the
SARG remained silent while Hamas officials harshly criticized
Abbas for not meeting Meshal and accused him of doing so at
the behest of Israel and the U.S.

-- (C) GOLAN TRACK: The SARG states that its participation
in indirect talks with Israel is a sign of a new willingness
to move forward on the Syria-Israel track. The talks are
naturally secret and we welcome efforts that lead to regional
comprehensive peace. But we see little evidence in Syria's
public statements that it is going beyond a restatement of
its positions in previously unsuccessful negotiations, most
recently in 2000. For example, Syria has simply
re-articulated its demand for the return of the Golan to its
June 4, 1967 borders. Syria also has recycled unproved
accusations that Israel is dumping nuclear waste in the
Golan. Future direct talks with Israel may be one indicator
the Syrians are serious, but even these direct talks might
not mean the Syrians are willing to make concessions.

-- (C) SYRIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS: The SARG has hinted broadly
that it is seeking alternatives to its strategic relationship
with Iran. While tensions between Damascus and Tehran have
surfaced over Iraq, the assassination of Hizballah leader
Imad Mugniyeh in Damascus, and Syria's indirect negotiations

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with Israel, there has been no public change in relations
between the two countries. In fact the record shows that the
SARG recently sent the Syrian Minister of Defense to sign a
defense cooperation MOU with Tehran on May 27. Syria and
Iran continue to coordinate strategic positions through
regular high-level contacts. Both governments support
deepening of economic, cultural, and trade ties with Iran, as
evinced by the recent telecommunications MOU on July 2 and
planned mid-July meetings of the Syrian-Iranian Supreme
Commission.

-- (C) SYRIAN INTERFERENCE IN LEBANON: President Asad's
proclaimed support for the Doha accord and his statements
that he wants to open an embassy in Beirut are welcome, but
thus far Syria has taken no concrete steps toward more normal
relations.

- Syria continues to transfer arms to Hizballah and has
done nothing to show it has abandoned its reliance on
Hizballah to protect its equities in Lebanon. SARG-Hizballah
contacts continue at all levels.

- Border demarcation: Syrian claims it wants to
establish normal diplomatic relations but thus far refuses to
discuss border demarcation of Shebaa farms, which prevents
progress on this issue and upholds Hizballah's destabilizing
position in Lebanon.

- Ongoing violence in Lebanon: While Syria's role in
continued violence in Lebanon is unknown, Syria maintains
close relations with Alawi groups that are well armed and
engaged in violent conflict with Sunnis in northern Lebanon.

- Lebanon's Syrian Socialist National Party, which
maintains close ties to Damascus, actively assisted
Hizballah's armed assault on Beirut in early May. In
addition, Syria's open support of Palestinian groups in the
Lebanese Bekaa, such as the PLFP-GC, undermines GOL control
of its own territory.

- The SARG has suggested that diplomatic relations with
Lebanon will come at a cost to the long-established and
mutually supportive Joint Syrian-Lebanese Economic Social
Council, which has provided mutual economic benefits that are
important to Lebanon. The SARG's public statements that
restoration of normal diplomatic relations will mean
summarily canceling these agreements are more threatening
than constructive.

- Doha Follow Up: Six weeks after Doha, Lebanon still
lacks a government. Syrian claims that it can do nothing to
help facilitate the process of government formation in
Lebanon call into question the credit Syria seeks to take the
Doha accord.

-- (C) SYRIA'S ROLE IN THE ARAB WORLD: Syria claims that the
March 29-30 Arab League summit confirmed Syria's moderate
role and gave it a mandate to address Arab issues, but we see
little evidence that Syria is contributing to resolving
disputes and promoting cooperation within the Arab world.

- Major Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt
continue to wait for Bashar to take concrete steps toward a
more constructive approach to Lebanon and away from the
destructive approach Syria has taken to Lebanon and its
rejection of moderate Arab appeals the address the situation
in Lebanon.

- Countries such as Jordan are willing to engage Syria,
such as Jordanian King Abdullah's recent publicized July 1
phone call but they are seeing little gains in return for
their efforts to reach out to Syria.

-- (C) WMD ISSUES: While Syria proclaims its desire to
cooperate with the IAEA in investigating serious evidence of

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a covert nuclear program and allowed an extremely restricted
June 22-25 IAEA visit to investigate a covert nuclear
program, Syria has never accounted for its CW stocks, refuses
to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, and is modernizing
its long-range missile systems in cooperation with Russia,
North Korea, and other countries. There remain suspicions
Syria could be sharing missile technology with Hizballah.
(Note: Just as Washington has done in past demarches
regarding Syrian WMD and missile programs, Post believes a
new scrub of releasable intelligence would strengthen our
arguments regarding the gap between Syrian rhetoric and
actions.)

-- (C) SECURITY COOPERATION WITH IRAQ: Despite Syria's
rhetorical claims it desires normal relations with a secure
and stable Iraq, Syria has done little to advance security
cooperation with Baghdad. Syrians continue to host former
Saddam Hussein military officials and Iraqi Baath Party
figures who raise money for weapons and subversion in Iraq.
Despite some high-level, Iraqi-Syrian high-level engagement
and unilateral deployments along its border, the SARG
continues to refuse to take concrete security actions to
improve security cooperation with the Government of Iraq.

-- (C) ECONOMIC REFORMS/CORRUPTION: President Asad and other
Syrian officials claim Syria has made strides in opening its
economy to global trade and fighting corruption. Yet despite
the Syrian Parliament's vote to ratify the UN Convention on
Anti-Corruption, Transparency International ranked Syria
138th of 179 countries in corruption (putting it among the
worst ranked in the Middle East.)

-- (C) FIGHTING EXTREMISM: The SARG claims it is actively
combatting extremism and terrorism, and it may be taking some
actions to reduce domestic threats to the Asad regime.
However, SARG cooperation with international bodies engaged
in the war on global terrorism is limited.


(C) ISSUES THE SARG IS NOT ADDRESSING

-- (C) HUMAN RIGHTS: When various foreign officials have
raised Syria's human rights problems (such as prisoners of
conscience),the SARG rejects any discussion of this subject,
arguing it is purely an internal matter. Leading Syrian
intellectuals and democratic reformers continue to be held in
prison, and the SARG is preparing criminal prosecution of
those involved with establishing the non-violent Damascus
Declaration National Council in December 2007. The Syrian
security services have orchestrated a country-wide crackdown
on all forms of political expression and activities that do
not conform to government dictates.

-- (C) FOREIGN FIGHTERS: The SARG claims it has strengthened
border security and is taking steps to scrutinize foreign
visitors to control the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq.
In fact, foreign fighters traversing Syrian territory
continue to kill and maim Iraqi civilians, security forces,
and coalition members. While the numbers of foreign fighters
and suicide attacks have decreased, their impact continues to
represent a security threat to Iraqi civilians and a
government attempting to establish law and order. If Syria
were truly serious about reorienting its policy, it would
take more effective action against networks facilitating the
flow of foreign fighters into Iraq.

(C) CONCLUSION

-- (C) As SARG officials reach out to the international
community and present an image of progress, we urge that all
involved parties respond to the SARG on the basis of its
record, not on its rhetoric.
CORBIN