HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQI REFUGEES IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000167

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2018
TAGS: HU PREF PREL
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQI REFUGEES IN
SYRIA FACING START-UP CHALLENGES

REF: A. A. DAMASCUS 00094

B. B. AMMAN 486

C. C. COMEAU EMAIL FEB 26

Classified By: A/DCM Todd Holstrom, per 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary: The following is a trip report by PRM Jay
Zimmerman. The international community's response to the
needs of Iraqi refugees has expanded the numbers and scale of
humanitarian agencies in Syria, however, humanitarian space
remains confused and uncoordinated. Local UNHCR
representatives said they can now more constructively engage
the Syrian government and have been successful in expanding
services - particularly health and education services - for
Iraqis. NGOs criticize the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC)
for failing to register them quickly and efficiently and
excluding them from funding opportunities and coordination
mechanisms, although even the Syrian MFA acknowledges the
delays originate elsewhere. Despite a lack of data on
existing refugee numbers and needs, all PRM-funded NGO
projects are reaching their contracted targets. However,
they are limited by their design to either serving small
numbers of refugees with comprehensive programs or relatively
larger numbers of refugees with one-off distributions. All
NGOs said they will request no-cost extensions and/or budget
modifications due to delays in initiating project activities.
End Summary.


2. (SBU) Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) TDY
Refugee Coordinator (Ref Coord) Jay Zimmerman and Project
Management Specialist Mona Halasa visited Syria from February
2-8 to assess the progress of PRM-funded NGO projects in
implementing humanitarian assistance activities for Iraqi
refugees, identify constraints humanitarian agencies are
encountering in programming activities assisting Iraqi
refugees, and highlight collaborative actions Embassy
Damascus and PRM can implement to improve humanitarian
assistance to Iraqi refugees. Ref Coord visited the Damascus
offices and, in most cases, the partners of NGO projects
funded by PRM (International Medical Corps (IMC),
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC),Catholic
Relief Services (CRS),and International Orthodox Christian
Charities (IOCC)),met with UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP and
UNICEF) and had meetings with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent
(SARC) and PRM,s Overseas Processing Entity the
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Ref Coord
agreed to provide Embassy Damascus with copies of completed
IPEs (Interim Progress Evaluations) on all NGO projects
evaluated and to draft a paper outlining suggested activities
PRM and Embassy Damascus can collaborate on to improve
protection and assistance activities for Iraqi refugees in
Syria. This cable highlights general constraints and
opportunities humanitarian agencies encounter in Syria.

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The International Communities Response to Iraqi Refugee
Open Humanitarian Space Needed
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3. (C) UN humanitarian agencies confirmed that the
international community's quick and generous response to
their 2007 appeals assisting Iraqi refugees was instrumental
in convincing the Syrian Government (SARG) to expand
humanitarian space for the UN to provide services to Iraqis
and directly contributed to the SARG permitting international
NGOs to begin operating in Syria. The SARC, for example,
said 43 international NGOs have registered to sign MOUs to
implement Iraqi-focused assistance programs in Syria. (NOTE:
SARC informed Post that 14 international NGOs have signed the
MOU, though Post has only been able to verify that IMC and
the French NGO Premiere Urgence have signed. END NOTE.)
UNHCR Resident Representative, Laurens Jolles said PRM,s
funding has given UNHCR the ability to constructively engage
the SARG to expand and link protection and assistance
programs for Iraqis. For example, Jolles said the families
of Iraqi refugee children enrolled in Syrian public and
private schools and those Iraqis with medical conditions -
both central planks of UNHCR,s and the international
communities, humanitarian efforts - automatically have their
visas renewed permitting them to stay in Syria and receive
assistance. UNHCR Jolles also said the international
response, along with Syria regularizing the transit of Iraqis
through a visa regime introduced in October 2007, gave the
Syrian government more control over the Iraqi population
allowing it to open public services to Iraqis.


4. (C) Besides contributing to a geographic expansion of
services, international funding has also served to broaden
the number of program sectors the UN and SARC are active in

and has helped humanitarian agencies strengthen their
management capabilities. The SARC, for example, had only a
health and disaster response capacity in 2006, but by the
time of our visit had also expanded their activities to
include NGO registration and coordination, food and non-food
item (NFI) distribution, and was seeking technical assistance
for psychosocial programming. To expand and improve its
programming and management capacity, the SARC is receiving
technical assistance from two International Federation
partners (the French and Dutch Red Cross) and has accepted an
expat secondment (funded by ECHO) to assist it in managing
the MOU process for international NGOs. (NOTE: The SARC
expressed a desire to develop stronger ties with the American
Red Cross - including a possible secondment of an American
Red Cross technical assistant. END NOTE.) SARC Director
General Marwan Abdallah said interactions with international
NGOs have improved the SARC,s abilities to implement
programs for poor Syrians as well as for Iraqis. IMC, for
example, had helped the SARC develop a common drug list,
implement standard operating procedures and initiate a HIS
(Health Information System) that it is adapting for its
clinics - none of which had been in place prior to IMC's
intervention. International community funding for Iraqi
refugees is also expected to introduce new or improved models
of practice to existing Syrian social services such as
psychosocial and mental health programs, vocational and
informal education, trafficking and gender-based violence
programs.

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But, Rapid Expansion Came at a Price
--------------


5. (SBU) The sudden increase in funding for Iraqi refugee
programs, however, has distorted the normal functioning of UN
agencies and other organizations. UNHCR-Syria,s budget in
2006, for example, was $700,000, increased to more than $43
million in 2007 and, if fully funded in 2008, will increase
again to $137 million. Maintaining internal controls,
effectively coordinating with other UN agencies and even
finding physical space to accommodate the increase in
staffing Iraqi-specific programs were all mentioned as
straining the internal capacities of UN agencies and UN
Country Team functioning. UNICEF warned that, although not
yet evident, the continued expansion of programs for Iraqi
refugees and the lack of complementary funding for poor
Syrians with similar needs could lead to increased social
tensions targeted at Iraqis - particularly as food, fuel and
housing prices are expected to increase shortly.


6. (C) The sudden increase in funding and rush to begin
assistance programs have also limited the UN,s ability to
establish basic information on the target population or
establish coordination and referral mechanisms with other
agencies. Rudimentary information such as the total number
of Iraqis requiring assistance, their location and the extent
of their vulnerability continue to be a matter of controversy
since significant donor contributions began to flow into
UNHCR in 2007 (Ref A). UNICEF Representative Anis Salem
lamented that the UN Country Team still lacks a coordinated
UN emergency response framework to meet the needs of this
emergency. The lack of a framework was cited by Salem as a
factor behind the issuing of uncoordinated UN appeals last
year, contributed to the rapid expansion of one UN agency
(UNHCR) at the expense of other UN agencies, and the UN
Country Team's lack of unity over UN priorities and
strategies.


7. (C) The sudden demand of international NGOs seeking
registration to implement assistance programs in Syria also
led to a complicated, confusing and frustrating process for
NGO registration. The SARG's appointment of the SARC as the
gatekeeper for international NGOs to operate in Syria has
strained the organizational and programmatic capacity of the
SARC and, claims the SARC's Abdullah, detracts SARC staff
from implementing its own substantial programs for Iraqi
refugees. The reluctance of UNHCR to sign sub-agreements
with any of the international NGOs in Syria until they have
first signed an MOU with the SARC has left the SARC in a
privileged position to obtain existing sub-agreements from
UNHCR and has created tensions within the NGO community. The
privileged position and the delay in signing MOUs with NGOs
has bred NGO suspicion and speculation as to the SARC,s
intentions. IMC Director Ibrahim, for example, speculated
that the SARC (along with Federation partners) were
monopolizing activities and funding opportunities in the
health sector by operating only in the most desirable clinics
and limiting NGO's participation in health coordination
meetings with UNHCR. IMC and other NGOs also speculated

about the extent to which the SARC would "control" NGO
programs and budgets - including salaries of expat and local
staff, administration and overhead costs, etc. via the MOU
process. (NOTE: Dr Attar, SARC President, confirmed that
international NGOs, after having signed the MOU with SARC,
would also be required to have their individual program plans
and budgets approved by the SARC before they could begin
implementing activities. The SARC has not yet developed, let
alone informed, NGOs of acceptable guidelines for program
plans or budgets. Dr. Attar, for example, said the SARC will
not approve programs or budgets that have excessive overhead
or administrative costs, but was unable to define what
excessive administrative costs would be. END NOTE.)

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A Response That Is Uncoordinated and Spotty
--------------


8. (C) There is a growing concern in the international
community that the Syrian government and UNHCR,s estimates
and assessments of the needs of Iraqis in Syria are not
substantiated (Ref A) and have led to inappropriate
assistance - such as a heavy emphasis on school construction.
All of the NGOs encountered, including the SARC's Abdullah,
agreed that the total number of Iraqis was less than the
official estimate of 1.2-1.4 million Iraqis, but few would
venture how many fewer. IOCC questioned the official
out-of-school rate cited in the UN Regional Education Appeal
by saying it had to call over 12,000 Iraqi families it has
registered for NFI distributions in order to identify 340
out-of-school youth for its programs. Most NGOs said Iraqis
who wanted to attend existing schools could enroll, but often
dropped out for reasons related to overcrowding, lack of
money for school costs, unfamiliarity with the curriculum or
other reasons. UNICEF,s Salem said his analysis of school
data also called into question the claim of severe
overcrowding in Syrian schools caused by the enrollment of
Iraqis saying he was not aware of any one school with more
than 50 Iraqis enrolled in it. UNHCR countered that,
regardless of the number of Iraqis in Syria, the number of
vulnerable Iraqis and Iraqis needing assistance was
increasing as Iraqis are unable to legally work, their
savings were becoming depleted and the costs of rent, food
and fuel were constantly increasing. UNHCR said it will
expand both its geographic reach within the country as well
as increase the number of Iraqis it will provide assistance
to from 130,000 in 2007 to more than 350,000 in 2008 to meet
the increasing needs for assistance. (NOTE: Even at the
official estimates of 1.2 -1.4 million Iraqis in Syria,
assisting 350,000 is equivalent to assisting almost one
quarter of the total number of Iraqis in Syria. END NOTE.)



9. (SBU) All PRM-funded NGOs, however, reflected UNHCR's
argument that the NFI, health and education needs among
Iraqis remains largely unmet and is growing. UN and NGOs
alike stressed the growing need for financial assistance to
pay rents and the need for food. All PRM-funded NGOs
(including IMC who will begin implementing programs six
months late) were confident they will meet or exceed their
beneficiary population targets by the end of the approved
project period. (NOTE: All NGOs said they will be requesting
no-cost extensions for their projects due to delays in
project implementation. END NOTE.) CRS, for example, which
only began Damascus humanitarian assistance operations one
week prior to our visit, reported seeing 30 cases the first
week, and had already scheduled 400 Iraqis for assistance
interviews while Iraqis seeking assistance at ICMC have been
told they have a three month wait for an interview. The
networks established through churches, mosques and interfaith
contacts, are being effectively used by the NGOs working
through local churches or religious organizations such as
Caritas to identify, refer and assist needy Iraqis regardless
of religious affiliation. None of PRM's funded projects
exclusively target any one faith. All NGOs said they expect
to expand their geographic reach in 2008 to reach Iraqis in
under or not-yet served Syrian communities and towns.
PRM-funded projects, however, were found to provide either
in-depth comprehensive services to a relatively limited
number of families or individuals or they reach an impressive
number of families but with limited services. ICMC, for
example, provides a comprehensive set of case management
services including home visits but is only targeted to reach
3,600 families. IOCC, on the other hand, has, to date,
provided one-off hygiene and school supply packages to more
than 10,000 families, but each family is limited to only one
distribution per year.


10. (SBU) Referral mechanisms and coordination between

agencies are nascent and adhoc. ICMC and CRS are both using
the same database and can share referrals with the eventual
goal of minimizing duplication of services, but no
coordinated database similar to the BIS in Jordan exists in
Syria (Ref B) for all providers to use. (COMMENT: Ref Coord
suspects overlap in services and service areas among
PRM-funded projects which better coordination could reduce.
END COMMENT.) ICMC has taken the lead in initiating
coordination between PRM-funded NGOs (Ref C),but this has
only happened one time (NOTE: Subsequent to the visit of Ref
Coords, Embassy Damascus reported the second NGO coordination
meeting. END NOTE.) One of the initial tasks of the
coordination group is to map the service areas of
participating NGOs to minimize overlap. As mentioned
earlier, no PRM-funded agency has been invited to participate
in UNHCR/SARC coordination meetings because they had not yet
signed MOUs with SARC. NGOs said the lack of coordination
between themselves and with UN agencies is leading to
divergent policies guiding project implementation. For
example, SARC cited ECHO's policies of only permitting Iraqis
to receive health services in three clinics it is supporting
whereas SARC policy is to permit both Syrians and Iraqis to
receive services. CRS reported another conflicting policy
impacting their program in that UNHCR provides 30 percent of
in-patient hospital costs whereas CRS and ICMC both pay 100
percent of hospital costs leading to "shopping" for services
among the Iraqi population and an oversubscription of
inpatient health services in their projects.


11. (SBU) Agencies providing assistance to Iraqis are
currently limited to UN agencies, SARC and those NGOs
affiliated with religious organizations (ICMC, IOCC and CRS).
UN agencies (principally UNHCR) have chosen to not sign sub
agreements with NGOs who are not yet registered with SARC.
(NOTE: CRS and ICMC have both informed SARC they are
interested in signing the MOU - partly to permit them to
access UNCHR funding. END NOTE) UNHCR said it wants to rely
less on the Syrian government in 2008 and more on direct
implementation (i.e. through partnerships with SARC and
NGOs),however IMC told Ref Coord it may not be able to sign
sub agreements with UNHCR because of UNHCR's limitations on
providing overhead and admin costs. WFP also said it is open
to using partners other than SARC to distribute food, but,
again, is limited because of the lack of NGOs who have signed
the MOU. UNHCR also expects to engage as many as 200 Iraqi
volunteers to expand its outreach efforts and most NGOs have
highlighted the untapped potential of existing structures
such as community centers that can be used to reach into the
Iraqi communities.


12. (SBU) NGOs report that Iraqis are frustrated trying to
obtain services from UNHCR. NGOs claim Iraqis are reluctant
to spend dwindling resources on the transportation costs
associated with various trips to and from UNHCR (to register,
be interviewed and then to return for assistance). NGOs also
criticize UNHCR assistance as not being mean-tested, but
rather, based only on having registered with UNHCR. The lack
of consistent vulnerability criteria among NGOs and UN
agencies encourages "shopping" for the best deal and
undermines efforts to reach the most vulnerable.

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Gaps and Other Issues
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13. (SBU) All PRM-funded NGOs said they will request no-cost
extensions for their projects due to delays in initiating
project activities. All NGOs said they will also be
requesting budget modifications or realignments as initial
estimates of costs were unknown or severely underestimated
(rents in particular) at the time of proposal submission, or
because they have been able to realize savings in one
activity and want to shift savings to another oversubscribed
cost center (usually from education costs to health costs).
CRS will request an additional $250,000 to fully implement
their education project claiming an error was initially made
in their budget submission and copied into the Cooperative
Agreement they subsequently signed.


14. (SBU) Despite the difficulty in working in Syria, all
PRM-funded agencies are planning on submitting continuation
proposals to PRM. NGOs underscored that last year's
proposals were based on guess-work, but now, having been on
the ground for some months, they have a better feel for where
the gaps in services are. NGOs highlighted current gaps in
services as: providing for secondary and tertiary care for
Iraqis; rental and food assistance; expanding vocational
training to young adults (18-24 years of age) and
female-headed households; and, in providing remedial

education to help Iraqis in the formal school system to
remain enrolled. New program needs were identified as mental
health and psychosocial needs, expanding hygiene
infrastructure (toilets and access to clean water) in
schools, protection against trafficking and gender based
violence and outreach to connect Iraqis to available services
including registration with UNHCR.
CORBIN