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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DAKAR830
2008-07-16 19:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

IMPLEMENTATION OF CHAD/SUDAN PEACE ACCORD

Tags:  PREL PBTS CD SU SG GB CF ER LY 
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DE RUEHDK #0830/01 1981929
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161929Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0824
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0359
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1131
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0404
						C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000830 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W, AF/C, AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS CD SU SG GB CF ER LY
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF CHAD/SUDAN PEACE ACCORD

Classified By: Political Counselor David G. Mosby



1. (C) Summary: The fourth meeting of the Contact group for
the implementation of the Dakar Accord between Chad and Sudan
is scheduled to take place on June 17. The meeting follows
the June 23-27 meeting military experts group, detailed
below. The military experts adopted a basic draft operation
plan for the establishment of a multinational Peace and
Security Force consisting of an observation and monitoring
force made of officers from the African Contact Group member
countries and a mixed protection comprised of 1,000 Sudanese
and 1,000 Chadian troops. The Peace and Security Force is to
man 10 observation posts along the border between Chad and
Sudan to monitor the movements of rebel groups close to the
border on both sides. The force,s staff headquarters is to
be in Tripoli under the command of a Libyan colonel. It is
unclear if the Contact Group is now intending to adopt or
approve the work of the military experts. End summary.



2. (U) On July 17, the fourth meeting of the Contact Group
for the implementation of the Dakar Accord between Chad and
Sudan is scheduled to take place. The accord, signed during
the March Summit of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) under the auspices of Senegalese President
Adoulaye Wade, calls for the establishment of an observation
force to monitor the border between Chad and Sudan. The
Contact Group which is made up of Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon,
Eritrea, Libya, and Senegal, as well as the OIC, is charged
with developing a plan for implementing accord. The United
States, France, and the United Kingdom, along with the
European Union (EU), the United Nations, the African Union
(AU), and the African regional organizations the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of
Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), and the Central African
Economic Community (CEAC) have all been requested to
participate in the meeting as observers. The USG will be
represented by Political Counselor.

The Draft Military Operations Plan


--------------------------





3. (SBU) This meeting of the Contact Group follows the June
23-27 meeting of Contact Group,s working group of military
experts. At that meeting, which was chaired by Libyan
Colonel Muftah Mohamed and co-chaired by Congolese General
Jean Marie Michel Mokoko and Senegalese General Antou Pierre
Ndiaye, the military experts discussed and agreed to a basic
military operations plan for implementing the Dakar Accord.
The plan calls for the establishment of a multinational peace
and security force (PSF). The PSF will have two elements: 1)
an observation and monitoring force consisting of military
representatives of each of the country members of the Contact
Group, including Chad and Sudan; and 2) a &mixed8 or
bi-national protection force consisting of 1,000 Sudanese and
1,000 Chadian soldiers to ensure the security of the
observation force.



4. (SBU) The plan calls for the PSF to be commanded by a
Libyan colonel and the staff headquarters to be in Tripoli.
The Libyan colonel is to be supported by a Congolese deputy,
a Senegalese intelligence officer, Gabonese administrative
and logistics officers, an Eritrean liaison officer, as well
as liaison officers from Sudan and Chad. The observation
force will be based in 10 observation posts along the border
between Chad and Sudan ) five on each side. Two of the
observation posts are to serve as secondary command posts )
one on each side. El-Genina in Sudan and Abeche in Chad have
been designated for this role. Each Contact Group member
country has agreed to provide two officers for the secondary
command posts and one for each of the rest.



5. (SBU) The mixed protection force will operate out of the
same observation posts. Two hundred soldiers will be
assigned to each observation post -- 100 from Sudan and 100
from Chad -- so that each country will have five hundred of
its own troops operating on the other side of the border.
However, the mixed protection force will not be under the
command of the observation force. Both will be under the
command and control of the staff headquarters in Tripoli,
which will report to a representative of the Contact Group.



6. (SBU) The military experts calculated that it will cost
$30 million to implement the plan the first year. Sudan and
Chad are to provide their own soldiers and cover their costs
for the mixed protection force. However, the Contact Group

DAKAR 00000830 002 OF 003


hopes to have the international community pay for the
multinational observer force.

Sudan Drags its Feet


--------------------------





7. (C) The military experts meetings got off to an
inauspicious beginning. The Sudanese did not show the first
day and although they had successfully arrived later that day
they chose to be late to morning the following morning. From
the beginning, the Sudanese head of delegation, General
Ibrahim Izzelduin, questioned the basic mission of peace and
security force, although the military experts had been tasked
by Foreign Affairs Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio in the name
of the Contact Group to come up with a technical plan to
implement what had already been agreed to politically. The
Sudanese seemed to be proposing to reopen issues that the
other delegates thought had been decided.

Conflict Between Mediators


--------------------------





8. (C) Also from the beginning it was clear that there was
tension between the Libyan chair and his Senegalese and
Congolese co-chairs, such that the Congolese General Mokoko
left the meeting at one point in a fit of pique and did not
return until the following day. While each country was asked
to make a contribution to the task, it was Congo that
produced the most thorough and detailed proposal for a draft
operations plan. One which essentially mirrored Chad,s less
comprehensive proposal. However, for much of the meeting the
Libyan chair and delegation actively worked against Congo,s
proposal serving as the template for the groups work because
of Libya,s desire to have the conclusions of the process
verbal of the Tripoli meeting of the Contact Group adopted in
this military experts meeting because they had not been
adopted in Tripoli due to Sudan,s absence from the meeting.



9. (C) Finally, delegates from Senegal and others were able
to convince the Libyan chair that the conclusions from the
Tripoli meeting could be noted and adopted in the process
verbal the military experts meeting and the Congolese plan
could serve as the template for the draft operational plan.
However, once they agreed to that basic formula Libya and
Sudan worked in concert to remove all mention of the United
Nations or the wider international community from the
document. Whereas the Congolese draft specifically described
the PSF,s mission as an Article VI peacekeeping mission, the
final draft adopted by the contact group did not. Moreover,
the role of the AU vis--vis the force is unclear because
Sudan and Libya successfully manage to reduce the status of
the AU representative to that of a mere observer.



11. (C) General Ndiaye and Colonel Barthelemy of Senegal
both expressed frustration to Political Counselor regarding
the maneuverings of Libya and Sudan. They described Libya,
acting on Sudan,s behalf, as determined to control
everything and to eliminate the possibility of any UN
participation or even official designation as an AU mission.
At one point Sudan even objected to the use of the word
&peace8 in the name of the force arguing that it is a
&UN8 term. Ostensibly, this is because Sudan is afraid
that the force will evolve from being an African one to being
a hybrid one as in the case of UNAMID. Senegal is adamant
that their must be international participation in the mission
if it is to succeed.

Comment


--------------------------





12. (C) It is unclear what was agreed to in the end.
Although a process verbal was adopted and signed by the
members of the contact group along with a draft military
operations plan as an annex, there was no time for the
Contact Group to discuss the annex in detail in plenary.
Moreover, after having signed the process verbal, the
Sudanese head of delegation proceeded to take issue with
passages of the draft operational plan in spite of the fact
that his subordinates had worked on the plan with the other
members of the contact group in break out sessions.
Bizarrely, the Libyan chair suggested that the offending
passages could simply be removed although the document had
already been adopted. The Senegalese co-chair, General
Ndiaye, objected on procedural grounds and pointed out that
the entire contact group needed to discuss the matter. At

DAKAR 00000830 003 OF 003


which point there was no more time left, and the meeting was
adjourned.



13. The French representative, Colonel Charles de Kersabiec,
defense attach in Dakar, and the British by their
non-resident ambassador to Chad based in Yaound, Syd
Maddicott, as well as the representatives from the EU all
expressed dismay at how the meeting was conducted as well as
their lack of confidence in the outcome. Colonel de
Kersabiec took issue with the lack professionalism and
quality of the draft operation planning noting that the draft
plan fails to delineate the specific area of operations or
specify the obligations of the mixed protection force
vis--vis the observation force (e.g., If the observation
force is under attack how much time is an acceptable amount
of time for the protection to respond). Moreover, at times
it appeared that the antagonists might have more easily come
to an agreement without the presence of the warring chair and
co-chairs. Finally, none of the African participants
expressed much confidence that the PSF would be deployed any
time soon. A Congolese colonel told Political Counselor,
&If this happens within a year, you can cut of my head.8
SMITH