Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DAKAR732
2008-06-20 12:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

BUDGET MINISTER TRIES TO REASSURE CHARGE ON GOS'

Tags:  EFIN EINV KCOR PGOV PREL EAID SG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201235Z JUN 08 ZDK DUE NUMEROUS SVCS
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0704
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0056
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0398
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 000732 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/RSA, AF/EPS, AF/W, EB/IFD/ODF
TREASURY FOR RHALL, DPETERS
ABU DHABI FOR OTA GRIFFERTY
STATE PLEASE PASS MCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2028
TAGS: EFIN EINV KCOR PGOV PREL EAID SG
SUBJECT: BUDGET MINISTER TRIES TO REASSURE CHARGE ON GOS'
SALE PLANS FOR SONATEL SHARES

REF: DAKAR 588

DAKAR 00000732 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. JAY T. SMITH, FOR REASON 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 000732

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/RSA, AF/EPS, AF/W, EB/IFD/ODF
TREASURY FOR RHALL, DPETERS
ABU DHABI FOR OTA GRIFFERTY
STATE PLEASE PASS MCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2028
TAGS: EFIN EINV KCOR PGOV PREL EAID SG
SUBJECT: BUDGET MINISTER TRIES TO REASSURE CHARGE ON GOS'
SALE PLANS FOR SONATEL SHARES

REF: DAKAR 588

DAKAR 00000732 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. JAY T. SMITH, FOR REASON 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (S) Senegal's Budget Minister Sarr attempted to reassure
Charge that the government's proposal to sell its large stake
in Sonatel is being carefully studied with an eye to
preserving the national interest. The impression he gave,
however, was that the Presidency is determined to sell, and
likely as a non-transparent private/strategic offering. Sarr
indicated that the government would likely use the windfall
for investment projects in the hopes of promoting economic
growth and recovering the 12 percent of lost revenue in the
mid-term. He outlined an agreement with Rothschilds Bank,
negotiated by the Presidency, that appears to give every
incentive for the study to conclude that a private deal is
thebest option. We are hoping the IMF Resrep will beable
to review this document because a Ministry f Finance contact
believes it includes provision for a pre-arranged and
corrupt recommendation.

GOS WILL LIKELY SELL
--------------

2. (C) Charge, accompanied by Econ Counselor, met wit
Deputy Finance Minister in Charge of the BudgetIbrahima Sarr
on June 4 to discuss our concerns about the government of
Senegal's (GOS) reported plans to sell its 28 percent stake
in the country's top telecommunications company, Sonatel.
(Note: Sarr is reportedly one of the key players in
organizing the government's efforts on the share sale. End
note.) Sarr tried to be reassuring in outlining what he said
was the government's line of thinking in considering the
divestment of this important asset. He explained that one
consideration was the possibility that Sonatel's share price
would soon drop, particularly if the company was not
effective in expanding its business in the sub-region while

also facing new competition from the entry of Sudatel into
the local market in the coming year.


3. (C) Minister Sarr asserted that the sale will only make
sense if the proceeds (up to USD 1 billion if all shares are
sold) go to projects that will enhance economic growth in the
mid- to long-term. Sarr did not offer any specific examples
of investment projects, nor did he discuss the possibility of
using that income for different investment instruments. He
did, however, make the disconcerting point that he could cut
programs in the budget to make up for the forgone near-term
income. (Note: This could equal up to 12 percent of annual
revenue at a time when the government is struggling with a
large budget deficit and remains dependent on donor budget
support to close the gap. End note.) Sarr admitted that the
government must reassure both Sonatel's employees (who have
publicly stated their opposition) and the company's majority
owner, France Telecom (which has apparently expressed its own
concerns privately).


4. (C) Charge made the point that there are many examples
from around the globe of countries being surprised by
unexpected difficulties, including "leakage," in investing
large windfalls in a manner that can be assured of increasing
growth and enhancing government revenues. Sarr acknowledged
the point and said that is why they are studying their
options. In the end, however, we had the strong impression
that the Wade administration had already made up its mind to
sell at least a large portion of its Sonatel shares. Sarr
himself underscored this assessment by noting that the issue
was being pushed by the Presidency.

PRIVATE CONTRACT ALREADY SIGNED?
--------------

5. (C) Sarr confirmed that a non-competitive contract for
two million Euros had been negotiated and approved by the

DAKAR 00000732 002.4 OF 002


Presidency for Rothschild's bank to conduct a feasibility
study on the fiscal impacts of the proposed sale and on the
best way to proceed -- whether a private or public offering.
(Note: last week the IMF Resrep told EconCouns that he met
with Sarr and was told that the contract was in fact signed
for USD 5 million. End note.) In an unusual clarification,
Sarr stated that the contract paid only one million Euros up
front and the other million only if the study recommended
selling the shares. Sarr stated that a decision on the sale
could happen within six months.


6. (S) Sarr's outline of the contract process more or less
conforms to what we have been told. However, as noted in
Reftel, the contract is being very closely held. When asked
if the contract was, in fact limited to the feasibility
study, a senior official at the Ministry of Finance, who has
seen the document, said yes and no. According to our
contact, the contract is nominally for the study, but it
contains a clause granting Rothschilds Bank the right to act
as the strategic advisor (with the previously mentioned 1.5
percent commission) should the study conclude that a
private/strategic sale is the best course of action. Our MOF
contact also claims that a clause in the contract permits
Rothschilds the right to select the buyers. The bank,
apparently, has everything to gain by promoting a private
sale.


7. (C) Sarr admitted that the IMF Resrep had not actually
seen the contract, but he offered to share it if asked.

COMMENT
--------------

8. (C) There is still no clarity on this matter. Most of
our contacts feel that the sale will happen, with many
believing that the deal with Rothschild is fait accompli,
including the sale of shares to select parties. Even giving
the GOS all the benefit of doubt, we have serious concerns
that this administration is not prepared to wisely invest any
significant windfall, and that the funds would quite possibly
go to more of President Wade's "prestige projects." We will
encourage the IMF Resrep to follow-up on the offer to review
the approved contract. In addition, we hope the Minister of
Finance, who reportedly advised against the sale and was
outside the process that established the agreement with
Rothschilds, will be able to underscore to President Wade the
importance of transparency and objectivity in such an
important matter.
SMITH