GUINEA BISSAU:THE USG SHOULD RE-OPEN EMBASSY BISSAU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000416

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA, OBO, DS
ACCRA FOR USAID/WA
PARIS FOR POL D'ELIA AND DEA HOUSTON
LAGOS FOR DEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: AMGT ABLD PGOV PREL PU
SUBJECT: GUINEA BISSAU:THE USG SHOULD RE-OPEN EMBASSY BISSAU

Classified By: Charge Jay T. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
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1. This is an action request. See para 14.


2. (C) Summary. Prospects for achieving USG goals in
Guinea-Bissau are problematic at best as long as the embassy
in Bissau remains shuttered. Weak security, porous borders,
poor governance, fragile democracy, and unchecked narcotics
trafficking make the country a potential flashpoint for
regional de-stabilization. The Government of Guinea-Bissau
(GOGB) has repeatedly and emphatically requested the return
of U.S. leadership to help them confront their problems.
With years of relative stability after the 1998-9 civil war
behind them and the specter of becoming a thoroughly corrupt
narco-state ahead of them, now is the time for the United
States to reengage and reopen the embassy. End Summary.

USG NEEDS AN EMBASSY IN BISSAU
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3. (SBU) In the FY 2010 MSP for Guinea-Bissau, the first ever
done for that country, Post's plans to work toward goals of
achieving peace and security, governing justly and
democratically, and promoting economic growth and prosperity
are all dependant upon achieving the highest priority goal:
reopening the embassy. The first step proposed is moving the
Guinea-Bissau Watcher position from Embassy Dakar to Bissau.
Without permanent, on-the-ground presence, post is
significantly limited in its abilities to achieve the goals
in the MSP. For example, EUCOM and INL have expressed plans
to contribute to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
sponsored project in 2010 and both will require Post support
in monitoring and managing contributions. The participation
of both agencies is sorely needed, but Post may be unable to
provide the necessary level of support from Dakar.

POTENTIAL FAILED STATE THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY
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4. (C) Several factors come together in Guinea-Bissau to give
it the potential to cause a disproportionately grave threat
to stability and peace in West Africa relative to its size
and population: a weak government that only rules with the
permission of the armed forces; territory used periodically
by separatist rebels from Senegal's Casamance region; poorly
guarded munitions stocks which occasionally get pilfered;
small arms and light weapons trafficking; a large yet unknown
number of men under arms, including those who fought in the
war for independence and have never been properly demobilized
or surrendered their weapons; and the presence of al
Qaida-trained terrorists and Hezbollah financiers. President
Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira enjoys a close relationship with
President Conte of Guinea and owns a house in Conakry,
linking his fortunes closely with the neighboring country.
Drug trafficking operations reportedly move fluidly between
Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry depending on the level of
vigilance at any given time.


5. (U) The weak economy is based almost exclusively on a
single crop (cashews) and the irregularities in government
policies and world markets result in almost annual food
shortages. There is infrequent access to basic services such
as water and electricity. The GOGB would not be able to pay
civil service or military salaries without foreign donations.
The justice system does not function. Police and public
security forces cannot even afford fuel for the few vehicles
that they have and there is no prison to house any criminals
that they manage to capture and convict. Hospitals are
scantily staffed by foreign doctors and are short of all
basic medicines, technologies, and electricity. Schools are
closed almost as much as they are open because teachers
rarely receive salaries. High infant mortality, malaria,
HIV/AIDS, malnutrition, and trafficking in children for
forced begging plague the countryside. The UN Human
Development Index places Guinea-Bissau just three spots from
the bottom of 177 countries.
GROWING ROLE AS HUB FOR NARCO-TRAFFICKING

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6. (U) All these problems alone are daunting enough, but in
Guinea-Bissau they are merely backdrop for the entrenched
cocaine trafficking and associated corruption that has seized
the country. The massive influx of narco-dollars on one side
and international community concern and donations on the
other are significantly raising the profile of drug
operations that stayed below the radar screen for many years.
Tensions are rising, people are getting killed, and urban
youths are becoming addicted to crack.


7. (C) Guinea-Bissau has an absorption capacity problem and
may quickly become inundated with international support.
Already, donors are concerned about coordination and
implementation of assistance from the UN Peacebuilding
Commission, EU Security Sector Reform, and UNODC
counter-narcotics program, which are starting to filter in
the same time as IMF post-conflict assistance and World Bank
infrastructure projects are getting started. The few members
of the GOGB that are still fighting drug trafficking,
including the Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs, Justice,
and Defense ministers, tell us what they need more than U.S.
financial aid is our presence. They say a U.S. Embassy in
Bissau will send a message of confidence and stability. What
they imply but will not say outright is that without a
permanent U.S. presence and demonstration of strong support,
Guinea-Bissau will never be able to confront the most
dangerous of those corrupted by drug trafficking, the chiefs
and deputies of the GB armed forces. While there are still
elected officials with whom we can work, legislative
elections scheduled for late 2008 could usher in a government
whose campaigns have been fully financed by drug money.

PROVIDING A DEMOCRATIC COUNTERBALANCE TO CHINA AND CUBA
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8. (C) The United States is virtually the only great power
that does not have an embassy in Guinea-Bissau. In addition
to the former colonial power, Portugal and regional neighbors
Senegal and The Gambia, China, Russia, and France, as well as
the European Commission, Brazil, Cuba, Nigeria, and Libya all
have embassies in Bissau. Spain and Angola both opened
embassies last year. Among these missions, little is being
done to help politicians, political parties, and civil
society understand the democratic process. Politics in
Guinea-Bissau is governed almost solely by petty personal
interests.


9. (C) China is one of the most active bilateral donors. It
built the National Assembly, military staff and officer
housing and has promised to build a government palace and a
major hydro-electric dam with imported prison labor. China's
influence has grown significantly in the past two years as
these projects materialize. President Vieira visited Beijing
in 2007 and China's Foreign Minister visited Bissau later the
same year. In Guinea-Bissau, as other places, China does not
require good governance or adherence to human rights norms as
a condition of its assistance. Beijing only seeks access to
the rich fishing waters, which it and others have heavily
overfished, and Guinea-Bissau's support on its Taiwan policy.


10. (C) Cuba has historically close ties to Guinea-Bissau and
many elites have studied there, including the Prime Minister.
Cuba is active diplomatically and holds occasional anti-U.S.
rallies to highlight specific policy grievances. It also
supports health and development initiatives, including
dispatching doctors throughout the country.

OIL AND RADICAL ISLAM ON THE HORIZON
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11. (U) Companies from several countries continue to search
for commercially viable petroleum offshore and U.S. firm
Occidental Petroleum is among them. If and when deposits are
found, the USG will want a presence on the ground to support
the increase in American visitors and have input as to how
the government manages the windfall.


12. (C) Also looming is a changing demographic shift toward a

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more radical form of Islam. Today, the country of about 1.5
million is roughly a third Muslim, but countries like Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait are pumping money into communities and
tilting the balance. Contacts say they see more strict
observance of Muslim customs, hear more radical messages on
the radio, and see more Koranic schools and madrassas going
up. The United States has a positive image in Guinea-Bissau
and Post has made some efforts to reach out to the Muslim
community in particular but without a permanent presence it
is difficult to cultivate relationships in those communities.


COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
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13. (C) Establishing a permanent U.S. presence in
Guinea-Bissau would provide unparalleled opportunities for
project management, engaging locals on discussions of U.S.
policies, promotion of human rights, and U.S.-style
democracy. It would allow Post to provide clearer and more
frequent reporting about politics, security, and regional
concerns. However, moving the Guinea-Bissau Watcher position
to Bissau should only be the fist step toward re-opening the
embassy. With full diplomatic and consular services restored
the United States would enjoy the benefits of a grateful
government: easy access to top leadership and openness to
working toward and supporting U.S. goals on any number of
issues.


14. (C) Action Request: Post requests a detailed timeline and
budget for moving the Guinea-Bissau Watcher position to
Bissau and re-opening the embassy. Post has received
commitments from OBO and DS to re-open the embassy in Bissau
and Post has communicated that intention to the GOGB but with
no specific timeline. In preparation for the move, Post has
opened an office in mixed commercial space and is in the
process of hiring a second FSN to handle administrative
issues.

Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.
SMITH