GUINEA-BISSAU ENTERING PERIOD OF VOLATILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 001416

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, INL
EUCOM PASS TO AFRICOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PU SNAR
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU ENTERING PERIOD OF VOLATILITY
FOLLOWING ATTACK ON PRESIDENT VIEIRA

REF: DAKAR 1365

Classified By: Ambassador Marcia Bernicat for reasons 1.5 B/D.

Summary and Introduction
--------------


1. (C) Summary: Many aspects of the November 23 attack on
Guinea-Bissau's President, Joao Bernardo Vieira, remain
unclear. According to the official account, the President
narrowly escaped an attempted assassination as a prelude to a
coup d'etat, which he survived due to the intervention of
loyal elements in the armed forces. However, this is not
exactly the version of events subscribed to by various senior
political figures and observers during the Political
Counselor's November 24-26 visit to Bissau.


2. (C) The capital is rife with rumors that the event was
staged by President Vieira or by Vieira in concert with the
chief of staff or that, at a minimum, the president knew the
attack was imminent and was not at home, as he claims
officially. It is clear, however, that the country's fragile
democracy is at risk from a combination of the jockeying for
power between the current president, former President Kumba
Yala, the Army Chief of Staff General Tagme Na Wai, former
Prime Minister Carlos Gomes, Jr., the slowly growing ethnic
tension between the Balanta military elite and the rest of
the country's largely non-Balanta ruling class, and the
malevolent influence of drug traffickers.


3. (C) As of December 5, the investigation into the attack
was ongoing. The suspected leader of the insurgents, navy
sergeant Alexandre Tchama Yala, according to press reports
was captured in Dakar on December 3. Against this backdrop,
the country waits to see if the president will nominate his
personal enemy, Gomes, as prime minister after Gomes's
party's resounding victory in the November 16 legislative
elections. End Summary.

Something Does Not Add Up
--------------


4. (SBU) One day after the attack on President Vieira's
house, Bissau was uncannily calm. There was no heightened
security evident in the city. There were no more police or
military personnel in the streets than usual and the street
of the President's house, while off-limits to car traffic,
was not off-limits to pedestrian traffic. A meeting of the
Council of Ministers was held without any extra security,
according to the UN Secretary General's Representative (RSG,)
Shola Omoregie.


5. (SBU) As reported reftel, on the night of the assault on
the President's house, General Na Wai could not be reached
because he was allegedly ill. However, Political Counselor
saw General Na Wai on the balcony of his Staff Headquarters
just before he drove off, after having canceled a scheduled
meeting with the Political Counselor at the last minute. The
General appeared to be healthy.


6. (C) According to the RSG, Attorney General Luis Manuel
Cabral, the Portuguese First Secretary and Colonel M. Camara,
military adviser to the Minister of Defense, there was a
noticeable and significant delay before troops were sent to
the aide of President Vieira. In fact, the RSG reported that
the Portuguese Ambassador was moved to contact the Minister
of Interior to urge that the Public Order Police (POP) be
sent to aide the president.


7. (C) When asked about the inexplicable delay in sending
troops to reinforce Vieira's guard force during the assault
on his residence, General Na Wai told the RSG, "If the
military had been involved in the attack on the President, it
would have been successful," but refused or was unable to
explain how or why it took more than an hour, perhaps as long
as two, for military forces to be sent to the president's
aid.

Vieira Was Not Home
--------------


8. (C) President Vieira officially claims to have been home

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9. (C) Cabral told Political Counselor that General Na Wai
was not being cooperative in the investigation into the
events of November 23. He said that Na Wai refused to hand
over the suspects in military custody, in spite of the
Minister of Justice and Cabral's insistence that this crime
is covered under civilian criminal law. According to Cabral,
a source he trusts informed him that while Na Wai claimed to
have only five prisoners, in reality he was holding 18 men in
custody. (Note: According to the Bissau-Guinean Ambassador
to Senegal, seven suspects had been turned over to the police
as of December 8. End note.)

A Commission Established to Oversee Investigation
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Prime Minister Carlos Correira has established a
commission chaired by him and consisting of the Ministers of
Justice, Defense, Public Administration, Finance, Interior,
and the Attorney General to oversee the investigation into
the attack. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General
both opposed the creation of the commission. Minister of
Justice Pires said it was unnecessary, insisting that the law
was clear that the assassination attempt was a "common crime"
to be investigated and prosecuted by civilian law enforcement
and attorneys. Both she and Attorney General Cabral
described the commission as a form of foot dragging -- or
obstruction, noting wryly that previous commissions of this
nature never came to any conclusions when investigating
earlier alleged political assassinations.

Non-Balanta Leaders Blame the Balanta for Attack
-------------- ---


11. (C) Several non-Balanta officials -- including Minister
of Justice Carmelita Pires, who is descended from Cape Verde
parentage, Attorney General Cabral (who is of the Pepel
ethnic group) and the Minister of Defense Marciano Silva
Pereira Barbeiro (who is Majaco) -- placed the blame for
these events squarely at the feet of the Balanta military
elite. In separate meetings with Political Counselor,
Attorney General Cabral and Minister Pires were particularly
emphatic about this point, Stressing that "one ethnic group"
is responsible for the situation. Cabral went on to say that
Balanta military officers "only respect the United States,"
urging that the USG put pressure on the military.


12. (C) MOD Adviser Colonel Camara told Political Counselor
that the instability facing Guinea-Bissau was largely a
result of the fear of the Balanta military elite vis--vis
security sector reform. Camara, who fought in the
independence war at the age of 16 and subsequently was
educated in Lisbon and the Soviet Union, said, "I have
colleagues who are colonels and who are illiterate. They
don't trust security sector reform because there is nothing
they can do outside of the military." He said that the
Balanta did not have much power in Bissau before the
Balanta-ization of the armed forces by former President Yala
and were fearful of losing the power their dominance of the
armed forces gives them. Camara went on to say that he was
not completely trusted by his Balanta colleagues because,
while his mother is Balanta, his father is Mandinke. (Note:
According to LES staff, he is also known as a President
Vieira loyalist. End note.)

Former President Yala Contests Election Results
--------------


13. (C) Former President Yala's party, the Party for Social

DAKAR 00001416 003 OF 004


Renewal (PRS),has protested against what they regard as the
disrespectful and abusive treatment of their leader. On
November 21 more than two dozen police officers were
dispatched to issue a court summons to Yala who was in the
stronghold of his party and his ethnic group, Bissora, for
alleged slander of the president. (FYI - During the recent
legislative campaign, Yala accused Vieira of being the
"biggest drug trafficker in Guinea-Bissau." End FYI) There
are reports that Yala's passport was taken from him in
advance of President Vieira bringing slander charges against
him in court. PRS's First Vice President told Political
Counselor that this treatment was completely unacceptable.


14. (C) During a November 24 meeting of the diplomatic corps
with the Foreign Minister, several ambassadors opined that
the issuance of a summons at this time was reckless,
according to RSG Omoregie, and might have been provoked the
attack. At a minimum, the timing of the issuance of the
summons is considered suspect because it was done on the day
the provisional election results were announced --results
that were a crushing defeat for both Vieira and Yala -- and
likely done to distract from the resounding PIAGC victory.
As of December 8, PRS's complaint was being reviewed by the
National Election Commission (CNE).

Drug Trafficking a Likely Element in the Attack
-------------- ---


15. (C) According to the Minister of Justice and Attorney
General, the August abortive coup attempt and the November 23
attack are directly linked to the July seizure of a plane
suspected of being used to transport cocaine. While the
pilot and crew were released by a judge in spite of efforts
by the Minister Justice and Attorney General to have the
pilot expelled and placed into Mexican custody (where he is
wanted on trafficking charges),both said their investigation
of that incident was ongoing. According to them, fear of
what their investigation might uncover was the motive for the
attack, which they blamed on former President Yala and
fugitive Navy Chief-of-Staff Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto who is
allegedly under house arrest in the Gambia. However,
according to UN Political Officer Rasul, Admiral Na Tchuto is
"Vieira's man and the two are in regular contact by phone.
Bubo calls Nino (Vieira) and Nino calls Bubo."

Comment: This Isn't Over
--------------


16. (C) Comment: Guinea-Bissau is entering yet another
precarious period in its fragile democracy. If President
Vieira dramatized the events of the failed attempt on his
life to enhance his political stature in advance of forming
a new government, the tactic has been arguably )- if
temporarily -- successful: almost all political leaders in
the country and the international community have expressed
support for him as the duly elected president. However, this
does not obscure the fact that he has suffered a devastating
blow as a result of the PAIGC victory in the legislative
elections. By all accounts, Vieira had hoped his party, the
Republican Party for Independence Development (PRID),and PRS
would win at least enough support to prevent PAIGC from
winning an absolute majority (67 out 100 National Assembly
seats).


17. (C) The two-thirds majority would give a PAIGC prime
minister complete legislative power and, as PAIGC President,
Carlos Gomes, Jr. expects to be named prime minister. He
spoke out during the campaign against the notion of a
"presidential system," and observers believe he is likely to
try to reduce the role and constitutional powers of the
president. Vieira does not want to be reduced to being a
figurehead chief of state. Adding to the tension, the two
men are widely regarded as protagonists stemming from a land
dispute. Some therefore believe that Vieira might name
another PAIGC leader prime minister instead of Gomes . He is
not constitutionally obligated to choose the majority
party,s leader; he is only obliged "to take into account the
election results and views of the National Assembly." (FYI -
By tradition, the majority party or coalition provides the
president with three names from which he chooses. PAIGC,
however, is balking at the idea of providing the president
any name other than that of Gomes. End FYI)

DAKAR 00001416 004 OF 004



General Na Wai,s Role Potentially Troubling
--------------


18. (C) Chief of Staff Na Wai's role in the attack is
suspect. While it does not appear he had a hand in planning
the attack, his slow response suggests that, while he might
not have had an interest in assassinating the president, he
might not have been averse to someone else doing so.
Otherwise, a renegade group of soldiers able to mount a
credible attack exposed the limits of Na Wai's control over
his own forces, which, if true, is equally disturbing. The
proposed reform of the security sector and increased
international effort to tackle Guinea Bissau's drug problem
are placing enormous pressure on the people Na Wai cares most
about - his fellow Balanta soldiers. Nor would a reformed
military have a place for an illiterate chief of staff.

19. (C) In the interim, counter-narcotics efforts will
diminish the drug money he uses to maintain a hold on the
military, and could even put him in danger of being charged
with a crime at some point. In the short term, Na Wai's
position has likely been solidified because he has secured
President Vieira,s position. Vieira cannot dismiss Na Wai
(presuming Na Wai would accept to go, which by all accounts
he would not) without dividing military and engendering its
distrust. The attack suggests there are elements that will
do anything they can to derail security sector reform and
thwart counter-narcotics efforts, and have, however
inadvertently, demonstrated Yala's continued influence as
unofficial leader of the Balanta people.

Comment: Gomes Not Safe
--------------


20. (C) Gomes is the political figure most at risk at this
time. As a former businessman, he is the only key player
with no support in the military. He is considered a
proponent of security sector reform and counter-narcotics and
is a foe of Vieira, Yala, and Na Wai. RSG Omoregie has urged
Gomes to get good security and told Political Counselor the
international community should train some form of protective
force for him should he be appointed as prime minister.
BERNICAT
BERNICAT