Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08COTONOU420
2008-07-15 19:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cotonou
Cable title:  

BENIN: POLITICAL STATE OF THE NATION - NATIONAL

Tags:  PGOV SOCI EFIN PINR KDEM BN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY COTONOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0434
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0359
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1288
RUEHLMC/MILLENIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COTONOU 000420 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/W
MCC FOR JBLOOM
PARIS FOR BKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
NSC FOR BPITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV SOCI EFIN PINR KDEM BN
SUBJECT: BENIN: POLITICAL STATE OF THE NATION - NATIONAL
MEDIATOR'S VIEW

REF: A. COTONOU 417

B. COTONOU 408

C. COTONOU 348

D. COTONOU 201

COTONOU 00000420 001.4 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Gayleatha Brown. Reasons: 1.4 (b&d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COTONOU 000420

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/W
MCC FOR JBLOOM
PARIS FOR BKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
NSC FOR BPITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV SOCI EFIN PINR KDEM BN
SUBJECT: BENIN: POLITICAL STATE OF THE NATION - NATIONAL
MEDIATOR'S VIEW

REF: A. COTONOU 417

B. COTONOU 408

C. COTONOU 348

D. COTONOU 201

COTONOU 00000420 001.4 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Gayleatha Brown. Reasons: 1.4 (b&d).


1. (C) Summary: The uncertain legitimacy and role of
Benin's Presidential Mediation Entity (OPM) headed by
National Mediator, Albert Tevoedjre, is indicative of the
political quagmire that engulfs the administration of
reform-minded President Boni Yayi. The latter is beset on
one hand by the intrigues primarily of opposition party
members in the National Assembly that block action on
Government of Benin (GOB) proposed legislation, including
that to create the National Mediator position, and on the
other by rising fuel and food prices to his electoral
base. At the President's request, Tevoedjre has presented
a series of analyses and recommendations since late 2007 on
the country's socio-political situation, proposing bold
actions several of which Yayi has accepted. Tevoedjre
shared with the Ambassador his views on the best way
forward. End summary.


2. (C) Background: The National Mediator's role is akin
to an Ombudsman in the US system. It was initially created
as an independent body that the Constitutional Court ruled
illegal and unconstitutional (Ref A). In reply, the GOB
issued another decree establishing the position in the
Presidency. However, this requires National Assembly
endorsement, something that Yayi's opponents - joined by
Deputies associated with the President's FCBE party - have
successfully blocked. National Mediator Albert Tevoedjre
is an elder statesman. He seemed an ideal choice for the
new position and has worked tirelessly to mediate the
political sparring between Yayi and opposition party
leaders that has imperiled pro-Yayi National Assembly
President Nago's tenure. Both Teveodjre and Nago expected
FCBE to renegotiate a majority in the parliament shortly.
That majority has not yet materialized, and the deadlock

continues. End background.


3. (C) Mr. Albert Tevoedjre understood in a July 8 meeting
the Ambassador's rationale for postponing signing of an
agreement of understanding between the National Mediator's
office and MCA-Benin pending clarity of the National
Mediator position's role and constitutionality. He
explained that a second GOB decree addressed the
Constitutional Court's objections and awaited National
Assembly action.

//GENESIS OF POLITICAL STALEMATE//


4. (C) Tevoedjre reported to President Yayi that since the
March 12, 2008 declaration by four opposition parties
(MADEP, PSD, PRD, and RB) (Ref D),political tensions were
at levels unprecedented since Yayi's assumption of power in
March 2006 (with no end in sight). He urgently initiated
dialogue with the "principal protagonists of this
situation" and members of NGOs and civil society to solicit
their views on the roots of the "malaise" and to find
solutions. Over a period of two weeks, Tevoedjre consulted
with Idji Kolawole (MADEP),former president Nicephore
Soglo (RB),Emmanuel Golou (PSD),Lazare Sehoueto (Force
Cle),Issa Salifou (G-13) and Sports Minister Galiou Soglo
(estranged son of Soglo). He also met with FCBE members
Deputy Mama Chabi Sika and National Assembly President
Mathurin Nago, former president Derlin Zinsou and Stanislas
Kpognon. A scheduled meeting with MADEP leader Sefou
Fagbohoun fell through.


5. (C) Tevoedjre called attention to the March 12
declaration's five major points of contention with Yayi:

- non-respect of a March 2006 agreement with various
parties between the two presidential electoral rounds.
Soglo, Kolawole, Golou and Sehoueto contend that Yayi's
election victory was in large part due to their support

- media use only to promote the "High authority" (read
Yayi)

- targeting of certain political figures, notably Sefou

COTONOU 00000420 002.4 OF 004


Fagbohoun, who had remained in jail for a long time with no
action on the case

- encroachment on political "zones" widely understood to
be the preserves of the Group of 13 Deputies in the
National Assembly (G-13),(i.e., Parakou (Salifou) and
Cotonou (Soglo)),and

- blocking local municipality control over finances and
attempting to discredit local councils in the eyes of the
electorate.

//TREVOEDJRE'S OBSERVATIONS//


6. (C) One of Tevoedjre's reports noted the people's
aversion to anything that runs counter to the spirit of the
(1990) National Conference (that switched government from
Marxist-Leninism to democracy) and cited the following
observations:

- Yayi's reforms are necessary for the country's future as
evidenced by progress in several sectors and for which the
people are most grateful. These include: education,
health, clean-up of public finance, extending new
infrastructure such as roads and schools to all parts of
the country, and micro-finance on soft terms.

- Soglo's international radio broadcast on RFI and other
related broadcasts in Africa damaged the country's
reputation as a democracy, one of Benin's principal assets,
precipitating requests for explanation from GOB embassies
in western countries. He urged the President to stop
fighting with Soglo.

- Yayi's public image could be better handled with less
attention on his person and more on productive action.
Presidential engagement with the media should be
responsible, based on analysis and critical intelligence,
fortified with examples and viable statistics.

- Refrain from references to the "old political class,"
which tends to set up conflict between two generation of
political leaders (citing Konrad Adenauer and Charles de
Gaulle who at advanced ages made substantial contributions
in their countries).

- Even if the population supports Yayi reforms, it does
not understand the tone and style of the implementation of
certain decisions. Confrontational practices only generate
tension.

//RECOMMENDATIONS TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS//


7. (C) Tevoedjre made the following recommendations:

- Undertake dialogue with the political opponents,
especially Soglo.

- Open management of some parliamentary business to
principal "personalities" regardless of their parties
(i.e., reports, investigations, studies).

- Seek the support of religious and spiritual communities,
major political and civil society leaders, and

- Make a speech calling for unity.

//HOW THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS PLAYED OUT//


8. (C) Tevoedjre decried the disorganization of the
municipal elections that created a mess deplored by all.
The announced results posed serious problems of credibility
in certain regions for which he could only hope that the
Supreme Court would take better action. To correct the
dysfunctional election system, all political parties should
insist on a permanent computerized electoral list and
reorganization of CENA, the National Election Commission.
Announcement of the election results coincided with the
funeral for the widely-respected Cardinal Bernardin Gantin
that tended to unite disparate elements in a period of
ditente. Tevoedjre hoped that the then upcoming CEN-SAD
Summit would have the same unifying affect (Ref C).


COTONOU 00000420 003.4 OF 004


//EXPECTATIONS//


9. (C) Tevoedjre concluded from his consultations that
there is room for compromise based on the necessity to
promote a climate of detente and to take into consideration
certain concerns and expectations. For example:

- Yayi could thank former Chiefs of State and leaders of
major political parties for supporting his decision to
rename the Cotonou International Airport in the Cardinal's
honor and take advantage of the more relaxed exchanges with
Soglo.

- Circumstances permitting, Yayi could take several other
initiatives, including:

-- launch the computerized electoral list and
distribute voter cards that also serve as ID cards

-- adopt and publish the decree applicable to the law
related to opposition parties

-- take decisive action on the Fagbohoun case

-- pursue a preferential dialogue with President Emile
Derlin Zinsou and establish a privileged relationship with
his UNDP Party. Careful approaches to UNDP and MADEP, with
Zinsou's support, could reap immediate political benefits.

-- G-13 would be receptive to an approach that does
not label it as part of the "opposition" but a particular
wing of the presidential majority. Implementing this
approach, in Tevoedjre's view, especially in Alibori, would
calm things down as would including G-13 in the next
government (the anticipated reshuffling of the cabinet to
include opposition ministers).

//OTHER PACIFYING INITIATIVES//


10. (C) Tevoedjre advised Yayi to:

- announce a decision to open up to competent and
experienced dignitaries and parliamentarians important
assignments (special missions) such as preparing groundwork
for important milestones (celebrations of 50 years of
independence and 20 years since the National Conference,
which coincide in 2010. Other such missions would be well
received in Tevoedjre's view.

- Firm public commitment on application of the
decentralization law is awaited, notably by the RB (Soglo's
party). With that, doors would open for cooperation with
the RB on other dossiers and plans. One criticism heard
more often is about weakness of the administration in
general and the lack of progress on decentralization in
particular.

- It is time for an efficient administration. The law
calls for 12 departments and 12 prefects and requisite
services. Make those reforms on an urgent basis.
Ministries need full staffing and efficient administrative
services. The MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is a
flagrant case (in point) and should be fixed. Now.

- Yayi should follow this proposed course of action,
announced in a solemn environment such as the National
Assembly by the end of June 2008 (date suggested by
Tevoedjre). Summarily, Tevoedjre said rapid action in key
areas would not compromise Yayi's authority and pose no
constraints on an open government, while integrating
political figures chosen by their proper groups. These key
action areas include: rapid movement on the Fagbohoun case,
restarting stalled arrangements with President Zinsou,
conciliatory approaches to Soglo on decentralization, and
conferring state missions on various dignitaries (read
political party leaders). These actions would avoid a
dangerously unpredictable government of national unity that
would require a common program and allow nominations over
which Yayi would have no control.


11. (C) Comment: Tevoedjre's analysis and recommendations
are sound, calling on Yayi to address lack of
administrative capacity and weak leadership in the

COTONOU 00000420 004.4 OF 004


ministries. To break the logjam in the National Assembly,
Yayi has no choice but to negotiate with renegade Deputies
from his coalition and those from opposition parties.
Successful action along Tevoedjre's suggested lines would
allow him to control the government while taking
constructive action to maintain Benin's democracy on
track. The trade-off is that he may be obliged to deal
directly with suspect politicians such as Fagbohoun, widely
considered to be corrupt and who now is out of jail and in
the Parliament. Yayi's salvation and the success of his
administration may remain largely with the Beninese people
who in March 2006 gave him their support in the
confrontation between a movement for position change versus
those in the previous GOB governments tainted with
mismanagement, corruption, and theft. Yayi's outreach to
donors, including travel to the US for a July 15-21 visit
(Ref B),is an attempt to shore-up his reformist policies
and obtain emergency food assistance in the face of
mounting political resistance at home.

BROWN