DENMARK: GOVERNMENT FIRM, PUBLIC NERVOUS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 000022

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2028
TAGS: MOPS NATO PGOV PREL PTER AF DA
SUBJECT: DENMARK: GOVERNMENT FIRM, PUBLIC NERVOUS ON
AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador James P. Cain, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Denmark's participation in ISAF enjoys broad
parliamentary support, and the Danish government is looking
to do more in Afghanistan. Danish public support regarding
NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, however, is slipping,
jarred by continuing casualties and the perception that other
Allies are unwilling to share the risks and dangers of
fighting in Afghanistan's restive south. Denmark's
government is moving to shore up public opinion to seal fault
lines in an otherwise solid parliamentary foundation. The USG
needs to acknowledge Denmark's contribution in Afghanistan,
while helping with the success stories Denmark needs to
convince an increasingly skeptical public that NATO can
prevail against the Taliban. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Denmark's robust engagement in Afghanistan has from
its beginning in 2002 enjoyed broad parliamentary support,
including among the largest Danish opposition parties.
Indeed, the Danish military presence in Afghanistan, part of
the British-led Task Force Helmand, increased from
approximately 290 soldiers to a total at the close of 2007 of
roughly 550 soldiers (250 of whom were redeployed from Iraq
when Denmark ended its military engagement there in summer
2007). Official Danish support has held even through nine
casualties in Afghanistan, a significant number for Denmark.
Five of those casualties have come in the last four months
alone, raising fears here that Denmark's growing presence in
Helmand is providing a larger and easier target for the
Taliban.


3. (C) Those casualties, and a spate of negative press
questioning strategy and the effectiveness of military and
civilian engagement, are eating into public support for
Denmark's participation in ISAF. A poll released in the
closing weeks of 2007 showed 48 percent of Danes want troops
brought home from Afghanistan, while 43 percent continue to
support engagement. The Danish Defense Command has also, for
the first time and within the last six months, encountered
some difficulty in attracting new recruits to serve in
Afghanistan.


4. (C) The Danish government says its commitment to
Afghanistan is firm. In fact, Danish officials tell us they
want to do more in Afghanistan. Danish MFA Security Policy
Department Chief Lone Wisborg insisted January 15 that
Denmark "has the momentum we need" to continue in
Afghanistan. Still, officials recognize the need to shore up
public support. Lisbet Zilmer-Johns, foreign policy advisor
to Danish PM Rasmussen, told us recently it was no mistake
the PM had focused on Afghanistan and Danish engagement there
in his annual televised New Year's address. Danish officials
note all of Denmark's political parties supporting the
Afghanistan deployment know they need to engage with an
increasingly skeptical Danish public. Wisborg said the Danish
MFA and MOD will organize an Afghanistan-themed conference in
late February, focusing on Denmark's contribution and
including some Afghan ministers. The Danish parliament will
hold public meetings in the spring to highlight the
importance of Danish support.


5. (C) The Danish government also recently released a
"Helmand Plan," a series of recommendations for increasing
the effectiveness of Danish reconstruction efforts in the
south and focusing on more effective military and civilian
cooperation. Wisborg explained that the Helmand Plan is part
of a broader Danish government policy review of its overall
engagement in Afghanistan. The plan has been well received
by Danish policy makers and politicians.


6. (C) Both MFA and PM's office note the "Helmand Plan" and
broader strategy review are designed not just to build public
support but to identify areas where Denmark could offer
additional contributions to ISAF. Wisborg and other contacts
in the Danish MOD tell us that Denmark is keeping an open
mind on OMLTs, but experts are concerned that Denmark's
limited resources and experienced military officers might be
spread too thin if asked to take on this additional mission.
Moreover, the MFA does not consider F-16s a "foreign policy
priority" for Denmark, but Wisborg acknowledged there are
some in the Danish MOD and Defense Command who feel
otherwise. MFA and the PM's office clearly prefer the focus
of any new Danish resources should be on training the Afghan
National Army.


7. (C) The Danish government is looking at other means to
strengthen public and parliamentary support. MFA is
gathering examples of reconstruction "success stories" that

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can be passed to politicians for use with wavering
constituents. MOD continues journalist visits to
Afghanistan. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller this
past week authored an op-ed piece arguing that success in
Afghanistan is not merely a question of Alliance solidarity,
but is also critical to Denmark's own security. Danish Chief
of Defense Staff Tim Sloth Joergensen recently stated
publicly that he believes Danish troops will be in
Afghanistan for at least another five years, as part of a
reconstruction effort that could still last another 10-15
years.


8. (C) The PM's office, meanwhile, is closely tracking public
opinion and its impact on the political coalition backing the
deployment. Here, said Zilmer-Johns, the government is
particularly focused on dual themes of security and
reconstruction, since different parties in the parliamentary
coalition supporting the ISAF mission could, if public
support continues to erode, split along these two lines.
Denmark's minority government depends on the rightist Danish
People's Party (DPP),and the DPP has been deeply skeptical
of civilian reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan,
emphasizing instead the importance of counter-terrorism and
combat missions directed at the Taliban.


9. (C) In contrast, the Danish Social Democratic Party,
Denmark's largest opposition party, supports the ISAF mission
but has frequently complained that the government has
neglected civilian reconstruction in Afghanistan.
Emphasizing that military and reconstruction efforts are
complementary and mutually reinforcing (stressing the
"comprehensive approach"),the Danish government remains
optimistic it can address the concerns of both groups. The
MFA has also begun to consult more frequently with the Social
Democrats on strategy, and the Danish parliament's Foreign
Policy Committee is considering a trip to Afghanistan later
this year.


10. (C) Comment: While official Danish support for
engagement in Afghanistan is built on a strong foundation of
cross-party support, we cannot take Denmark for granted. If
trends continue and the Danish public grows more insistent in
its questioning of strategy, we could see a split within
parliament. The USG can help by continuing to provide Danish
policy makers and politicians with success stories, and by
being careful not to inadvertently slight the Danish
contribution. The Danes are particularly grateful whenever
our senior policymakers note their contribution publicly, as
Secretary Gates did January 17, listing Denmark as one of the

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Allies the U.S. values most in southern Afghanistan. With
the resolute support of the Danish government and some help
from us in ensuring that the public knows its forces are both
needed and valued, we believe we can continue to count on
Denmark in Afghanistan.
CAIN