FEAR HINDERS MEDIA COVERAGE OF GUINEA MUTINY

C O N F I D E N T I A L CONAKRY 000385


STATE FOR AF/PD, AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPAO GV
SUBJECT: FEAR HINDERS MEDIA COVERAGE OF GUINEA MUTINY

Classified By: AMCLEAN FOR REASONS 1.4(b) AND (d)


1. (C) Summary: During the military mutiny of May 2007,
media coverage was more notable for its absence than anything
else. RTG, the state-run radio and television service, was
noteworthy for its initial lack of coverage of the mutiny and
inability to act without government approval, while private
radio acted very guardedly. This is a sign of the limits of
real freedom of the press in Guinea and is a result of
government harassment and intimidation of the media going
back to the strike of January-February 2007. End summary.

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State-Run Radio/Television
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2. (SBU) Journalists working for state-run RTG told PAS that
the events of May-June 2008 were "delicate" or "complicated,"
which helped explain the lack of initial coverage by the
network. They said they could not report on the mutiny
because they did not have access to good sources of
information involved in the mutiny, and could not get their
equipment to the source of the events. One journalist said
they did not know "who was who" or "who was doing what" and
this prevented them from covering the story.


3. (SBU) More tellingly, they said they were not told to
report on the events and that as a public service, this
prevented them from providing coverage. These journalists
noted that private radio stations did not have this hindrance
from above, which is why they were able to report on events
and stay out in front of the news stories. Only when
government officials started dealing with the situation, such
as Joint Chief of Staff General Diara Camara's meeting with
the mutineers and meetings involving President Conte, did RTG
begin covering events.


4. (C) The reporters also noted that it is risky to report
on the military, especially when there are problems in the
ranks. If something happened to the reporter, such as being
targeted for reprisals by the military, there would be no one
to whom they could complain. A senior person at RTG tried to
explain RTG's failure to cover the mutiny by saying that the
military has its own reporters to cover military issues.


5. (C) According to this same senior director, during the
mutiny, the mutineers came to RTG and demanded coverage, but
the Minister of Communication and New Information
Technologies, Issa Conde, was reluctant. The mutineers
pressured Conde into allowing a team of RTG journalists to go
to Camp Alpha Yaya. They reported on the hostage situation
involving General Sampil and his bodyguard. From then on RTG
covered all of the meetings between the mutineers and the GOG.

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Private Radio
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6. (SBU) Initially, private radio was no more daring in its
coverage of the mutiny than RTG. None of the private radio
stations reported on the events of May until one of the
presenters on Radio Familia FM started talking about the
mutiny during his call in show. It was during this show that
the mutineers contacted the station and asked to make a
statement. The mutineers also gave a press release to the
station.


7. (C) At first, the presenter was hesitant to address the
issue, but finally he conducted an interview with the leader
of the mutiny, Claude Pivi, aka Coplan. Prime Minister
Souare heard the interview and called the presenter to his
office to talk about Pivi. During this conversation, Pivi
called the presenter to demand why he was speaking to the PM.
The presenter passed the phone to the PM and he had a tense
conversation with Pivi. It was after this that the
government began negotiating with the mutineers. There were
no repercussions for the radio station for providing this
coverage.

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Comment
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8. (C) The sparse initial coverage of the mutiny shows that
there is as much fear of the military at RTG as at private
radio. RTG is not willing to act on controversial stories
involving the government or military unless given direction
from above, i.e. the Minister of Communication. In this
case, the Minister of Communication seemed as much at a loss
as anybody as to how to handle the coverage, did not provide
strong guidance to RTG and did not inform them to cover the
mutiny, which prevented them from doing so.


9. (C) Private radio, in particular Radio Familia FM, was
more willing to risk coverage of the mutiny, which probably
helped encourage dialogue between the mutineers and the
government. Private radio is still suffering the chilling
effect of the January-February 2007 strike, when one radio
station, Radio FM Liberte, was ransacked by soldiers and
Radio Familia FM was threatened with similar treatment if
they didn't go off the air. Both stations had been doing
"man on the street" live interviews during altercations
between the military and civilians. In addition, the CNC,
the government media regulator, suspended a newspaper in
October 2007 after they reported that soldiers were going to
demonstrate if they did not receive unpaid back wages.


10. (C) Despite the risks, private radio played a positive
role in eventually reporting on the mutiny and allowing the
mutineers to vent their grievances on air. This gave the
mutineers an outlet that they undoubtedly would never have
had with RTG. Radio Familia FM also played an important role
in getting the mutineers and the government to talk, and in
fact the first known conversation between the Prime Minister
and Claude Pivi happened during the above mentioned meeting
in the PM's office with the Familia reporter.


11. (C) During the mutiny, the GOG proved themselves once
again inept at speaking to the media and getting a message
out to the people. However, once they started speaking to
the media, starting with a statement read by General Camara,
the situation started calming down. It should be noted that
General Camara participated in media training for military
leaders organized by the Defense Attache in June 2007. Post
is looking into other options to provide training to
government officials to improve their communication with the
public. End comment.


CARTER